“Is Schuerholz running the club or are Hart and Coppolella running it?”

In an article for The Athletic, Ken Rosenthal points to possible dissension within the Atlanta Braves front office. The article is behind a paywall so I won't quote it word-for-word, but the general perception is that Braves general manager John Coppolella and John Hart, the President of Baseball Operations, could be in a bit of a power struggle with Team Vice Chairman - and former GM and Team President - John Schuerholz. Rosenthal cites unnamed sources in the organization that suggest a number of internal shuffling of Schuerholz hires like Roy Clark and Dave Trembley as a possible sign that Coppy is either trying to squash dissent in the front office or at least see how many changes they can push past Schuerholz, who seemingly retains a good amount of team control.

One unnamed team official offers this particularly worrisome quote:

“It’s a power struggle over who is running the club...is John Schuerholz running the club or are John Hart and John Coppolella running it?”

If true...this is a bad sign for the Braves' organization. Worse - it's nothing new.

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It can be difficult for guys who are used to calling the shots to move to the side so that new decision makers are given the proper autonomy to lead an organization. That seems to run especially true for Schuerholz, who spent nine seasons at the helm of the Royals before 17 years as the Braves general manager. Rather than retire at the age of 67 when he finally moved aside for Frank Wren after the 2007 season, Schuerholz simply moved to a different position as the Team President. For an additional eight years, he held that spot before being promoted (?) to his new position of Team Vice Chairman in March of last season. The new role was created specifically for Schuerholz to keep him in the loop, but also keep him at an arm's reach as Schuerholz entered his late 70's.

It was supposed to be the Hart/Coppy show for the Braves with Hart providing leadership while Coppy handled the day-to-day grind that would likely make the young general manager lose his hair - if he had any to speak of, that is. However, things don't appear to have actually moved in that direction. And again, this is really nothing new for Schuerholz and "The Braves Way" culture, which has a stranglehold on the Braves' decision-making.

When Schuerholz moved up to the Team President role, he handpicked his successor in Frank Wren. Despite a contentious previous run as the Orioles' GM, Wren was lauded for his baseball mind and had spent a number of years providing support to Schuerholz in an assistant role. You couldn't blame the Braves for valuing consistency over a new direction of the franchise which had run off division title after division title from 1991 to 2005. The team still had Chipper Jones, John Smoltz, and Bobby Cox in the fold along with a young nucleus led by Brian McCann and Jeff Francoeur. Wren was given the keys, but Schuerholz's watchful eye was never far away.

According to many reports, Wren was difficult to work with and the culture shock soon grew hard on longtime Braves employees. Many, like Roy Clark, left the organization in droves. The most high profile defection would have been Cox himself, who nearly quit the Braves during their first spring training with Wren in charge. It took Schuerholz smoothing things over to keep the future Hall of Fame manager in charge. Major league managers with the kind of pull Cox had have often used the threat of their resignations to enact change. It took Jim Leyland blowing up and threatening to leave to avoid a Barry Bonds-to-the-Braves trade in March of 1992. Cox, known for a short temper, was agitated by what he felt was a micro manager trying to butt his nose where it didn't belong. Of course, considering that Wren joined the Braves eight years before becoming its general manager, why was his style such a surprise for so many people in the organization?

Despite the problems, the two put their differences aside and Wren eventually gave Cox a team that was playoff worthy in Cox's final year and third year with Wren calling the shots. Moving forward, whether Wren made the choice of who replaced Cox is debatable. Considering how much dissension would develop between Wren and Fredi Gonzalez, I tend to believe it wasn't Wren's choice - or at least it wasn't his choice alone. Instead, Schuerholz and Cox intervened with Cox essentially afforded the opportunity to select his successor in Gonzalez. Just 48 hours after Cox's final game as Braves' manager, the team had already named a new manager without even pretending to perform a search. Both the Schuerholz-to-Wren transition and the Cox-to-Gonzalez one were reflective more of a college football team replacing coaches with "coach-in-waiting" picks rather than a professional team seek out the best possible candidates available.

Wren and Gonzalez were not a good mix. The team that Wren wanted to build was one of power and pitching. The team Gonzalez wanted to coach was more traditional - one that put down bunts and put the ball in play. This was never more evident than in 2013 when Wren built the All-or-Nothing Braves, a team capable of big home runs and offense - and a lot of strikeouts. This was simply not the kind of team Gonzalez ever felt comfortable with. The two forces were never meant to co-exist and as the Braves collapsed in 2014, Wren wanted to fire Gonzalez for a manager better suited to take the young-and-talented mix he had built into contention for 2015. It was Cox who stepped in and saved the job of his handpicked successor by appealing to Schuerholz. Instead, it was Wren that fired.

What happened next was another sign that the Braves' organization was not too interested in radical change. Instead, they sought reverting back to "The Braves Way," something they felt Wren was never interested in following. Before announcing John Hart as the future choice to lead the Braves, the organization staged a GM search with Cox, Hart, and Schuerholz as the search team. It was a sham as Schuerholz and Cox simply convinced Hart to take the job full-time while they organized a power-sharing agreement with John Coppolella. The system was simple. Hart would take the hit as the organization blew the team up. Gone would be popular members of the Braves like Jason Heyward, Justin Upton, Evan Gattis, and Craig Kimbrel. The deals would have Hart's name on it, allowing the Braves to protect Coppy, who was the guy actually putting the trades together for Hart to sign off on. It was a convoluted process from the beginning.

Even before announcing the Hart/Coppy grouping, the Braves began to reshape the front office with Schuerholz calling the shots. He brought Roy Clark back into the mix, named Clark disciple Brian Bridges as scouting director, and Dave Trembley as the Farm Director. And frankly, the process began the year before with hires that were largely made without Wren's input the previous winter (including Hart as a senior adviser and Rick Williams as a special assistant to the GM). Once again, Schuerholz was putting his guys into place, which cuts the legs out from a GM making similar decisions.

All the while, the Braves kept Gonzalez at the helm. Well, of course, they did. They had Cox on the search team after all. It would take a truly rotten start to the 2016 team to finally stain Gonzalez enough to get rid of him. The Braves named long-term organizational filler Brian Snitker as his replacement. At the end of 2016, Snitker seemed like a longshot to return despite a solid end to the 2016 season. The Braves were valuing heavyweights like Ron Washington and Bud Black and Snitker just seemed overmatched. He also seemed like a questionable fit with Coppolella, who took a more innovative and nuanced approached to baseball than a traditionalist like Snitker (or Washington and Black for that matter). Instead of a more exciting younger hire, Snitker was promoted to full-time manager and Washington was brought on for added experience.

But the team only gave Snitker one year. It screamed of compromise, but why? Freddie Freeman had joined the ranks of baseball's elite in 2016 while dynamic young stars like Dansby Swanson, Ozzie Albies, and Sean Newcomb were either already in the majors or very close. The Braves seemed on the rise and the farm system was only getting better. The job had to be enticing with a new park, a winning tradition, and so many pieces in place. Why had the Braves settled for an organizational lifer as their manager? Why had they been so focused on guys like Black and Washington over younger and hungrier - not to mention better fits - like Dave Martinez, the longtime second-in-command under Joe Maddon? None of it made much sense.

Perhaps today's article by Rosenthal speaks to why these strange decisions have been made. For all of his flaws, could you really blame Wren for wanting to run the organization the way he wanted? For wanting the manager he wanted? For wanting to be the general manager the way he wanted to be a general manager? I would say no.

Three years later, many of the same figures are in place in high-profile or, at least, influential positions. Could we really blame Coppy for wanting more of an active role in deciding the makeup of the Braves front office - decisions he was not allowed the luxury of making after Wren's sacking in 2014? And if there is any truth to the idea that Coppy is testing the waters, what might come next? Could the Braves scrub most of the coaching staff, including its beleaguered manager, and start anew in 2018?

And shouldn't that be his decision anyway? After all, when the 2015 season concluded, the Braves elevated Coppolella to the general manager position. Isn't it about time the organization give him the responsibilities it once handed Schuerholz so willingly?

A lot of this is perception, I admit. We are not privy to the closed door meetings taking place. Perhaps Schuerholz has voluntarily moved to the side while telling his former pupil to, "call if you ever need to bounce ideas off someone." Maybe the article over-exaggerates the idea that there is any sort of power struggle between the two camps. I would like to believe that is the case, but we've seen this script before. Again, Wren had many flaws and made a number of poor decisions along the way. In no way am I suggesting that his firing wasn't appropriate. Nevertheless, the Braves did him few favors by micromanaging him nearly as much as he attempted to micromanage the organization. It would be a shame for them to do the same to such a capable GM in Coppolella.

After all, it's his team now.

Right?

Baseball's Weirdest Rule 5 Situation

What better way to explain service time than with the hottest prospect to come through the Braves system since Jason Heyward? For that matter, what better way to explain arbitration than with the strangest case that we've seen over the last number of years?

In professional baseball, you earn two different kinds of "time." The one that everyone gets from a rookie-league ballplayer to R.A. Dickey relates to how long you have been a professional. This is especially important when it comes to things like the Rule 5 draft and minor league free agency. For instance, after seven seasons in the minors, you can become a minor league free agent. Oddly, we call them "six-year minor league free agents" despite needing seven years. Baseball is strange.

The other kind of time a player earns - which is far more important to this article - is service time. This refers to each day spent in the major leagues. Under the new CBA, there are 187 days to fit in a 162-game schedule. However, you are still credited with a day of service time during those off days. In fact, a full season is referred to as 172 days in the major leagues - which did not change in the CBA despite the added days to the MLB calendar year. Think of this way - as long as a player didn't use an option that season (i.e. 20 days in the minors), he likely earned a year of service time if he was with the team in April.

You receive service time while on the active roster, the disabled list, the restricted (or suspended) list, and...well...any list. As long as you haven't been optioned to the minors, your service time is climbing. Hence why some teams have tried to play the system against itself. In 2015, the Chicago Cubs waited exactly 13 days to call up Kris Bryant. Under the previous CBA, there were 184 days in a calendar season. As Bryant was not on the 40-man roster to begin the season, by pushing his debut off nearly two weeks, the 2015 Rookie of the Year received 171 days of service time in 2015. That's a day short of a full season. Chicago said all the right things about Bryant needing to work on some parts of his game, but the decision was made with the 2021 season in mind. Had the Cubs opened the season with Bryant on the major league roster, he would have become a free agent after 2020 as players with six years of service time in the majors at the end of any given season can become free agents should they not be signed beyond that season. Believing it was more beneficial to them to keep him in the minors, they did just that.

Should the Braves follow suit with Ronald Acuna? There is a lot of talk about bringing him up in September and why not? Over three stops from High-A ball to Triple-A, Acuna has hit .320/.374/.539 with 28 doubles, eight triples, 20 homers, and 37 steals. His numbers have improved at each stop and despite being about eight years younger than the International League, Acuna has an OPS of 1.021 with Gwinnett over 34 games. He's not only the top prospect in the Braves' system but has a solid claim to the best prospect in baseball and he's just 19 years-old.

Bringing him up now would sacrifice a potential extra year of team control. There are other concerns, but provided Acuna stays in the majors, he would reach free agency after 2023. If the Braves waited until sometime in late April of next season to bring Acuna up, they would follow the Bryant route and gain an extra year of team control while merely sacrificing a few weeks of the 2018 season with their top prospect in Triple-A. The Braves have historically not concerned themselves with that, though. I mentioned Heyward and he opened his rookie season in the starting lineup on opening day. By that September, Freddie Freeman joined the team for a cup of coffee. Last August, Dansby Swanson was surprisingly brought to the majors, which started his clock early. In fact, the last time I remember the Braves really concerning themselves with service time came in 2009.

Tommy Hanson was absolutely dominant with Myrtle Beach and Mississippi in 2008 as a 21-year-old. He finished the season by crushing the Arizona Fall League with a 0.63 ERA over 28.2 innings and 49 strikeouts. Over 14.2 innings the following spring, Hanson had a 2.45 ERA with 14 strikeouts. But it was Jo-Jo Reyes who was named the fifth starter. Predictably, he failed and in mid-May, the Braves made a change. Hanson had a 1.70 ERA and 64 strikeouts in 47.2 ING over his first eight starts, but the Braves passed on bringing him up from Gwinnett. They instead called on Kris Medlen, who had been nearly as excellent but wasn't considered a top prospect. Medlen would get three starts until June 7, when the Braves finally brought up Hanson.

All of this was done for one reason - arbitration. Had the Braves opened the season with Hanson as the fifth starter, not only would he have gotten to free agency a season quicker, he would have gotten paid a lot quicker as well. Players become arbitration-eligible after three seasons on a MLB roster. The Braves passed and continued to pass even after gaining the extra year of team control. That was done to get him past the expected date for Super 2 arbitration-eligible players. Super 2 refers to players with two years of service time plus a lot more. Basically, you group all of the players with more than two years of service time, but less than three years in a given season. You take the top 22% of that list and it gives you a threshold. Anyone above that threshold reaches arbitration early. That threshold differs, but it typically lands somewhere in the 2 years and 120-to-150 days area. Remember Bryant from earlier? Despite the fact that the Cubs bought an extra year before free agency, he will still reach salary arbitration this year. And the three years after it. Hence why Super 2 guys can get really expensive. Since arbitration-eligible players rarely fail to receive a nice bump in pay, it gets pretty costly the third time around even for just good players. Add a fourth year and players often are getting plenty of bank. One such player for the Braves this offseason will be Mike Foltynewicz, who will likely have 2 years and 163 days of service time. While the Super 2 cutoff hasn't been decided for 2017, it's unlikely to be higher than 163 days.

The entire reason I bring up service time and arbitration today is related to Dan Winkler. Back in December of 2014, the Braves selected Winkler in the Rule 5 draft. They knew he would miss of the next season after having Tommy John surgery. When a Rule 5 player is injured and misses time the next season, they still have to log at least 90 days on the active roster to fulfill their Rule 5 eligibility. If they fail to reach 90 days in their first season as a Rule 5 guy, they must finish off the remaining time the next season before being eligible to be optioned to the minors. In Winkler's case, as we know, it gets complicated.

Winkler was activated off the DL in 2015 on September 10. Between that day and the end of the season, he logged 24 days on the active roster. The following season, he was on the active roster for eight days before fracturing his elbow. In two seasons, he had 32 days of service time - or nearly two months short of what he would need to satisfy the Rule 5 requirement of 90 days.

The right-hander is currently on his second rehab assignment this season, which has required approval because pitchers only receive 30 days on rehab assignments. Winkler's most recent rehab assignment began 12 days ago. If he has been granted a second rehab assignment of 30 days, the Braves would be able to keep him in the minors until September 1 without having to make a move with the current roster. The season runs through October 1, which would get Winkler to 31 days of active roster time for this season and 55 overall. That leaves an additional 35 days of active roster time he would need to reach in 2018 to satisfy his Rule 5 requirements.

But...he'll also be arbitration-eligible. Yep, even though Winkler has thrown four innings in the majors, he'd be eligible for arbitration even if he went back on the DL for the rest of the year. Earlier, I said players get credit for service time while on the DL. Even though Winkler has pitched 13 times this season in the minors, it's all came under rehab assignments, which means he's still on the major league DL. That would mean Winkler would reach 172 days of service time this season on or about September 15, which would give him three years of service time in the major leagues.

But why stop this extra-strength convoluted exercise now? Let's go over the Braves' options.

I don't remember a case even close to this so this is my best-educated guess.

The Braves could non-tender Winkler, but as far as I know it, non-tender players become official in early December. That might be longer than the Braves would like to go with Winkler taking up space on their roster if they already plan on getting rid of him.

Atlanta could outright Winkler to the minors, but there are a few hang-ups there as well. One, to get him off the 40-man roster, they would need to waive him, offer him to the rest of the league, and, provided he passed through waivers, offer him back to the Rockies. If the other 29 teams passed, the Braves could attempt to outright him to the minors, but as an arbitration-eligible player, Winkler would have the right to elect free agency. As a free agent, the Braves could still try to sign him as a minor league free agent if they so wanted. For that matter, they could simplify the process and release Winkler and then sign him. If he accepted an assignment to the minors after being outrighted or signed as a minor league free agent and either came before the Rule 5 draft, he'd actually be eligible in the 2018 Rule 5 draft.

The Braves could also elect to offer arbitration. After all, how much could Winkler ask for and what could his agent argue? That he's been a good patient? For his part, Winkler has looked much sharper since beginning another rehab stint with Gwinnett and was very impressive to open last season. As he is unlikely to receive significantly more than the major league minimum through arbitration, he still could be a good bet to receive an arbitration tender.

Fortunately, few cases are crazier than Winkler and most are much simpler. Joining Winkler and Foltynewicz among this year's arbitration-eligible players for the first time will be Sam Freeman, Danny Santana, and Jace Peterson. Another player, Jose Ramirez, seems like a good bet to also reach Super 2 status. Ian Krol, Rex Brothers, Arodys Vizcaino, and Matt Adams will also be arbitration-eligible. Much of this group seems likely to receive a non-tender - including Winkler. Should that happen, the next team won't even have to worry about Rule 5 eligibility with Winkler. That should keep the complications down to a minimal.

Saturday Stats Pack: Flowers, Stolen Bases, Bullpen, Sims

Unlike last season where I posted two separate entries, I'm going to try to do one Saturday Stats Pack with both major league and minor league notable stats. So, without too much stalling, here is this week's edition.

Tyler Flowers (By Editosaurus (Own work) [CC0],
via Wikimedia Commons)

.344 wOBA

Over the last two seasons, only six catchers have stepped into the batter's box at least 350 times and have a better weighted on-base average than Tyler Flowers. They include the current elite of the elite (Buster Posey, Jonathan Lucroy), the young Willson Contreras, a career-year from Wilson Ramos, the impressive Yasmani Grandal, and a part-time backstop in Evan Gattis. This is a surprise for White Sox fans, who saw Flowers post a wOBA of almost a hundred points lower during nearly 1400 PA playing in the black-and-white. To put it in simple terms, Flowers is simply making better contact. While with the White Sox, 20% of the balls he hit were given a soft-contact classification. There is a correlation between a high Soft% and a lower BABIP. Unsurprisingly, Flowers' BABIP has surged since coming to the Braves as he's lowered his Soft% to 13.4%. Meanwhile, his Hard-Hit rate has climbed 12 points. No catcher since 2016 can match it. Sure, there do remain sample size concerns here, but Flowers is winning over doubters every week that he continues to produce.

82.4%

So far, the Braves are 14-for-17 in stolen bases - a success rate of 82.4%. This would be some kind of franchise record. Only once in franchise history have the Braves reached the 80% threshold. That came in 1941 when the Braves swiped 61-of-76, good for an 80.3% rate. The Braves' best rate since moving to Atlanta came in 2012 when the Michael Bourn-Jason Heyward-Martin Prado outfield helped the Braves steal a shade under 76% of their attempts. Last year, they only stole 69%, which is still nice, I hear.

62.2 Innings

For all of the vitriol the Braves bullpen has received - and sometimes deserves - Brian Snitker has relied on his relievers for the third-fewest innings of any bullpen in baseball. Compared to the Reds, the Braves have needed 35.1 fewer innings from their relievers. To be fair, though...part of that accomplishment is because Atlanta has played, along with a few other teams, the fewest games in baseball - though the Reds have played just two more. Atlanta's starters have thrown 123 innings, good for 23rd.

What Are We, Anyway?

After Roger McDowell was let go, I wondered if it would alter how the Braves tried to pitch. McDowell was a guy who stressed the importance of pitching low and getting grounders. So far, the Braves pitching staff doesn't seem to be doing anything at a rate that suggests any kind of philosophy. Their strikeout rate is fourth worst, their walk rate is 11th worst, and only six teams induce fewer grounders. Their HR/FB rate is in the middle of the pact. However...they do one thing that stands out. 22% of the balls that batters connect on are rated as softly hit. This may be due, in part, because only the Cubs have a worse fastball velocity than the Braves. Moving forward, it will be interesting to see if anything substantial comes from a Chuck Hernandez-led pitching staff like the McDowell years.

Rick Briggs (CC by 2.0) via Flickr

Minor League Stats of Interest...Gwinnett - 2.3 BB/9

There's nothing too exciting about the walk rate above until you bring it into context. Since 2015, Lucas Sims' walks per nine innings have ranged from 5.2 and 5.9. Before that, he kept it around 3.5 BB/9 - which isn't great, but certainly something that can be worked around as a starting prospect. Early on this season, we have seen a possible return to the pre-2015 version of Sims. In 23.2 innings, Sims has walked just six. Sims has always had the stuff and typically carries a low H/9 as a result. Now, he's keeping batters off base, though the BABIP is artificially too low and will climb. The Sims of 2017 is no longer a top prospect. Outfield Fly Rule did a composite list of his rating according to Braves' top prospect lists and he landed #21 - a bit lower than my ranking of #18. However, if he continues to pitch like the top-flight prospect he once was, it's only a matter of time until he gets a shot to show what he has.

Mississippi - 38.4%

Travis Demeritte has routinely seen his prospect status hurt by his strikeout rate. It was 33% last season and 35% the season before. The offensive skills are intriguing, but the strikeouts are an issue. And, to be frank, a strikeout rate of 38.4% is very bad. The thing is...that rate is about 20% higher than Demeritte's, who has only struck out in 18% of his plate appearances this year. Instead, the 38.4% strikeout rate belongs to Connor Lien. The defensively minded outfielder became a bit of a prospect back in 2015 when he slashed .285/.347/.415 at high-A ball with a plethora of big defensive plays, but injuries limited him to just 64 games when he played at Double-A last season. So far this season, he's put a clinic on how not to reclaim your prospect status. Lien has hit four homers and stolen five bases - trends that could end with season stats that look rather solid. But at a near 40% strikeout rate (compared to a near 5% walk rate), he'll be in line for some problematic times.

Florida - 7.20 ERA, but Trending Up

Touki Toussaint is still a raw pitcher facing hitters that are older and more experienced than he is. He's trying to solve high-A ball for the first time and is still over a month away from turning 21. You might look at his 7.20 ERA and say "he's just not ready for the Florida State League." I, on the other hand, look at his K/BB rate and start to get excited. Like Lucas Sims, Toussaint's stuff is off the charts. In fact, his stuff is as good as anyone's in minor league baseball. What talent evaluators have doubts about are his ability to harness and control that stuff. He's been hit hard so far this season, but his 3.8 K/BB rate tells me he might be "getting it" a bit more. Consider that his career rate is 1.75 strikeouts per walk. Don't be discouraged if you see that ERA. Something good might just be happening here.

Rome - Waves Upon Waves

We've heard how John Coppolella and company want to build a farm system that will send prospects to the majors in waves. After last season's Rome pitching staff that included three former first round picks led the team to a league title, the next wave has landed in Rome and the South Atlantic League has turned into their playground. In 22 games, the staff has a 2.28 ERA. Starters Ian Anderson (1.93 ERA), Joey Wentz (2.70), and Bryse Wilson (2.55) were all plucked out of the first-thru-fourth rounds last year and each has been excellent. Relievers Thomas Burrows, Jon Kennedy, and Matt Custred each have ERAs under 1.00. As a staff, Rome has a K/9 of 9.7 per nine and have surrendered just four homers. It's early, but it looks like Rome will be a favorite to repeat in the South Atlantic League.

Thursday Throwback - Reed Johnson

Sometimes, moves just don't pan out like they ought to. That was the case of the 2012 midseason trade that sent Reed Johnson, along with Paul Maholm, to the Braves. The trade was born out of a move that didn't happen and ultimately, failed to deliver despite looking like a good deal on paper for Frank Wren. Even when Wren made the right move, it just didn't seem to work.

But long before that trade, Reed Johnson was born a few weeks before Christmas in 1976. A product of Riverside, California, Johnson was a star in both baseball and soccer in high school. His success there landed him a coveted scholarship opportunity with Cal-State Fullerton, where he was an Academic All-American and posted strong offensive numbers as a catalyst for the Titans' offense. Undrafted out of high school, Johnson played well enough during his college years to move into the 17th round of the draft, which is where the Blue Jays took him. The '99 draft wasn't very good for the Jays. They took Alex Rios with their first round pick and he did develop into a decent player, but only three other players made it to the majors, including Johnson, the second-best player taken that year by Toronto.

After a summer of adjusting to pro ball, Johnson became an overnight prospect in 2000. He spent the year at two different A-ball stops and slashed .298/.420/.479, flashing plus-plus plate discipline and enough power and speed to be a very intriguing prospect. In 2001, this time at Double-A, Johnson became a name to watch. Spending the year with the Tennessee Smokies, Johnson slashed .314/.384/.451. The walk total was a bit of a letdown, but Johnson filled out his baseball card with 29 doubles, four triples, 13 homers, and 42 steals. The Southern League All-Star looked like he was a great late-round find for the Blue Jays and a player that could help them very soon.

After missing most of 2002 with injury, Johnson worked his way into the picture for the big league club in 2003. After opening the year in the minors, Johnson would soon establish himself as a major league performer with a strong summer. In 114 games in the majors, Johnson hit .294 with 10 homers and a .353 on-base percentage. The Jays had opened the year with super sub Frank Catalanotto in right field, but an injury to Shannon Stewart opened left for Catalanotto and allowed Johnson to slide into right field. Bobby Kielty would later join the team, cutting into Johnson's playing time, but Johnson proved his worth by being the Blue Jays' most used leadoff hitter.

For the next two years, Johnson was the regular left fielder for the Jays and was unspectacular in his job before a breakout 2006 campaign saw Johnson hit .319/.390/.479 with 12 homers. He led the AL in getting hit by a pitch that season as well. However, his success was short-lived. During an injury-marred 2007 season, he hit just .236 over 79 games. Johnson struggled the next spring as well and with the Jays feeling a roster crush, Toronto surprisingly released Johnson as spring training was nearing its end. The five-year pro would not remain available for long as he landed with the Cubs. A bench bat and platoon player, Johnson was a perfect fit in Chicago. He OPS'd .778 his first season with the Cubbies before slashing .255/.330/.412 during an injury-shortened 2009 season.

Johnson took his talents out west and played for the Dodgers in 2010, which wasn't much of a trip from the city he was born (Riverside). He struggled with in Los Angeles, though, and lasted just one year before returning to the Cubs in 2011. Like he had never left, his success returned.

That brings us to the 2012 season. The Cubs were in the first year of their rebuild under Theo Epstein. The former Red Sox mastermind had just hired Jed Hoyer to be their General Manager. That season, the Cubs were breaking in young Anthony Rizzo at first base (who, interestingly enough, Hoyer had dealt to the Cubs as the Padres' GM) and Chicago was trying to add young talent to the mix to build what eventually would become a winner. Meanwhile, the Atlanta Braves were trying to get back to the playoffs after their 2011 collapse during then-manager Fredi Gonzalez's first year at the helm. The Cubs and Braves seemed like a perfect match and a week before the trading deadline, a deal seemed imminent. However, neither Johnson, nor lefthander Paul Maholm, were part of it.

Atlanta was desperate to add a starter to their team that they could count on. With Jair Jurrjens looking like a lost cause, the Braves had turned to Ben Sheets. 25 year-old Tommy Hanson was struggling and Brandon Beachy, also 25, had made just 13 starts before going down with injury. They still had Tim Hudson while Mike Minor was improving, as a team with playoff aspirations, Atlanta did not have the kind of rotation that would be able to compete against the big boys of the National League. Atlanta thought they had found their man in Ryan Dempster. The former closer had been excellent to begin 2012 with a 2.11 ERA through his first 15 starts. While Dempster wasn't an ace, he was the kind of bulldog starter that gave his manager and general manager a bit more confidence than hoping Sheets could make it through the summer or that Hanson could turn the corner.

Wren and Hoyer found the right mix of players that would make the deal happen. Atlanta would send young Randall Delgado to the Cubs, which would finally separate the four pitchers of the future (Minor, Delgado, Julio Teheran, and Arodys Vizcaino). Another prospect would head to Chicago as well and the Braves would get Dempster. One little problem, though. With over 14 years of experience, including eight full seasons with the Cubs, Dempster qualified as a 10-5 player and could nix any deal. Dempster was open to a trade, but preferred to head out west where he could join his good buddy Ted Lilly and the Dodgers. While Dempster weighed his options - and definitely held out hope for a move to the Dodgers - the Braves grew agitated. All the perimeters were agreed upon and the deal had been leaked out to the public. Wren set a deadline for Dempster, but the right-hander refused to make a decision as he held out hope Los Angeles would step up. Atlanta ultimately took themselves out of the process rather than watch Dempster play the part of the girl with a date to the Prom all lined up, but is still hoping to go with the high school quarterback rather than the dude that actually wants to be with her. Not that I know anything about that...

The Braves still wanted a pitcher, but could not find a Dempster-like arm on the trade market. Instead, they called Hoyer up and asked about Maholm. A long time Pirate, Maholm had joined the Cubs the previous offseason and he was also having a good season. Not a great one like Dempster, but would give the Braves a serviceable left-hand arm for their rotation. Meanwhile, the Braves did find their front-of-the-rotation arm by moving Kris Medlen into the rotation.  Coming along for the ride with Maholm and some bags of cash was Johnson. The Braves were stacked in the outfield with rookie Jason Heyward joining Michael Bourn and Martin Prado, but the prospect of adding a right-handed bat like Johnson to pair with Eric Hinske coming off the bench was a great fit. The Braves still broke up their four previously untouchable arms by sending Arodys Vizcaino to the Cubs in the deal along with reliever Jaye Chapman. Vizcaino was on the mend after having Tommy John surgery that spring.

Johnson got into 43 games down the stretch for the Braves and hit .270. He would get fairly regular time with Prado moving all over the field and helped to give the Braves their first real backup option to Bourn during the 2012 season. Both Prado and Bourn would be gone the next winter and would be replaced by Justin and Melvin "B.J" Upton Jr. Johnson, a free agent, liked Atlanta enough to return for a second year. He missed all of August with Achilles tendinitis, but missed even more time because Johnson was not a regular in the mix for the Braves even with the failures of the elder Upton. Instead, Johnson took a back seat to Jordan Schafer, who had returned after being claimed on waivers, and rookie Evan Gattis, who occasionally played left field to get his bat into the lineup more often. Johnson received five fewer plate appearances than Gerald Laird during the 2013 season and Johnson struggled to connect the bat to the ball with any authority.

During his year-and-a-half with the Braves, Johnson hit .256/.308/.332 with one homer, a pinch-hit two-run shot off former Braves farmhand Todd Redmond - then a member of Johnson's first team, the Jays. Johnson would struggle during a 2014 season spent as a reserve in Miami and continued his tour through the NL East with a stop in Washington next. A torn tendon in his left calf limited him to just 17 games with the Nats. He returned to DC the following year, but failed to make the roster coming out of camp last spring. I do not know if he's given up the dream of playing baseball again or not, but at 40 years-old, it seems unlikely that he'll continue his career.

His time with the Braves was short and ultimately uneventful. In the end, like many of Wren's deals, it just never worked like it should have. Of course, the Braves ended up re-acquiring Arodys Vizcaino from this deal so it cost precious little for Atlanta - even if it wasn't the deal they wanted.

Previous Throwbacks...
Mike Mordecai (1994-97)
David Ross (2009-12)
Ryan Langerhans (2002-03, 2005-07)

...or view ALL of them.

Ender Inciarte Makes Atlanta his Long-Term Home

Arturo Pardavila III on Flickr (Original version)
UCinternational (Crop) (CC 2.0) via Wikipedia Commons

Two days before Christmas, Ender Inciarte received a nice Christmas present. Or, maybe it was the other way around? Maybe Mom was right when she told me that giving a gift was a present in its own right.

The Braves and their new center fielder agreed upon a five-year contract worth at least $30.525 million. A sixth season option would increase the overall value of the deal to $38.5 million. Inciarte was eligible for arbitration for the first time this offseason and as a Super 2 player, he would have been arbitration-eligible for three more years. In essence, the Braves bought out at least one of his free agent years and if they exercise his option, they will have the defensive wonder through his Age-31 season.

While this contract cannot possibly be reasonably argued against, there are questions about Inciarte that remain valid despite a solid first year in Atlanta. Notably, he lacks any real defining skill offensively. While this is completely true, Inciarte makes the most of his skillset and has shown improvement as he's matured into a more seasoned veteran. Last year, he increased his walk rate 3% upon the previous year. He improved his contact rate while doing it, which meant he simply swung the bat less - a sign of a better eye. He lowered his groundball rate and increased his line drive percentage. That leads to more hits.

However, no matter what Inciarte does at the plate, in a good year, he'll merely rise to above average with the bat when league and park factors are weighed. What earned him a contract was his superb base running and defense. First, let's go over the base running because his defense is already well renowned.

Base running is one of those things that can be difficult to quantify and even harder to know how to quantify. Our old method was limited to stolen base numbers. If Player A was successful in, say, 80% of his stolen base attempts, he was a good base runner. However, now, we can better judge base running through metrics like BsR and some of the other numbers we can find at Baseball-Reference.

For instance, B-R keeps track of how many times a runner took the extra base. In his two years with the Diamondbacks, Inciarte advanced an extra base 29% and 40% of the time. The latter is roughly the major league average. In his first season with the Braves, 52% of the time, he took an extra base by going to first-to-third on a single or first-to-home on a double. While not in the same company as some of the elite speedsters and base runners in the game, it was a solid improvement for Inciarte. He was also successful in 70% of his stolen base attempts, which is close to league average.

Fangraphs paints an even rosier picture of Inciarte's base running prowess. With a 4.3 grade, Inciarte finished 2016 as the 21st best base runner in baseball. When you take into account the last two seasons, Inciarte moves up a bit to 16th best with a 7.6 overall grade. To put that into perspective for Braves fans, one guy we loved to watch on the base paths was Jason Heyward. Over the last two years, Heyward has a grade of 9.0 - ninth in baseball.

When it comes to defense, Inciarte is one of the five-best center fielders in baseball and you might be able to lower that number to three or four-best. Unfortunately, because he played a lot of left and right with the D'Backs, he doesn't rank very highly when you judge multiple seasons in regards to center fielder numbers. However, in the context of 2016, there is Kevin Pillar, Billy Hamilton, Inciarte, and a little bit of space before Jackie Bradley Jr. While he did play some left field and missed time with an injury, Inciarte still finished third in UZR/150, tied for second in rPM (Plus Minus Runs Saved), fourth in rARM (Outfield Arm Runs Saved), and third in DRS. Inside Edge ranks him a bit below Pillar and Hamilton as far as range goes and he doesn't make many remote or unlikely players, but Inciarte is as good as it gets when it comes to borderline, likely, and almost certain plays.

Here is a couple of things to keep in mind. What does Inciarte's contract extension mean for Mallex Smith? Probably not good things. To play both Inciarte and Smith, the Braves would be committing to two positions with very little pop. Remember that Ozzie Albies, the presumptive long-term option at second base, also lacks very much power. That would mean that on any given day, nearly half of the lineup (once you add the pitcher) would be full of guys who may never reach double figure homerun totals. On the flipside, with a fairly team-friendly contract, Inciarte becomes an even better trade asset. Teams will already be able to know how much Inciarte will be paid through what we can assume is the prime of his career. One could also suggest that the Braves do not grade Smith as highly as many fans do and think of him more as a fourth outfielder/platoon option than a full-time guy.

No matter how this plays out, this contract means two things to me. One, the John Hart-led contract extension frenzy of 2013-14 might be back on. During that offseason, the Braves signed Julio Teheran, Freddie Freeman, Chris Johnson, and Craig Kimbrel to long-term extensions. The latter two would be later dismissed, but Teheran and Freeman have blossomed into cornerstones. While Inciarte was the obvious choice for a contract extension this offseason, could we be that far away from considering Dansby Swanson a candidate for a contract extension? If Mike Foltynewicz or Matt Wisler take a monster step forward in 2017, could they be in line for an extension? Hart kept the young nucleus of the Indians together this way once before.

Second, this contract makes the Shelby Miller deal last winter look even better. While I have my concerns about Aaron Blair, the Braves have team control of Inciarte and Swanson through the 2022 season. If Blair figures it out, even better. Miller, along with Tyrell Jenkins, were once the early foundation of a future Braves winner. They were since turned into an even better foundation for a future Braves winner that has already developed into a pair of new franchise cornerstones to go with Teheran and Freeman.

All in all, I didn't expect a contract extension this winter, but I'm glad to see it. Inciarte is a great player to have around at a premium position. You just don't find 3+ fWAR guys on five year deals worth a shade more than $30 million anymore.

What Can the Braves Learn from the Cubs?

Swanson's Defense Important as Braves
Focus on Run Prevention
By Arturo Pardavila III from Hoboken, NJ, USA
[CC BY 2.0], via Wikimedia Commons

The World Series came to a close last night and what a Series it was! Just to put a cherry on top, Game Seven was one of the most captivating games ever played. Congratulations to both teams for reminding the country just how close to perfect baseball can be.

For the Braves, the end of the Fall Classic means we can flip to the Hot Stove Season. With a move to a new ballpark on the horizon along with a slew of young players moving through the minors to join the big league club, this offseason will be pivotal if the Braves want to make it to the playoffs for the first time in four years.

Baseball, like all sports, is a game in which success is copied. When moneyball was popularized by the A's, a cascade of teams tried to follow suit. When the Royals rode a bullpen to championship heights, teams tried to build a replica of their own and paid hefty prices in cash and/or prospects - including both teams in the World Series.

There is a lot to learn about the Cubs that can be applied to other teams, but one of the biggest differences in the series might have gone a bit under-the-radar. Sure, the bullpens and their usage was heavily digested. As was the differences between the rotations and lineups. For me, though, one of the clearest differences between the two teams was in defense and run prevention.

Take a look at Game Six. After Kris Bryant quickly put the Cubs ahead 1-0, Chicago followed with a pair of sharp singles. Josh Tomlin, a 1 fWAR guy with a 4.88 FIP during the regular season, went 1-1 on Addison Russell. What would happen next would carry more weight according to Win Probability than even Russell's later Grand Slam. Russell sent a flyball to the right-center gap. Tyler Naquin was a 25-year rookie this season who was not expected to play much of a role, but injuries and his own success changed that. He was in center field rushing toward the gap while Lonnie Chisenhall was coming from his place in right field. A six year veteran, Chisenhall had been moved to the outfield during the 2015 season after failing to establish himself as a competent third baseman in the major leagues. He even started a game in center field this season.

There remains confusion as to what happened next as the ball came down. Naquin said both called it, Chisenhall contends neither did it, and Terry Francona asserts that Naquin told Chisenhall to take it. Whatever the case, a rookie center fielder saw a converted third baseman fly in front of him and a ball drop to the ground between the two of them. Called a double because the error statistic is worthless, two runs scored and Russell ended up on third via an error that was called when a Jason Kipnis throw to the plate got away.

The defensive miscues continued in Game Seven. With a pair of runners on and no outs in the fourth, Ben Zobrist hit a grounder to first. To be clear, it would have been tough to turn a double play, but it nearly turned into no outs as Mike Napoli, a converted catcher, threw high-and-wide to shortstop. They got the one out, but had no chance for a double play. That left the opportunity for Russell to send a flyball to left-center. Again, it seemed the outfielders were not communicating or not keeping their heads in the game. Rajai Davis called for the ball, but never got into prime position to fire the ball home. All the while, left-fielder Coco Crisp was almost crowding Davis, who paused to gather himself after catching the ball before firing home to try to cut the runner down at the plate. His throw, like Napoli's, was high. This time, the runner was safe.

These are just a few of the most high profile situations during this series where the Indians failed to make a play, but it also points toward the differences in the two teams and it's even more evident in the regular season metrics. It's not that the Indians were necessarily bad defensively like the Braves were - just that the Indians were not very good. They were the Vinny Castilla of teams. They made most of the plays they ought to, but while the Cubs had 82 defensive runs scored (DRS), the Indians had just 17. While the Cubs had a Plus/Minus Runs Saved (rPM) of +99, the Indians were just +7.

Cleveland had just three players in their lineup with a composite defensive runs above average (DEF) of 5 or higher. While they had probably the best defensive player in the series in Francisco Lindor, the Cubs had 5 DEF or better guys at catcher, second base, shortstop, third base, and right field. Their worst defensive player, according to the metric DEF, was Anthony Rizzo, who played the least important defensive position and was still rated much better than his compliment on the Indians, the aforementioned Napoli.

None of this kept the Indians from being one game away from winning the World Series three times. The Cubs had their own issues, especially with depth in their lineup. Russell and Javier Baez, while both certainly did some nice things this year, had a .316 wOBA. Of course, a mark like that would have made Jason Heyward thrilled. While the Cubs offense was explosive, it also had issues and the Indians were able to exploit that during the Series at various times. Their bullpen depth was also not as strong as the Indians, though really, I felt that was splitting hairs because Chicago still had some really good arms in the pen.

Chicago's pitching staff was good, but not nearly as good as the results indicated. Kyle Hendricks had a 3.20 FIP and a 3.59 xFIP to go with his 2.13 ERA. Jon Lester had a 3.41 FIP and a 3.47 xFIP to go with his 2.44 ERA. The rest of the starting staff had similar, though less stark, differences that each saw their ERAs look much nicer than their FIP or xFIP. The Indians had some small positive differences or flatout reverse differences. Trevor Bauer's ERA was higher than both metrics while Tomlin's xFIP was .27 points lower than his ERA. However, most of the time, the differences were minor and suggested that the pitcher's ERA was rather close to his performance.

No team came close to the difference between ERA and FIP like the Cubs (-0.62 when ERA-FIP). It's the largest gap in which the ERA is lower than the FIP since the 2002 Atlanta Braves. That's not to say the Cubs weren't a great pitching team - they were. They had a strong collection of pitching talent that was magnified by the strongest defense in the league. The Indians, with a simply good defense, had a ERA/FIP difference of -0.06, which ranked 15th in baseball.

Run Prevention doesn't just fall on the pitchers and as the Braves look to the future, it's important to remember that. If the Braves want to follow anything the Cubs did as they ended their long-lasting streak of championship-less years, a focus on run prevention would go a long way to helping Atlanta get back to the playoffs and succeed.

Best 5 Braves Drafts Since 2000 - #2

On this 2016 Draft Eve, here is my pick for the second best draft since 2000.

Best/Worst Drafts since 2000
Worst: #5, 2009 | #4, 2004 | #3, 2013 | #2, 2011 | #1, 2001
Best: #5, 2010 | #4, 2015 | #3, 2007 | #2, 2002 | #1, 2000

2nd Best Draft Since 2000 - The 2002 Draft

Keith Allison via Flickr (No Changes)
(Creative Commons)

It was a perfect storm for the Braves. Two years before, they had added a lot of talent to the system, but were still short on real prospects. While they would win a NL East Title in 2002, the cracks began to show as they won just 88 games. That would actually help the Braves as it gave them a higher draft choice than they were used to getting during The Streak with the #23rd overall pick. They would add a supplemental first (#34th) and an extra second round pick (#65) after Steve Karsay signed with the Yankees.

The table was set for a big haul and the Braves had their eyes firmly set on one player - Parkview High School two-sport, do-everything, superstud Jeff Francoeur. But would he be there when they selected in the first round for the first time at #23? Previously, I went over how the Braves may have muddied the waters when it came to Jason Heyward. The Braves and especially their scouting director Roy Clark had been tied to some accusations of dirty play beyond that. They were blamed for bad medical reports related to Adam Wainwright before the 2000 draft. They were also possibly responsible for a fax that suggested Francoeur wanted a $4M bonus.

Whether any of that is true, Francoeur made it clear to other teams that he had three options in the draft. Either the Atlanta Braves drafted him or he received a "significant amount of money" to sign with whoever picked him. Or, and this certainly was a possibility, he could head to Clemson University, where he had signed a letter of intent to play defensive back. Francoeur was expected to be a standout as a college safety - something not lost on Bobby Bowden or his son, Tommy Bowden. One story involved the latter being at Francoeur's home on a recruiting trip. The elder Bowden called Francoeur, which prompted Tommy to take the phone and kindly tell his dad to get off the line while he was on a recruiting visit.

Teams ahead of the Braves had Francoeur higher on their Big Boards based on talent, but he dropped due to the demands Francoeur would have to sign. He never did get that $4M, regardless if it ever was one of his demands, but after Atlanta selected the outfielder and convinced him to give up football, he received $2.2M and the Braves' 2002 draft was off.

Up next, with the #34th pick, was James Madison University southpaw, Dan Meyer. A standout college pitcher for the Dukes, he was the first college arm selected by the Braves in the first round since 1987 when the Braves tabbed Derek Lilliquist as the sixth overall selection. Thirty picks later, the Braves again chose a prep star from their own backyard, Duluth High School catcher, Brian McCann. While he lacked Francoeur's infectious smile, he was left-handed catcher with power. McCann had been playing baseball with-and-against Francoeur since the two became teenagers. Now, they would become roommates.

The next pick of the draft was Atlanta's extra second-round pick courtesy of the Yankees. It would ultimately be wasted on shortstop Tyler Greene. An athletic shortstop with power, Greene passed on the Braves, but liked the area enough to attended Georgia Tech. Right-hander Charlie Morton out of a high school in Connecticut, was selected next. Morton, like Meyer, would be used in big trades.

Sad to say, but the rest of the draft produced very little. Long-time followers of the Braves' minor league system might recognize the names of Steve Russell (4th), J.J. Jurries (6th), and Wes Timmons (12th), but the latter two failed to progress beyond Triple-A while Russell was cut after five years in the system. Shortstop Jon Schuerholz out of Auburn would be lambasted as a sign of nepotism after the Braves spent an 8th round selection on him.

The Braves would get a hit on 20th rounder Chuck James out of Chattahoochee Valley Community College. It's difficult to get much value out of the 20th round, so the 64 games and 55 starts they received from James constitutes a hit in my mind. His metrics were never that good and after a fun retelling of Chuck Norris jokes with James in the latter's place, he wore out his welcome with the Braves. Nevertheless, he was the Braves' #3 pitcher in 2006 and '07.

For all of the hype surrounding Francoeur, this draft would ultimately be known as the year the Braves finally picked a catcher in the draft who turned into a star. In the previous ten drafts, Atlanta had spent eleven picks on catchers. Some didn't sign, but those that did gave the Braves precious little. You have to go back to 1989's draft choice of Tyler Houston, which was a bust, to find a catcher the Braves drafted and developed into a major leaguer for more than a cup of coffee. Of course, the Braves had more luck internationally, but catcher was a position that year-after-year was draped in failure. McCann gave the Braves not only success from the draft, but one of the best catchers in baseball for 8.5 years.

While 2002's draft could have certainly been better, grabbing a guy who may have a borderline Hall of Fame career when it's all said and done is a big get.

Worst 5 Braves Drafts Since 2000 - #2

With the 2016 draft tomorrow, it's time to get to the end of this series. Just three more articles remain after this one.

Best/Worst Drafts since 2000
Worst: #5, 2009 | #4, 2004 | #3, 2013 | #2, 2011 | #1, 2001
Best: #5, 2010 | #4, 2015 | #3, 2007 | #2, 2002 | #1, 2000

2nd Worst Draft Since 2000 - The 2011 Draft 

Gilmartin | By Kaotate [GFDL or CC BY-SA 3.0],
via Wikimedia Commons

On one hand, Atlanta's haul in the 2011 draft produced eight major leaguers. On the other hand, the Frank Wren/Tony DeMacio-led approach of cheap, sign-able college players effectively reduced the chance that the Braves would bring an impact player into the system. The 2011 edition would possibly be their worst draft together.

Flash back to 2010. The Atlanta Braves would win 91 games in Bobby Cox's final year and were batting on the young duo of Tommy Hanson and Jair Jurrjens to lead their rotation while the also young core of Brian McCann, Martin Prado, Jason Heyward, and the just-arrived Freddie Freeman would give the Braves a big boost at the plate. The Braves also had high hopes for the foursome of Mike Minor, Arodys Vizcaino, Randall Delgado, and Julio Teheran. You could forgive Wren and DeMacio if they felt they had a dynasty on their hands.

Of course, they didn't and the 2011 draft certainly didn't help matters. Their first pick finally came with the 28th overall selection. As they had done two years before, they went with a left-hander out of a big southern college program. But Sean Gilmartin wasn't Minor - who certainly raised his share of eyebrows when the Braves drafted him. Minor's floor was noticeably higher than Gilmartin for one. Gilmartin was a borderline Top 50 player heading into the draft. He was a perfectly fine second rounder, but the Braves played it safe as they had done so often during the Wren years. Either there was an edict that they needed to compete and needed cheap depth players to fill in the gaps rather than hope for the best with an 18 year-old out of high school or the Braves were just flatout missing. Regardless, Atlanta made the choice to knowingly give up on the high reward and play the chances that they have grabbed a high enough floor guy to play in the majors.

They were successful. They also had very bad drafts as a result. 2011 stands out because the Braves not only drafted a college player in the first round once again, they did so in 18-of-the-first-19 rounds. They went with smart kids out of UConn (Nick Ahmed) and Gonzaga (Cody Martin) along with smaller school standouts like Kyle Kubitza and Tommy La Stella. The draft could have just easily been a winner. Instead of Joe Panik or Henry Owens, it was Gilmartin in the first round. Instead of Andrew Susac in the second, it was Ahmed. Instead of Carter Capps, it was Kubitza in the third. Rather than draft Greg Bird in the fifth, they took Nick DeSantiago. Could have had Ken Giles, but took Martin in the seventh.

Is this unfair? You betcha. But 2011 showed just how warped the Braves valued talent in the draft under Wren and DeMacio. I'm not a guy who buries Wren. I think he shoulders too much of the blame. But when it came to the draft, the Braves simply were missing and missing badly.

Here is a sign that something went wrong. The 2011 draft was just five years ago. Nobody from the draft remains the system. Some, like Gilmartin and Martin, were given away. As was J.R. Graham, who the Braves lost voluntarily in the Rule 5 draft. Kubitza and La Stella were traded for arms with higher upside. John Cornely and Gus Schlosser were sent packing. As was Ahmed, though at least he was a piece that helped the Braves acquire Justin Upton.

If a year stands out as a reason to not play it safe and draft for need, it's 2011. The Braves got exactly what they sought - good bets to make it to the majors. Eight of them did that - so far. But their roles in the majors reflect the conservative draft philosophy the Braves followed. Each player that has made it to the bigs has little chance of developing into much more than they were when they were drafted.