2013 Atlanta Braves Myths: Part IX

For a few weeks, I thought I was finished with investigating myths that serve as potential pitfalls to the Atlanta Braves celebrating this season with a parade down Peach Street.  But one narrative continues to survive, spoken by commentators around the media landscape.  Some Braves fans follow blindly, believing the logic is so sound, it must be true.  Let’s find out.

1. Atlanta doesn't make productive outs because of strikeouts.

2. Atlanta seems to fall behind early and has to play catch-up.

3. Atlanta can't win if they keep striking out so much!

4. Anyone would be better than Uggla! 

5. Unless Its a Save Situation, Don't Use Kimbrel.

6. A Lack of a Leadoff Hitter Will Kill the Braves & 7. No World Champion gets shut out as often as the Braves.

8. Strikeouts Are Bad Because They Don't Press the Defense

9. The Atlanta Braves Won’t Win It All Because Their Staff Lacks Postseason Experience

When Tim Hudson went down, the Braves didn't just lose a clubhouse leader and a good guy at the bottom-of-the-rotation.  They lost their only player with a notable amount of postseason experience.  While a member of the A’s, Tim Hudson appeared in seven games with six starts as Oakland failed to get out of the ALDS.  Since becoming a Brave, he has made three starts, including one in 2010 where he tossed seven scoreless innings for a no-decision.  All told, he has logged 54.2 innings in the postseason.

Once you remove Hudson, the only other pitcher with a postseason start on the roster is Kris Medlen, who was handed the ball in the memorable Wild Card Game last season. 

The rationale follows as such: The postseason is a different animal.  Pitchers are relied upon with such a higher degree that not having experience in how to deal with those expectations can wreck pitchers the first few times they go through it.  The only cure to this is experience.  Relying on a rotation with youth will destroy Atlanta in the postseason.

Like any hypothesis, this theory must be tested.  I went back to 1991 just to make this tidy, but I’m sure you can go back a lot longer.  Remember, before 1969, only two teams made it to the playoffs.  You have to accept a lot of teams that earned the right to play in the World Series for the first time in ten or so years had little postseason experience in their starting staff. 

In this sample, I found five World Series Champions who meet the criteria.  All have occurred since 2002 and some sported staffs that lacked postseason experience across the board.  

2002 – Anaheim Angels…Though they finished as the Wild Card behind Hudson’s Athletics, the Angels defeated the Yankees and Twins with little trouble before beating the Giants in seven games to win the Series.  Of their top four starters, only Kevin Appier had any postseason starts.  One start, to be more exact and just two games overall.  The other three – Ramon Ortiz, Jarrod Washburn, and fresh-faced rookie John Lackey – had no postseason experience.

2003 – Florida Marlins…Another Wild Card entry, the Marlins reached the playoffs largely from their young, high-performing players.  Their staff was all under 30 and none of the five starters had a single game of postseason experience.  The unorthodox Jack McKeon would use all five to start at least one game in the playoffs and in 17 games, they won more than they lost and took home their second World Series Title in franchise history.  The playoff scene did little to take Josh Beckett, Carl Pavano, and others off their game.

2005 – Chicago White Sox…The ChiSox of ’05 had more experience than the previous two, but two of the starters they relied on (Mark Buehrle and Jon Garland) had one game out of the bullpen in the postseason between them.  Jose Contreras had postseason experience during his time with the Yankees, but never started a game.  Didn't stop their title hopes.

2008 – Philadelphia Phillies…Though they had the geriatric Jamie Moyer and his five postseason starts, the Phillies didn't have much starting experience in the playoffs outside of him.  Cole Hamels had one start and Brett Myers and Joe Blanton were used as relievers in their only postseason nods.  Yet, they rolled through the postseason with relative ease, winning 11-of-13.

2010 – San Francisco Giants…The final entrant resembles the 2003 Marlins.  While they had veteran Barry Zito on the staff, his ineffective play dropped him from the postseason roster.  Instead, the Giants relied on four postseason rookies and were matched up with the Phillies in the NLCS.  Philly was no longer the postseason newbie they were in ’08, having won the previous two NL pennants.   Nevertheless, the Giants took that crown away in six before breezing by the Rangers in five for the World Championship.

Postseason experience is nice.  But it’s not a necessity.  Even in 1991, the Braves and Twins matched up with one starter on each side who actually had a decent amount of postseason experience (Jack Morris and Charlie Leibrandt).  The rest of the starters, and there were some tremendous ones on both sides, were new to the postseason scene.  We still got one of the greatest World Series in history. 

Experience doesn't beat talent and execution.  I will grant you that postseason experience does nothing but help players, but its actual impact seems very low.  And though he’s hurt, Huddy is around to provide advice to the young guns on the staff.  Either way, if the Braves fail in the playoffs – and hopefully, they don’t – the reason for that failure will not because the other team was more seasoned than the Braves.  

2013 Atlanta Braves Myths: Part VIII

Some of the most interesting myths concerning the Braves are about strikeouts.  Everybody knew coming into this season that the Braves were going to strike out at a ridiculous rate.  From the moment this team was constructed, arguments against that construction were presented by many, many, MANY commentators, bloggers, and people who think their tweets are valuable.  They won't make productive outs, they said.  They can't win if they strike out, they scream.  STRIKEOUTS ARE BAD, they used all capital letters to say. Twice, I have specifically addressed myths that concern Atlanta's strikeout frequency.  Today, make that three times.

1. Atlanta doesn't make productive outs because of strikeouts.
2. Atlanta seems to fall behind early and has to play catch-up.
3. Atlanta can't win if they keep striking out so much!
4. Anyone would be better than Uggla! 
5. Unless Its a Save Situation, Don't Use Kimbrel.
6. A Lack of a Leadoff Hitter Will Kill the Braves & 7. No World Champion gets shut out as often as the Braves.

8. Strikeouts Are Bad Because They Don't Press the Defense

One of the common complaints historically against strikeouts is that by not putting the ball in play, you take the pressure off the defense.  That isn't in itself wrong.  At lower levels, especially little league and high school ball, putting pressure on the defense can go a long way toward facilitating defensive miscues and with that, help your team score.

Those complaints have also been used to explain why the Braves won't be a true contender.  I don't tend to watch ESPN, but on MLB Network, the lack of pressure put on opposing defenses has often been said by Harold Reynolds and Mitch Williams.  However, just using those names explains the level of intelligence that went into the contention made by the two former players.  Why have facts when you can feel the right answer?

I don't necessarily disagree that for certain players, making contact and pressuring the defense is a key component in their game.  For instance...Reynolds.  During his 12 year career, Reynolds stole 250 bases with an isolated slugging under .100.  His game was getting on base and using speed.  To his credit, he didn't strike out much.  He would be upset if we didn't mention that.  And his speed seemed to have some impact on the defense.  Reynolds reached base 64 times on an error, including two different seasons where he reached base 10 or more times in a single season via the error.  While the infield hit statistic has only been recorded since 1988, 144 of Reynolds' 958 hits from '88 to his retirement were infield hits, an impressive 15%.

However, that was his game.  The Braves don't have a guy just like that.  Jordan Schafer is the closest and he is hurt.  You ask your team to do what they are best suited for.

Regardless, are the Braves noticeably hurt by their strikeouts and their expected inability to put pressure on defenses?  Entering Sunday, the Braves had 840 strikeouts, which led the National League and trailed just the Astros for most strikeouts in baseball.  The league average is 723.

Atlanta had reached base on an error 37 times this season, led by Andrelton Simmons who has reached on an error an astonishing ten times.  Simmons hits his fair share of grounders (46.9%), but not like Norichika Aoki, the man who shares the league-lead in ROE's with ten of his own.  Aoki puts the ball on the ground 63.5% of the time and seems to be faster as well.  Anywho, as a team, where does the Braves 37 ROE's put them?  Fifth place and six above the league average.  Here's a look at the top five with their place in K% added for reference.  Note that the league average is that 19.8% of all plate appearances end in a strikeout.

Team	ROE	Rank	K%	Rank
Reds	46	1st	20.0	12th
Angels	43	2nd	18.2	24th
Twins	38	t-3rd	21.1	7th
Rangers	38	t-3rd	17.2	30th
Braves	37	t-5th	22.8	2nd
Cubs	37	t-5th	19.2	18th
Mets	37	t-5th	22.4	3rd

If any number can tell us that making contact over striking out puts pressure on the defense, ROE should do that for us.  Instead, it shows no correlation between ROE and K%.  The Rangers strike out the fewest and they have one more ROE than the Braves and Mets, who strike out over 5% more.  Like usual in this series, the strikeouts themselves mean jack.

In addition, there doesn't to be a correlation between infield hits and K%.  Atlanta has 104 infield hits on the season, good for a tie for 8th place.  The amount of infield hits is also ten more than the league average.  The Rangers have 91 infield hits, good for 18th most and three below league average.  In fact, infield hits doesn't even have a correlation to stolen bases beyond the Brewers, who lead both categories.  

Scientifically, there is little evidence to believe that strikeouts impact the amount of pressure the opposing team's defense truly goes under.  These are professional ballplayers.  Most know how to defend their position and with advanced scouting, are in great position to field the ball even before the pitch.  The idea that striking out provides any noticeable effect on making things easier on the opposition is just not supported by facts.  It feels like the right answer.  For me, that's just not enough.  

2013 Atlanta Braves Myths: Part VI & VII

Back to dispel a myth or, rather, two myths.  The first was a common answer I intended to answer.  The second came from the research as I was attempting to answer that first myth.

1. Atlanta doesn't make productive outs because of strikeouts.
2. Atlanta seems to fall behind early and has to play catch-up.
3. Atlanta can't win if they keep striking out so much!
4. Anyone would be better than Uggla! 
5. Unless Its a Save Situation, Don't Use Kimbrel.

6. A Lack of a Leadoff Hitter Will Kill the Braves

On many a blog, the mantra has been clear.  The Braves don't have that speedy guy who gets on base and causes havoc.  And it's true.  There is no more Michael Bourn on this team.  Rafael Furcal is long-gone.  So is Otis Nixon, Deion Sanders, and even King Kelly.  The Atlanta Braves have stolen 31 bases this season and are on pace for just 21 more.  You can make a rather compelling argument that they won't come close to that considering their leading thief, Jordan Schafer, is on the mend and will likely be out until the end of August.  

Beyond that, the most-used leadoff hitter this season, Andrelton Simmons, is one of the absolute worst leadoff hitters in the game.  The average MLB hitter has posted a .267/.330/.391 slash.  Simmons as a leadoff hitter?  .226/.263/.329.  Even if you include the other people who have led off this season, most notably Schafer, you only get a team .303 OBP out of the number one spot in the order, good for the fifth WORST mark in baseball.  

However, do the Braves lack a leadoff hitter or a manager willing to better utilize his hitters?  Both are true to an extent, especially the latter point.  But more to the point, will the lack of a leadoff killer hurt the Braves if they get to the postseason?  Like any individual detrimet to a team, it's not that simple.  The 2011 Cardinals used two primary leadoff hitters.  Ryan Theriot posted a .324 OBP out of the spot and was replaced by Furcal, who posted a .296 OBP.  However, Furcal got hot in the postseason and that erased a lot of the issues the Cardinals had at the top of the lineup.  And doesn't that change everything seemingly each postseason?  Who's hot, who's not?  

One thing is clear, though.  Batting Simmons leadoff has significantly stunted any kind of offensive growth with the Braves.  And too often for our sanity as fans, that leads to a lot of goose eggs - even nine of them - and good teams don't have to worry about that because...

7. No World Champion gets shut out as often as the Braves.

You really only need to go back three years to crap on that belief.  The 2010 San Francisco Giants relied on starting pitching, a good bullpen, defense, and getting some extra base hits.  However, they had significant issues scoring runs, finishing ninth among 16 NL teams in runs scored with a run differential just a shade over a hundred.  Atlanta hasn't had nearly as much trouble in scoring runs, currently third in the NL in runs scored with a run differential of of eighty runs.  

But one thing the Braves and 2010 Giants have in common was how many times they were shutout.  So far this season, the Braves have been held scoreless eleven times, most recently on June 22nd, the second of two shutouts pitched by the Milwaukee Brewers.  During their World Championship-winning season, the Giants were shutout 16 times, including four times in twelve games during September as they battled for a the NL West division lead.  

As the Braves were struggling to score in late June, being shutout for 24 innings between their final six innings of a series with the Mets and back-to-back shutouts by the Brewers, fans spoke of how good teams don't have this level of offensive ineptitude.  Wrong again.  The 2010 Giants matched the Braves with 24 scoreless innings between May 21st and May 25th.  And just last year, that version of the Giants were shutout over 20 innings from July 27th to July 30th.  

It should be noted, though.  While the Braves have some similarities to the 2010 Giants, they lack the top-of-the-rotation forces that both Matt Cain and Tim Lincecum were at the time.  They also are a much better offense.  

In the end, while the Braves can tinker with the lineup in efforts to make it more efficient, and they should, a lot of their postseason future is out of their hands.  If someone could figure out how to make sure you enter the offseason hot, they would be a rich person.  But because that's not too possible, Atlanta has to get there and do everything in their power to give their team the best chance to win...use your best players the most, for instance.  Still, if those players are slumping....well, I imagine a great deal of Braves fans will be quick to call this team a massive failure.

2013 Atlanta Braves Myths: Part V

A rarely witnessed event occurred last tonight.  No, not the 14 inning affair that saw the Braves plate six in the top of the 14th to win 7-1.  That is a little rare, I will grant you, but something a bit stranger happened in the 11th inning and it's a reason to bring back the 2013 myths.

1. Atlanta doesn't make productive outs because of strikeouts.
2. Atlanta seems to fall behind early and has to play catch-up.
3. Atlanta can't win if they keep striking out so much!
4. Anyone would be better than Uggla! 

5. Unless Its a Save Situation, Don't Use Kimbrel.

This one is a modern take on an old stand-by from "Old Cliches to Manage By", co-authored by 394 former managers.  The idea is that closers, unburden by the ever-pressing need to save a game, lose their drive, their mojo, their killer instinct when the game is tied.  Knowing this, and never one to go against the grain, Fredi Gonzalez has seemingly refused to bring in Craig Kimbrel unless it's a save situation, a tie-game at home in the ninth inning, or just for work.

However, does Kimbrel actually struggle based on unfamiliar situations?  Depends on whether or not you believe in sample size.  If you looked at just this year's numbers, those stats would say yes.  In non-save situations, a prospect Kimbrel has rarely been called upon during this season, Kimbrel's opposing hitters are slashing .304/.429/.391.  Even though Kimbrel hasn't been quite as dominating as he was last season, those numbers are not good.   However, it's never wise to base anything on 28 plate appearances.  Kimbrel, before last night's game, had been used in all of six non-save situations and despite the astounding amount of baserunners, only one run scored.

Over his career, the numbers become even less notable.  Hitters have hit just .165/.280/.242 against Kimbrel in non-save situations, good for a 15.5 K/9 rate and a 1.22 ERA.  That mimics his career numbers.

Well, most of those games are tie games!  Surely, when he's just getting work for work's sake, Kimbrel sucks the proverbial big one, right?  After all, that's all Joe Simpson used to say about Rafael Soriano.

Again, wrong.  Hitters OPS a miserable .474 when the difference is four runs.  I'll throw out the numbers for when the margin is bigger than four runs because Kimbrel has only logged 64 plate appearances against hitters in those situations.  The .474 OPS with a four run margin is almost the same as when there is a 3-run margin.  When the margin is just one run, hitters OPS a much better (relatively speaking) .561 OPS.  When it's a tie game, like it was tonight, hitters OPS just .532.

Fortunately, very few people still support this myth that seems entirely built on observational bias.  There is absolutely zero proof that Kimbrel suffers when it's not a save situation or even when it's a blowout.  Kimbrel seems perfectly capable of pitching in a variety of situations and tossed a perfect 1,2,3 inning in the 11th during a tied 1-1 game to get the game into the 12th.  I'm sure in the future, I will complain that Gonzalez fails to utilize Kimbrel for the "save" when it's most important (not always the ninth), but in the case of this myth, it's completely debunked.  Kimbrel is still the same dominating pitcher regardless of score.  He doesn't require a save situation to be himself.  He just is.

Atlanta Braves 2013 Myths: Part IV

Time for another Walk-Off Walkmythbusting adventure. Today, let's specifically go over one player who has been the target of tremendous derision from Braves fans.

1. Atlanta doesn't make productive outs because of strikeouts.
2. Atlanta seems to fall behind early and has to play catch-up.
3. Atlanta can't win if they keep striking out so much!

4. Anyone would be better than Uggla!

We have all heard it.  A good number of us have thought it.  Still more have said it.  Due to his inability to perform at the level he routinely reached as a member of the Florida Marlins, Dan Uggla has been one of the most disappointing performers of the last three seasons and often, that makes fans wonder about alternatives.  Like a QB without a Super Bowl win, suddenly everyone would be a better choice than Uggla.  Is that true?

Well, admittedly, this is subjective.  Better is an imprecise term that is a reflection of the person using the term.

Except in this case because the Braves DO NOT HAVE A BETTER OPTION than to play Uggla.  There, it's said and it's quite simply the truth.  There are two ways of looking at it.  One, the less obvious way, is that despite all of his struggles, Uggla has remained, at the very worst, an above-average option at second base in his two-and-a-half years in Atlanta.  All stats were entering Friday's contests. 

Cats	BB%	ISO	wOBA	WAR
Uggla	12.5%	.195	.327	6.2
2B Rank	2nd	2nd	13th	13th

In no way does that mean Uggla has produced at the level expected from him when he was acquired before the 2011 season and subsequently inked to a 5 year, $62M contract.  He has been a massive disappointment and I'm sure he would tell you as much.  And I'll grant you that his WAR is likely inflated by an unlikely 4.2 UZR last season, second-best of his career.

However, the idea that Uggla is one of the worst second-basemen in the game is simply misguided.  27 different second-baseman qualified for this and Uggla was at least average in most categories.  So, finding a replacement for him that is noticeably better than him isn't quite as easy as people think.  Of the 12 that are ahead of him in WAR, the expected names of Cano, Kinsler, Utley, Pedroia, Phillips, and Zobrist are among them.  As are young cornerstones like Jason Kipnis and Neil Walker.  Finding a 2B who can put up consistent 2 WAR seasons seems easier said than done.

The more obvious way of looking at this is who would conceivably replace Uggla at second?  Ramiro Pena was suggested before his injury and Pena had definitely played significantly better than ever before.  Fredi Gonzalez called him an NL-player.  I don't know if that's really a thing, but Pena was outperforming his Yankees years by a great margin before hitting the DL.  In fact, his .335 wOBA would have ranked as his best season of his career, minors or majors, outside of a 55-game run in AAA in 2011.  However, he still wasn't truly outperforming Uggla by a great degree like some might think.  And unlike Pena, Uggla has done this for a full season at the majors.

But with Pena gone, this really shouldn't be a discussion, yet with the promotion of Tyler Pastornicky as essentially Pena's current replacement on the bench, some have flirted with the idea that Pastornicky would be a suitable replacement for Uggla.  After all, Pastornicky makes more contact!  And he slashed his way to a .309/.351/.429 run at AAA this year.  However, now in 207 major league PA, Pastornicky has a .266 wOBA with 10 EBH.  Yes, I will grant you that Pastornicky will make considerably more contact that Uggla and possibly, in certain situations, that might make Pastornicky an attractive option, though that skill is considerably lessened by Uggla's walk-rate.  Pastornicky is unlikely to do a better job at making fewer outs and gives you little else.

That leaves us with Uggla and he is signed through the 2015 season and the smart money is, unless he gets injured before then, he will play a good 350 more games at second base for the Braves.  Fans will often get stuck on his average and the money he receives and yell "Struggla!"  But remember that a player is not paid for what he does today, but what he did yesterday.  The contract he signs has no true bearing on the production to follow outside of incentive clauses.  It is a symbol of the player he was when he signed and what the market called for.

For all of his warts, Uggla is not easily replaceable, nor, as the myth states, is anyone anywhere better than him.  In fact, to find a second baseman that is clearly better is quite rare.  He may not be the Uggla we want, but the Uggla we have is still better than half of the guys trying to find a long-term home playing second for much worse teams than the . 

Atlanta Braves 2013 Myths: Part III

Earlier today, I touched on another myth I have seen and a couple of days ago, I began this series. Time to turn a corner and possibly find some truth in a myth.

Possibly.

1. Atlanta doesn't make productive outs because of strikeouts.
2. Atlanta seems to fall behind early and has to play catch-up. 

3.  Atlanta can't win if they keep striking out so much!

Commonly, we hear about the strikeouts being the Achilles's Heel of the Atlanta Braves by "experts" and "analysts" and "Harold Reynolds."  In addition, the mantra is repeated often on message boards, twitter, and in the ballpark.  There is some degree of truth, though not entirely related to the Braves.  Often, especially in history, a plethora of strikeouts is a sign of a bad offensive ball club.  However, the mantra itself does not tell us all that much.  There are 7.53 strikeouts on average by a team per game this season.  In 2000, the average was 6.45.  To put that simply, every team in baseball, on average, is striking out one more time per game and 162 more times in a season than they were 13 years ago.  Every year since 2005, MLB teams have struck out more than they did the year before.

Not all of that is due to hitters just not caring about strikeouts or whatever jibber-jabber they spout on MLB Tonight.  There are some REALLY good fucking pitchers in today's game and every year, more of them seem to develop.  People are throwing harder and with more movement than ever before.  Now, hitters and teams have begun to adopt a model that downplays the importance of strikeouts for batters, focusing on value elsewhere.  And let's be honest, strikeouts generally aren't that worse than any other out.  In situational hitting, that truth can lose its effectiveness. 

With that in mind, I decided to find if there was a certain number that truly defined the breaking point for the Atlanta Braves as far as strikeouts go.  If they strikeout, say 10 times, are they more/less likely to win and does that data have much importance?  And because I can totally kick butt at tables now, here's another one.

# of K's	# of Times	Record	ExtIng
3	1	1-0	NA
4	7	5-2	NA
5	3	3-0	NA
6	10	9-1	NA
7	10	6-4	0-1
8	10	5-5	1-1
9	5	3-2	NA
10	12	4-8	3-2
11	9	5-4	NA
12	4	2-2	2-0
13	3	0-3	NA
14	2	1-1	NA
15	1	1-0	NA
16	3	2-1	NA
18	1	0-1	NA

What's to gain here?  Anything?

Well, from the raw data, if the Braves strikeout 10 times or more, they are 15-20 with only 10 of those wins coming in nine-inning games.  If they strikeout less than 10 times, they are 32-14.  However, the league average is 7.5 K's a game.  Rounding that up to 8 and below, the Braves are 29-12.

If the Braves don't strikeout, they do win.  However, is that truly the myth?  Hell, if they strikeout 14 times or more, they are 4-3, sample size be damned.  Regardless, you would have to assume that when the Braves strikeout more than the league average, they are often facing pretty good starters.  Typically, that does play out.  Anibal Sanchez, Jeff Samardzija, Matt Harvey, Madison Bumgarner (twice), Stephen Strasburg (twice), Patrick Corbin, Gio Gonzalez (twice), Zack Greinke, and Cliff Lee were some of the good starters they faced and most often, those starters had good game scores and the Braves were headed to a loss.  The average game score in those games was 67 and the Braves were 4-8 in those games.  Seems to make sense, right?  If there is a good starter on the mound and he's dealing and you strikeout over 10 times, you lose.  However, when the starter isn't dealing, the Braves tend to strikeout a lot regardless, but when they aren't striking out, they are getting hits, hitting homers, taking walks, and most importantly, scoring runs.

The strikeouts in themselves are not a problem.  It goes way deeper than that.  It's why the Braves can strike out 18 times and lose 10-0, but strike out 16 times and win 9-2.  You are going to get strikeouts with this team and quite often, more than you can bear because the ones that you agonize over occur in close games, a good deal of which are lost.  If only Dan Uggla had made contact...or one of the Uptons...or so on...and you come to the knee-jerk conclusion that the strikeouts are the problem.  And they can be.  But win-or-lose, the Braves are, on average, going to strike out 8.8 times a game.  When they strike out less, they often are going to win, but remember, if a strikeout team isn't striking out, it typically means the opposing pitcher is crap or at least pitching like crap.

In the end, I came away from this little exercise surprised by the layout, expecting more victories with 10 or more strikeouts.  However, the more I delved in, the more I saw that you have to see more than the strikeouts.  Was the pitcher dealing or were the Braves simply striking out because that's part of their game?  And in the end, all of this is sample size dependent.  The biggest sample I can take from this is that in 57% of their games, the Atlanta Braves strike out 6-to-11 times, but that's a small sample to take from this.  They have a blistering .695 in those games if you are curious.

Regardless, there is little evidence that striking out is the problem.  For instance, the Atlanta Braves have had 10 games of 10 or more strikeouts this month, a month that has seen their R/G fall over a run from May.  Despite 10 or more strikeouts in 27 games this month, the K rate is the lowest it has been all season (though it's still 8.2 K per game).  Hell, they are walking a lot more and have a new month-high in steals this month.  Why so few runs?  Worst month for homers so far.  That is the telling number about this team.  They're going to strikeout and they will probably walk a good deal.  I'm a little surprised they haven't been more proficient in stolen bases, but whatever.  Their weapon of choice is the homer.  If it's not coming, the Braves aren't scoring like they should.

However, with 6 homers in the last 5 games, maybe the Braves offense is getting back to their bread-and-butter.

Atlanta Braves 2013 Myths: Part II

Previously, I began a series to seek out the truth behind some of the comments typically made about the Braves, often from observational bias.  Today, we continue as we try to find out more truth about the Atlanta Braves current philosophy.

1. Atlanta doesn't make productive outs because of strikeouts.

2. Atlanta seems to fall behind early and has to play catch-up.

I'm not entirely sure where this idea comes from, but I have seen it presented on message boards and on facebook, typically after a loss or even a come-behind win.  Sometimes, commentators will add a sense that the players just don't care early, though the idea is rather absurd.  Not that a player might not have his head elsewhere for a game, but truly, to believe these guys just don't care all that much whether or not they make an out or get on base is ridiculous.

But hysterics aside, the entire idea being presented is just wrong.  Here is a breakdown for Atlanta's run-scoring abilities at different points in the game.

Innings	Runs Scored
1-3	98
4-6	129
7-9	91

Hey, cool, a table.  A crude one, but it's been several years since I have attempted a table.  Go me!  Anyway, the evidence doesn't support the notion that Atlanta turns it on late.  In fact, they seem to turn it on middle.  Course, there are several possible of reasons for that.  Hitters are typically seeing the opposing starter for the second and third times in the middle of the game.  That not only helps hitters time a pitcher, but pitchers make more mistakes when they are deeper into a game.  The OPS for the team from the first time they see a pitcher vs. the 2nd rises 51 points.  From the second to third time, the OPS rises an additional 80 points. 

In addition, the little change between early and late in the game also is added up when you compare the first time the team sees a starter vs. the first time the team sees a reliever.  Atlanta does fare slightly better in those situations (.693 OPS vs. 680), but there is not much difference. 

I understand that we tend to associate what we think we see with the truth.  Maybe for a week this season, Atlanta didn't seem to wake up until the seventh inning and after that, we seem to recall the instances where that also occurred.  However, typically, this could not be more from the truth.  The Braves might struggle early to get going, but once they get a look at a pitcher and what he is bringing that particular day, Atlanta's chances of producing rightfully improve.  The more chances, the better it typically gets until the bullpen gets the call for the opposing squad. 

Makes sense, right? 

Atlanta Braves 2013 Myths: A New Series

I love numbers.  I'm not naive to argue that "numbers never lie," but they, when properly used, can often strike down the evils of observational bias and provide some clear thinking based on actual facts.  With that, let's start a new series on these myths.  Each article in the series might answer one myth or maybe two myths.  Did I mention I started a new series?  How professional is this shit?

1. Atlanta doesn't make productive outs because of strikeouts.

A lot of the myths about the 2013 Braves stem from their frequency in strikeouts.  The league average of all plate appearances ending in a strikeout is 20.1%.  Atlanta has five starters above that mark along with often-used subs like Evan Gattis and Jordan Schafer.  Atlanta has a whole strikes out 23.6% of the time, led by Dan Uggla's staggering 34.3% of the time.  To put that in more expressive terms...

DAN UGGLA STRIKES OUT A THIRD OF THE TIME!!!!!

Holy crap, that's a lot.  All those strikeouts must mean a lot of unproductive outs.  Right?  Well, considering this a "myth" column, I bet you know the answer.  Baseball-reference tracks the statistic "Productive Outs" which goes a long way toward providing the evidence of the often talked about strategy.  The number basically is found by adding up any of the following situations: Successful sacrifice for a pitcher with one out, advancing any runner with nobody out, or driving in a baserunner with the second out.  Currently, the league average is in 32% of the situations, success is found.  That runs in striking contrast to the mentality, perpetrated by probably 95% of baseball analysts, that making the productive out is the "easy" thing.  To compare the league average, I picked three seasons from Atlanta Braves past (1985, 1995, 2005) to see, briefly, if there was any notable difference in the times.  The league average for those three years were 34% success, 34% success, and 32% success in 2005.  As the game has changed, the approach has altered, but only slightly.  Someone with more time, resources, and a much better internet can do further research and my usage of the Productive Outs statistic is not to say it's a perfect statistic, but it can help to tell a story. 

If the league average is 32% this season, and the Atlanta Braves strike out a lot, and Harold Reynolds says that strikeouts are highly unproductive, the Atlanta Braves must be failing tremendously to even be league average.  Mediocre.  Run-of-the-mill. 

Observational bias is inherent and we all suffer from it.  It is almost impossible to approach everything in life without it.  In arguments with our significant others, we often only recall the things that help our side, ignoring everything else. 

But baseball doesn't need to suffer from it with information so readily available.  Again, the league average on productive outs is 32%.  This number is pretty consistent with the last 18 years based on our sample.  Atlanta is slightly below average in productive outs at 31%.  However, if we just look at players who receive significant playing time, we come away with the conclusion that Atlanta, at worst, is at least average at the notion of productive outs.  The trio of Andrelton Simmons, Dan Uggla, and Justin Uption have been successful in 35% or more of their productive outs opportunities.  Freddie Freeman and Evan Gattis are both slightly above league average, Ramiro Pena slightly below.  Jason Heyward, Chris Johnson, and B.J. Upton are both well below, especially the older Upton, who has only been successful in 3 of his 18 attempts.  The sample size for all players is tremendously low, but it's the closest thing we have to being able to quantify productive outs. 

For what it's worth, the 1985 Braves were successful in 31% of their opportunities, the World Series Champion 1995 Braves were successful in an abysmal 30% of their opportunities, and the 2005 Baby Braves were successful in 33% of their opportunities.  Further observation seems to point to a small trend.  Slap hitters are generally better at the successful productive outs, but that should be expected, though not just for the reason you expect.  Mark Lemke was successful in 39% of his chances in 1995, but he was also 7 for 9 in sacrifice bunt attempts. 

I hope you learned something.  Productive outs are a key staple to the idea of small ball.  Atlanta is not built for such a game, but they do an adequate job at successfully capitalizing on productive out opportunities, at least according to their peers.