Random Ex-Brave: Roman Colon

During the offseason, the Random Ex-Brave column ran on Sundays, but during the season, Random Prospect Sunday gets that preferred spot largely because its name literally has the day of the week in it. So, like a TV show getting moved to a new time, Random Ex-Brave will be a Thursday special here at Walk-Off Walk.net. Our first victim's best ERA with any one team in the majors came as a member of the Braves. Bad news...it was still 4.69.

S. Cunningham | Getty Images

Born in the Dominican Republic on my oldest sister's birthday, August 13, 1979, Roman Colon would sign his first professional contract the day after he turned 16. Guess the Braves really wanted him. I remember him as kind of lanky, but B-R has him at 245 pounds, so he definitely filled out his 6'5" frame. The righty was never a big prospect. He spent the first three seasons of his career climbing the latter, even playing for short-season A Jamestown. The Braves no longer carry a short-season A squad anymore. After 2000 was lost to injury, Colon strung some decent years together where his ERA was around 3.50 and he looked the part of an okayish starter with decent control and a penchant for keeping the ball in the park. Midway through 2003, the Braves began to shift Colon to the pen, where his limited arsenal was better suited and he followed with the best K numbers of his short career in 2004.

By late August, an injury to the Braves pen had them reeling so they brought Colon up to fill in. In his first outing against the Dodgers on August 21, Colon pitched an innings in a 7-4 loss, striking out former Brave Jose Hernandez and future Brave David Ross. Colon followed that up with a pair of similar outings where he faced the minimum in garbage time before getting touched up for two runs in his fourth game. On August 30, Colon worked a quiet ninth against the Giants, including retiring Barry Bonds, and in the bottom half of the inning, Julio Franco tripled in a game-tying run before Andruw Jones singled in Mike Hampton, who was running for Franco, for the walk-off pitcher scoring win. It was the first of eight major league wins for Colon.

He would continue to receive steady work throughout September, but would not appear in the majors. The following year, because of his available service time, he became one of the Baby Braves. He opened the year in the pen, but was pretty awful. His ERA was an awful 8.50 in mid-June when an injury moved Colon to the starting rotation. His first start came against the Orioles and he stifled the O's for no runs over six innings, though the former Brave Bruce Chen was doing the same to the Braves. Finally, after Colon had left, the Braves jumped out to a 4-0 lead. They would watch that lead disappear over the final two innings, largely due to Chris Reitsma sucking. Andruw would bail them out with a homer to leadoff the bottom of the ninth for the win. Colon would lose his next start, but cruised in a 5-1 victory against the Cubs on July 5. He would receive one more start before being shifted back to the pen for one game. On July 31, the Braves moved him, and Zach Miner, to the Tigers for Kyle Farnsworth. Farnsworth would blow in the NLDS. Screw Farnsworth.

Colon finished the year with the Tigers and got 20 more games with Detroit the following year, including his only major league save (three inning variety). His last game with the Tigers would come on his 27th birthday. In 2007, he began the year on the DL and once finally healthy, he went on a rehab assignment. He would get into a fight with teammate Jordan Tata and inadvertently punched Jason Karnuth, another Mud Hens pitcher who tried to break up the fight. Karnuth would require a titanium plate to be screwed into his head. Colon pleaded no contest to assault and did 200 hours of community service. Moral of the story - don't break up fights. Shortly after a suspension halted his rehab assignment, Colon was traded to the Royals for a minor leaguer. He would appear in just one more minor league game that season before returning in 2008 for 33 games in the minors, including ten starts. He was no great shakes, but the Royals of the Oughts didn't care about such things. He was a former Brave.

So, in 2009, it was of little surprise that he appeared in 43 games for the Royals to fairly ugly results. The 2009 Royals did lose 97 games and Colon was tagged for 27 of the 842 runs their staff gave up. The presence of Colon helps answer the question of how bad does the rest of your staff have to be to have a team ERA of 4.83 and waste years by two of the most promising pitchers in baseball at the time in Zack Greinke (2.16 ERA) and Joakim Soria (2.21 ERA).

Colon would open the 2010 season in the majors, but even the Royals had their limits and demoted him after an ERA of 18 in five games. Yeah, that's eighteen with an 18. He briefly played in Omaha before testing his luck in Korea. He actually wasn't all that bad, which says more about the level of play in Korea. Interestingly, Kia wanted Colon to return the following year. They submitted a qualifying offer for 75% of his prior contact. I'm not exactly sure what that would have been and Colon didn't know about it at the time because his agents never informed him. His next contract brought him back to the states for $12,500 a month. He sought a million in the lawsuit and stated he would have immediately signed with Kia had he been told about the offer so I imagine it was a fairly lucrative one for him, especially considering he only garnered minor league contract interest.

In 2011, the Dodgers needed some depth in the minors and brought Colon aboard for a year. Then, the Royals called...again. Seems they just couldn't quit Colon. He returned to Omaha to open the year and had a 3.09 ERA in 40 games with 7 saves so the Royals naturally did what the Royals did back then. Brought him back to the majors. It only took them three games this time to realize that Colon was better suited to stick in AAA.

The year of 2013 was one of movement for Colon. He started the year trying to make the Pirates roster, but naturally headed to Indianapolis. For one game. It appeared the Braves needed an arm so why not Colon? They purchased their former non-prospect for seven games with Gwinnett before trying to return Colon to the store for a full refund. The Pirates policy was no returns so the Braves put Colon on Craig's List, where the Rockies purchased him in May. He played two games in their system.

Last year, Colon found himself in Taiwan with the Brother Elephants. Can we change our mascot to the Elephant? No real idea how he did there and I don't care enough to research it. Colon is currently signed to the, you guessed it, Royals. He's schedule to open 2015 with the AA Northwest Arkansas Naturals. His last action in AA also came with Northwest Arkansas. That came in 2008.

It's actually fairly impressive that the now 35 year-old is still around almost twenty years after becoming a professional at the age of 16 and 1 day. You have to respect the resolve. Or the stubbornness to not quit.

More Random Ex-Braves
Ray Holbert (1998)
John Burkett (2000-01)
Derrek Lee (2010)

The Misguided "Hooray for Smallball" Argument

Two games, two wins, two pretty good showings of the 2015 Braves offense. Against a very tough Henderson Alvarez on Monday, the Braves took advantage of a balk, a misplayed ball in center, a double clutch at second, and apparently Mother Nature (if Dee Gordon's to be believed) to win 2-1. Tuesday evening, the Braves shifted gears and worked the count into aiding a seven-run first. Of course, it helped that Mat Latos was throwing batting practice fastballs, but the Braves kept hitting it where they weren't, aided by a trio of doubles that quickly put the game out of reach in a 12-2 win.

Twitter and facebook groups quickly came to a conclusion. Smallball works and strikeouts are the devil.

There appears to be no undecided's on this front. To some, strikeouts are just another out and there is plenty of evidence to suggest that - in most circumstances - strikeouts are just another way to make an out when the name of the game is to not make outs. Others would argue that strikeouts too often are a product of selfishly giving up on an at-bat over putting the ball in play and forcing the defense to make a play. Like many other social and/or political stances in our country, there doesn't seem to be much wiggle room on this subject.

However, it misses the point. In fact, it's basically trolling the subject.

Strikeouts aren't the enemy if your offense is built a certain way. On the other hand, smallball is best suited for certain offenses. It all boils down to philosophy. Let's get this out of the way...if the Atlanta Braves had showed the power last year that they did in 2013, they would have been a productive offense. They probably would have been in the playoffs. Frank Wren is probably still the general manager. But something went awry between 2013 and 2014. Looking at the numbers, it appeared the Braves, under a manager like Fredi Gonzalez, sought to not maximize their best abilities. Rather, they wanted to put the ball in play more. The problem with that philosophy, as justifiable as it may be in a vacuum, it doesn't work with the cast of characters the Braves had in 2014. The Braves swung more, but didn't make more contact. That led to the exact same strikeout percentage. That in itself doesn't tell us too much, but the bigger problem was that the Braves walked less and hit for less power. That turned what was, at worst (or best), an average offense in 2013 (101 RC+) to a woeful facsimile the following year despite largely sporting the same players. If Atlanta did desire to make more contact and strikeout less in 2014 than they did the previous year, it failed on both fronts with destructive side effects.

The Braves faced two possible avenues. Continue with Fredi and the same offensive players from 2014 and hope the problem was that their guys strangely hit better in odd years or accept that if Fredi is their guy, their personal ought to be better suited for what Fredi wants. Whether you like Fredi or not, and I'm certainly not a fan, you can't ask him to buy into a philosophy he doesn't support. That's why Wren wanted to get rid of him and that's why you wouldn't ask Bill Parcells to stick to a 4-3 defense when he prefers a 3-4. The manager has to be reflected in the philosophy of the team. One reason for the consistency of the Bobby Cox 2.0 Braves was because everyone was part of the same picture. At times, the philosophy altered, but what was important was that John Schuerholz and Cox were on the same page.

What does that have to do with this year's offense? Well, this year's offense suits Fredi. He wants the bunting, the aggressive running, the putting the ball in play. To be clear, there is no right way to score runs provided you, ya know, score runs. A look at the best offenses in terms of wRC+ over the last five years shows a variety of ways to sport an elite offense. The 2011 Red Sox did it with walks and power. Two years later, the Sox hit for less power and struck out more, but kept the walk rate and were a better team on the basepathes. The 2013 Tigers stunk as baserunning (which includes more than stealing bases). But they did for a high average and had enough pop. The 2012 Rangers didn't walk or strike out much, but hit for power (aided by their park). Boxing yourself into a Smallball vs. Three True Outcomes discussion is a waste of time. Both can work provided the team philosophy and the roster facilitates it. You wouldn't tell the 2013 Tigers that they need to steal more bases. Similarly, you wouldn't tell the 2013 Braves that they need to put the ball in play more. You would waste your team's best resources to tell Justin Upton he needs to put a bunt down.

Smallball works with the presently constructed roster and the manager tasked with getting the most out of it. It's not better than the 2013 offense that relied on walks, homers, and yes, a lot of strikeouts. It's not worse, either. It's right and that alone is a better use of the roster than we saw all of last year.

Let's Rationalize Nick Markakis

In an offseason of rebuilding that has sent young veterans packing for prospects, John Hart has done a nice job rebuilding a farm system on a fly while improving the financial freedom of the organization to re-enter the free agent market to supplement the youth when the time calls for it. It's been a marvel that has turned the system from barren to envious in less than six short months.

Yet there has been a few questionable moves. Well, really only one, but you could question the two year pact given to new closer Jason Grilli, but that would be nit-picking. No, the only move that still confuses even the most knowledgeable of commentators was the four-year, $44M contract the Braves gave Nick Markakis to come home to Georgia.

At the time the deal was signed, I wrote about the signing with this ending thought. "My biggest worry this offseason was that the front office would half-ass a rebuild rather than full-ass." As we would find out, the Braves ultimately did full-ass a rebuild, which was the right call if you felt they needed to rebuild at all. But the signing of Markakis continues to stick out like a sore thumb. By the way, I do realize the odd timing of this article when Markakis went 1-for-4 yesterday with a steal and both RBIs to help the Braves win, but that does not alter what remains the bigger underlying question. Why are the Braves paying him so much for so long considering he's entering his age-31 season and they most certainly are rebooting the franchise?

I've thought about this for quite awhile and here's the only reasoning I can suggest...

1) The Braves felt Markakis was the model ballplayer.

He doesn't strike out. He puts the ball in play. Orioles players were distraught when he left Baltimore so he's got leadership skills and good character. Markakis was the type of player that Atlanta wants their young guys to become. The gritty, balls-to-the-wall player who leaves it all on the field. It's this kind of David Eckstein-ish behavior that wins games...theoretically.

On the other hand, the reason why players like Markakis have to be so gritty and all heart is because they have to squeeze every last bit of talent out to even be the complimentary baseball player that Markakis actually is. Markakis has been around a two-win player since 2008. That's useful, but not unusual. Over the last five years, there have been 482 instances of a position player finishing the year with 2 fWAR or higher. Simple math suggests close to hundred players each year are just as valuable as Markakis typically is and often, more valuable. Not all of them are sniffing $44M. And that's not even getting into finding 2 wins in the aggregate via a platoon or whatever the hell a "soft platoon" is.

But Atlanta seemed to either not agree with that assessment or believed, as I said before, that Markakis's intangibles made him the model ballplayer they wanted to seek out.

2) Atlanta bought into their own hype.

There are many fans, especially in the wake of the Craig Kimbrel trade, who are upset about a front office that lied to them regarding Kimbrel's availability. He was untouchable, they pointed out and there are plenty of links to suggest that, yes, Kimbrel was supposedly part of the core that was safe from the offseason of change.

Another line that Hart and Company and thrown around is that the Braves believe they can compete in 2015. This seems ridiculous on the service, though anything can happen, but Hart spoke of a "parallel" vision of building for the future while also attempting to compete in 2015. Remember when I said I worried that the Braves would half-ass a rebuild? Lines like that bothered me to no end.

Trading Kimbrel changed that. The Braves were effectively waiving the white flag on the 2015 season, acknowledging what seemed apparent when they found new homes for Justin Upton and Evan Gattis. But when they signed Markakis, Upton and Gattis, along with Kimbrel, were still on the team. People made a reasonable comparison between Markakis and Jason Heyward, who had already been dealt, and suggested that the Braves got a poor man's Heyward (for $44M), Shelby Miller, and an intriguing prospect in Tyrell Jenkins and avoided Heyward leaving via free agency. It seemed like a reasonable exchange that could even benefit the Braves both in 2015 and in the long run. After all, they were trying to woo Jon Lester if you believe that their interest was as significant as the AJC tried to suggest that it was.

Maybe, at the time, the Braves felt they could still build a team that would compete in 2015 and still build toward the future. We may never know what they originally sought for Upton, but they may have also been seeking major league-ready players (beyond Jace Peterson, of course). They shopped the pieces that didn't fit what they wanted their offense to be and tried to acquire talent that could help the 2015 squad, but teams balked at giving up a solid haul with major league talent for a soon-to-be-free agent like Upton or a defensive question mark like Gattis. The Braves could have painted themselves into a corner and accepted their fate. Rebuild with prospects and deal with the consequences.

3) They got to spend the money anyway

When you are part of a department of any huge entity, whether it be government or a corporation, you have to utilize every cent of the payroll you have been given or risk losing it in the future. Atlanta may have figured that a rebuild would have lasted at least two years - probably more - and the Braves still needed to carry a reasonable close payroll to previous years regardless of the moves that they made to build the franchise up. Adding another big contract to the mix like Markakis was a reasonable exercise to field team with a comparable payroll to recent years.

Of course, Atlanta could not have foreseen the willingness of an organization like San Diego to take on every cent owed to Melvin Upton Jr., which would have a significant affect on their payroll. Either way, the Braves have a payroll and needed to spend some of it. Why not add a high character guy like Markakis on a deal that may run its course by the time the Braves are able to compete?

Conclusion

There is no real conclusion, sadly. Unless John Hart wants to pen Built to Win 2: How I Became Public Enemy #1 in Atlanta, why the Braves ultimately went down the road they did while also adding Markakis is simply subjective guessing. In the mean time, signing Markakis will continue to look inconsistent compared to the the winter (and spring) of change. Also in the mean time, the Braves gave Markakis a reasonable amount of money for his services and at least give the Braves a competent major league bat in a lineup that may not have many. We can quibble about the years and the context and we most certainly will. By this time the deal is coming into the fourth year, the Braves may pay someone to take Markakis like they did with Derek Lowe.

But for now, he is unquestionably a pretty good fit for the Braves offense. So, there's that.

Once a Brave, Always a Brave: Opening Day Rosters

This series keeps tabs on how former Braves are doing in the league. Typically, I will focus on one division or even one team in isolated situations, but there's not a lot to report right now so I will focus more on which former Braves made opening day rosters in other cities. If I counted correctly, there are 62 former Braves (or Braves farmhands) who either were on the opening day roster or the DL. Only four teams are currently without a Brave, which is probably why they will fail in 2015.

Arizona
Nick Ahmed
Randall Delgado
Gerald Laird

Baltimore
None surprisingly enough

Boston
Anthony Varvaro

Chicago Cubs
David Ross
Tommy La Stella

Chicago White Sox
Emilio Bonifacio
Melky Cabrera
Tyler Flowers
Adam LaRoche

Cincinnati
J.J. Hoover
Jason Marquis (seriously?)
Brayan Pena

Cleveland
Michael Bourn

Colorado
David Hale (DL)
Boone Logan

Detroit
None

Houston
Evan Gattis
Brett Oberholtzer (DL, minor league Brave)

Kansas City
Omar Infante
Kris Medlen (DL)

Los Angeles Angels in the Outfield
Cory Rasmus (DL)

Los Angeles Dodgers
Brandon Beachy (DL)

Miami
Jeff Baker (do you remember that?)
Mike Dunn
Martin Prado
Jarrod Saltalamacchia

Minnesota
Blaine Boyer
J.R. Graham (sob)
Ervin Santana (suspended)
Jordan Schafer

Milwaukee
None

New York Mets
Buddy Carlyle
Sean Gilmartin (why have you forsaken us, Ryan Doumit?)

New York Yankees
David Carpenter
Garrett Jones (he played in the minors for the Braves)
Brian McCann
Chasen Shreve
Mark Teixeira

Pittsburgh
Jeff Locke
Charlie Morton (DL)

Philadelphia
Jeff Francoeur
Aaron Harang

Oakland
Jesse Chavez
Eric O'Flaherty

San Diego
Craig Kimbrel
Justin Upton
Melvin Upton Jr.(DL)

San Francisco
Erik Cordier (DL)
Gregor Blanco
Tim Hudson

Seattle
Jesus Sucre

St. Louis
Matt Belisle
Jason Heyward (fresh wounds)
Adam Wainwright (old wounds)
Jordan Walden

Tampa Bay
None

Texas
Elvis Andrus
Neftali Feliz
Matt Harrison (DL...shocker)

Toronto
Todd Redmond (four days with the Braves, never played)

Washington
Yunel Escobar
Nate McLouth (DL)
Reed Johnson
Dan Uggla (excusing Reed, this list of players should make us root against the Nats all the more)

2015 Top 30: Wisler & Paroubeck's ranking

Small update on my Top 30 Prospects in the wake of yesterday's trade, which threw another wrench into what was completed a few weeks ago. Both players would slide into my Top 30, which pushes Victor Reyes and Wes Parsons out for right now (they may return in the midseason version).

I knew from the get-go that Matt Wisler would be in my Top 5, but where? My current Top 5 is Jose Peraza, Lucas Sims, Max Fried, Michael Foltynewicz, and Rio Ruiz. I grade Wisler as a B+ prospect and I'll put him second, pushing Sims back one. Peraza remains my only A- prospect, so he'll stave off the challenge and stick at the top.

As for Jordan Paroubeck, he's much more raw. However, he's a very intriguing prospect so I have him as a C+ guy right now, which covers #12 to #21. I'll place him #21 for right now, right behind Jace Peterson and in front of Johan Camargo. He has the potential, however, to jump into the Top 20 quickly and even higher. I'm trying to keep my optimism about him limited because of how young and raw he is. Chances of bust with a player like that are significantly higher than normal. Nevertheless, it's hard not to dream about how good he could be.

By midseason, we'll see the addition of a lot of draft prospects so as deep as the system is now, it has a chance to be flowing with high-end talent very shortly.

Opening Day Fun Facts for the Atlanta Braves from About.com

Let's put this Craig Kimbrel stuff behind us for a second. Today is opening day, one of the most exciting days of the year for baseball fans. Anything is possible on opening day even for teams, like the Braves, who are projected to be among the poorest teams in baseball. Checking the standings, the Braves are tied for first. And last. But I prefer first.

I compiled a serious of often random facts about opening day throughout the years for the Braves. Jason Heyward, Hank Aaron, Warren Spahn, Greg Maddux, Chipper Jones, Eddie Mathews, and today's opening day starter Julio Teheran are all mentioned. Happy opening day, everyone!

Breaking Down the Epic Kimbrel Trade for About.com

I've went over the Who in this article and also this one, but what about the trade and what it means for the Atlanta Braves. For that, head on over to the About.com blog where I dare to use addition to look at the financial implications plus what this trade means in the short-term and in the future. Trading Craig Kimbrel is never easy, but the deal looks like a steal for the Atlanta Braves. In the end, it was the smart move to make even if it made twitter go nuts. 

Keep reading for more.