Should the Braves Consider Moving Teheran?

Julio Teheran looked like the unquestioned ace of the Big Four pitching prospects the Braves once had churning in the minor leagues. Along with Mike Minor, Randall Delgado, and Arodys Vizcaino, Teheran was part of a group that would hopefully anchor the Braves rotation for much of the 2010's. Of course, here we are in 2017 and only Teheran remains as a starter, let alone in the Braves staff. And some might argue that we've reached the point where even that needs to change

Such commentary has pushed other Braves fans in a different direction. While more focused on a different pitcher, a frustrated Aaron Kirby remarked on Twitter this morning, "In fact, Julio and Folty have pretty similar stats this season. When are we moving Julio to the pen?" This refers to a common refrain from Braves fans - including ones at this blog - that Mike Foltynewicz profiles better as a reliever. But Kirby rightfully points out that both the flame-throwing right-hander and Teheran share many of the same issues. Why does one get talked about moving to the bullpen and the other doesn't? I would say for a variety of reasons, but the biggest is perception. People have long felt Folty's stuff was better suited for the bullpen. Nobody held the same regard for Teheran, who was considered a potential front-of-the-rotation arm.

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But five years into his career, is Teheran merely a decent enough rotation filler? Should the Braves consider possibly trading Teheran now rather than pay him at least $20M (including a 2020 buyout) through the 2019 season? While many will scoff at the idea out of practice, it's worth considering.

When Teheran signed a $32.4M extension in mid-February of 2014, he was coming off his first full-season in the majors. The deal effectively bought out the remaining five years of arbitration, a year of free agency, and potentially a second year with an $12M option for 2020. Along with the Andrelton Simmons' extension, both were very aggressive moves by the front office as they attempted to get ahead of the horse for what appeared likely to be very expensive arbitration years for the two young players. The plan was to pay them a bit more now but potentially save money later on. In turn, the players received financial security. Simmons would later be traded and while Teheran was often thrown around as a potential arm to be dealt in trade talks, he stuck around as the Braves went into a full rebuild.

Since signing the extension, he's been equally good and bad. In 2014 and 2016, he posted a matching WAR, according to Fangraphs, of 3.2 in both seasons. But then, his WAR fell to 1.1 in 2015 and it's unlikely to even reach that this season. In fact, since he signed the extension, his fWAR ranks just outside the Top 50 qualified starters in baseball at 7.9. That's lower than Tanner Roark, Mike Leake, and Bartolo Colon. It'd likely be lower if not for Teheran's durability. He's tossed the tenth most innings since the beginning of 2014. Nevertheless, the last four years haven't exactly lined up for Teheran like anyone had hoped.

Further, there is a reason to believe his 2016 bounce back season had a little too much luck in it. Lefties had a .247 BABIP against him that season, 35 points below his career average when facing left-handed hitters. His production against lefties has long been an issue that has limited Teheran, who has yet to develop a pitch to keep them honest. In turn, lefties bash him around to the tune of a 5.05 FIP over his career and it's only worsened as time has gone on (5.67 FIP since the beginning of 2015). Nearly 35% of batted balls since 2015 are classified as hard-hit, according to Baseball Info Solutions. To put it another way, a third of all balls left-handed batters put in play are scorched around the park. Some are caught, but too many of them find holes in the defense - or worse, become a souvenir for a fan in the outfield bleachers.

Teheran's problems against left-handers start with one key issue: his fastball loses much of its effectiveness against them. About a quarter of all swings on his four-seam fastball against right-handers are whiffs. That number falls about 10% against left-hand batters. Without a fastball to get ahead in the count, Teheran can't use his secondary pitches to induce weaker contact - or get more whiffs. Further, we don't see much of a drop in whiffs on Teheran's breaking pitches despite how many plate appearances in a game a right-hand hitter might have against Teheran. Against left-handers, his slider and curve see great declines in whiffs-per-swing after the first time through the order. That suggests that after left-hand batters get a read on his breaking pitches, they learn to lay off the ones they can't hit. The ones that they do...well, they don't always land.

Single Season Top fWAR for Braves SP since 2008 

Let's pull back for a second because it's definitely worth mentioning that Teheran doesn't turn 27 until the end of next January. Further, this is a pitcher with a pair of 3-win seasons during his career, something that's happened just nine times over the last decade for the Braves and almost certainly won't occur this year. Ignoring the reasons the Braves gave him an extension in the first place is a disservice to Teheran's time in the majors.

But two other pitchers show up on that list of 3-win guys since 2008 and they should scare Braves' fans - Jair Jurrjens and Tommy Hanson. Much like Teheran, they were, at different times in their career, expected to front line a Braves' rotation for the next half-decade. And while we can talk about injuries and personal demons, another issue that developed for both pitchers might also serve as a warning sign for Teheran.

Declining velocity doesn't always mean something bad, but it can be a problem for a pitcher moving forward. In his rookie season of 2008, Jair Jurrjens averaged 92.4 mph on his four-seamer and 92.7 mph on his sinker. By 2011, he had lost three mph on both and a year later, he would be non-tendered by the Braves. He's made three starts in the majors since. During Hanson's rookie year, he averaged 92.7 mph on his four-seamer and 92.4 mph on his sinker. During his one 3-win season, he added a tick more velocity on the four-seamer but lost some on his sinker. The added velocity on his four-seamer was gone the next year and in 2012, it fell to 90.7 mph. That was his final year with the Braves. With Teheran, his velocity dropped after his rookie season from 93 mph to 92.2 mph. It stayed roughly the same in 2015, but he's continued to bleed a little velocity off in the two years since. In five years, he's gone from an average 93 mph to 91.9 mph. He's just 26 years-old. Now, the loss in average velocity is not a massive alarming discrepancy, but at his age, losing velocity is something to keep an eye on.

To not be concerned about Teheran's production at this point is to ignore reality. What's worse is that Teheran's struggles might only get worse, depending on how high this peak in offensive production that we are seeing league-wide goes. In 2014, the league ISO was .135 and the wOBA was .310. It's climbed to .172 and .322 respectively this season, prompting many commentators to refer to this year as a sign the ball is juiced again. Teheran has always given up a healthy amount of homers, but with home runs leaving the yard at an increased rate, that makes a pitcher like Teheran especially vulnerable. It's worth mentioning that baseball runs in cycles and just a few years ago, people were going crazy about a "Golden Age of Pitchers."

Could the Braves need, as Kirby also said, a new pitching coach? Well, they went down that route last winter when they sacked Roger McDowell in favor of Chuck Hernandez. It's unlikely that the Braves will shed Hernandez after just one year, though Ken Rosenthal recently suggested some radical moves might be on the horizon by an increasingly frustrated front office.

Let's circle back to those questions I asked earlier: is Teheran merely a decent enough rotation filler? Should the Braves consider possibly trading Teheran now?

To the first question, I think there is a good chance of yes, Teheran is just a durable innings eater. According to Baseball-Reference, Teheran's most similar pitcher through 25 was Scott Sanderson. A veteran of 19 years in the majors, Sanderson got to the bigs at 21 years-old with the Expos and a lot was expected from the right-hander. Ultimately, he never received a Cy Young vote, was named to just one All-Star Game, and started two playoff games in which he got beat around a good deal. Nevertheless, he was a good rotation piece for the Expos and then the Cubs before settling into a more nomadic experience over the final seven years of his career. Essentially, he was the Ervin Santana of his time. Could that be Teheran's future?

Or could he be a starter that does figure it out finally in his later 20's more than he ever had before? Certainly, it's a possibility, but is it one the Braves should count on? Is it one that Teheran has shown much reason to expect over the last three years?

Maybe the best argument against trading Teheran is the one I have made before. Trading him this offseason might be the worst time to do so. His value has taken a big hit this season and moving him now could be considered selling low on a player who, again, has had two 3-win seasons in his young career. General managers can get over missing the right window to trade a pitcher - as Frank Wren did with Jair Jurrjens. What keeps them up at night is trading a pitcher who looks to be on the decline only to see them find it again in a new city while you took back a small return just to get rid of him.

Teheran's Splits vs. LH batters since 2013

The second-best argument against trading Teheran is the same one that one might argue when we discuss moving Foltynewicz to the bullpen. Why move these guys when the rotation isn't exactly pushing them out of the way right now? Inning eaters certainly have value especially in a young rotation prone to outings that require long relief stints. In addition, trading Teheran would have to be part of a series of moves aimed at shoring up the front-of-the-rotation. John Coppolella would have to rebuild the first three spots in the rotation this offseason without Teheran in the mix at an affordable rate.

To sum up, this has been an exercise from someone who's not sure what the answer is. I have decreasing confidence that Teheran will resemble the guy we once thought would headline a playoff rotation. At the same time, are the Braves in a position where they can actually trade Teheran right now? And even if they were, is now the right time to trade Teheran? Did the Braves already miss their window to maximize Teheran's market value and now are better off keeping him for some level of consistency as he eats innings every fifth day? All the while, they are merely hoping to see another unsustainably low BABIP against left-hand batters to increase Teheran's production.

There's no easy answer here. My belief is that the Braves will wait, see, and hope. I guess their fans are left with the same options.

Thursday Throwback - Reed Johnson

Sometimes, moves just don't pan out like they ought to. That was the case of the 2012 midseason trade that sent Reed Johnson, along with Paul Maholm, to the Braves. The trade was born out of a move that didn't happen and ultimately, failed to deliver despite looking like a good deal on paper for Frank Wren. Even when Wren made the right move, it just didn't seem to work.

But long before that trade, Reed Johnson was born a few weeks before Christmas in 1976. A product of Riverside, California, Johnson was a star in both baseball and soccer in high school. His success there landed him a coveted scholarship opportunity with Cal-State Fullerton, where he was an Academic All-American and posted strong offensive numbers as a catalyst for the Titans' offense. Undrafted out of high school, Johnson played well enough during his college years to move into the 17th round of the draft, which is where the Blue Jays took him. The '99 draft wasn't very good for the Jays. They took Alex Rios with their first round pick and he did develop into a decent player, but only three other players made it to the majors, including Johnson, the second-best player taken that year by Toronto.

After a summer of adjusting to pro ball, Johnson became an overnight prospect in 2000. He spent the year at two different A-ball stops and slashed .298/.420/.479, flashing plus-plus plate discipline and enough power and speed to be a very intriguing prospect. In 2001, this time at Double-A, Johnson became a name to watch. Spending the year with the Tennessee Smokies, Johnson slashed .314/.384/.451. The walk total was a bit of a letdown, but Johnson filled out his baseball card with 29 doubles, four triples, 13 homers, and 42 steals. The Southern League All-Star looked like he was a great late-round find for the Blue Jays and a player that could help them very soon.

After missing most of 2002 with injury, Johnson worked his way into the picture for the big league club in 2003. After opening the year in the minors, Johnson would soon establish himself as a major league performer with a strong summer. In 114 games in the majors, Johnson hit .294 with 10 homers and a .353 on-base percentage. The Jays had opened the year with super sub Frank Catalanotto in right field, but an injury to Shannon Stewart opened left for Catalanotto and allowed Johnson to slide into right field. Bobby Kielty would later join the team, cutting into Johnson's playing time, but Johnson proved his worth by being the Blue Jays' most used leadoff hitter.

For the next two years, Johnson was the regular left fielder for the Jays and was unspectacular in his job before a breakout 2006 campaign saw Johnson hit .319/.390/.479 with 12 homers. He led the AL in getting hit by a pitch that season as well. However, his success was short-lived. During an injury-marred 2007 season, he hit just .236 over 79 games. Johnson struggled the next spring as well and with the Jays feeling a roster crush, Toronto surprisingly released Johnson as spring training was nearing its end. The five-year pro would not remain available for long as he landed with the Cubs. A bench bat and platoon player, Johnson was a perfect fit in Chicago. He OPS'd .778 his first season with the Cubbies before slashing .255/.330/.412 during an injury-shortened 2009 season.

Johnson took his talents out west and played for the Dodgers in 2010, which wasn't much of a trip from the city he was born (Riverside). He struggled with in Los Angeles, though, and lasted just one year before returning to the Cubs in 2011. Like he had never left, his success returned.

That brings us to the 2012 season. The Cubs were in the first year of their rebuild under Theo Epstein. The former Red Sox mastermind had just hired Jed Hoyer to be their General Manager. That season, the Cubs were breaking in young Anthony Rizzo at first base (who, interestingly enough, Hoyer had dealt to the Cubs as the Padres' GM) and Chicago was trying to add young talent to the mix to build what eventually would become a winner. Meanwhile, the Atlanta Braves were trying to get back to the playoffs after their 2011 collapse during then-manager Fredi Gonzalez's first year at the helm. The Cubs and Braves seemed like a perfect match and a week before the trading deadline, a deal seemed imminent. However, neither Johnson, nor lefthander Paul Maholm, were part of it.

Atlanta was desperate to add a starter to their team that they could count on. With Jair Jurrjens looking like a lost cause, the Braves had turned to Ben Sheets. 25 year-old Tommy Hanson was struggling and Brandon Beachy, also 25, had made just 13 starts before going down with injury. They still had Tim Hudson while Mike Minor was improving, as a team with playoff aspirations, Atlanta did not have the kind of rotation that would be able to compete against the big boys of the National League. Atlanta thought they had found their man in Ryan Dempster. The former closer had been excellent to begin 2012 with a 2.11 ERA through his first 15 starts. While Dempster wasn't an ace, he was the kind of bulldog starter that gave his manager and general manager a bit more confidence than hoping Sheets could make it through the summer or that Hanson could turn the corner.

Wren and Hoyer found the right mix of players that would make the deal happen. Atlanta would send young Randall Delgado to the Cubs, which would finally separate the four pitchers of the future (Minor, Delgado, Julio Teheran, and Arodys Vizcaino). Another prospect would head to Chicago as well and the Braves would get Dempster. One little problem, though. With over 14 years of experience, including eight full seasons with the Cubs, Dempster qualified as a 10-5 player and could nix any deal. Dempster was open to a trade, but preferred to head out west where he could join his good buddy Ted Lilly and the Dodgers. While Dempster weighed his options - and definitely held out hope for a move to the Dodgers - the Braves grew agitated. All the perimeters were agreed upon and the deal had been leaked out to the public. Wren set a deadline for Dempster, but the right-hander refused to make a decision as he held out hope Los Angeles would step up. Atlanta ultimately took themselves out of the process rather than watch Dempster play the part of the girl with a date to the Prom all lined up, but is still hoping to go with the high school quarterback rather than the dude that actually wants to be with her. Not that I know anything about that...

The Braves still wanted a pitcher, but could not find a Dempster-like arm on the trade market. Instead, they called Hoyer up and asked about Maholm. A long time Pirate, Maholm had joined the Cubs the previous offseason and he was also having a good season. Not a great one like Dempster, but would give the Braves a serviceable left-hand arm for their rotation. Meanwhile, the Braves did find their front-of-the-rotation arm by moving Kris Medlen into the rotation.  Coming along for the ride with Maholm and some bags of cash was Johnson. The Braves were stacked in the outfield with rookie Jason Heyward joining Michael Bourn and Martin Prado, but the prospect of adding a right-handed bat like Johnson to pair with Eric Hinske coming off the bench was a great fit. The Braves still broke up their four previously untouchable arms by sending Arodys Vizcaino to the Cubs in the deal along with reliever Jaye Chapman. Vizcaino was on the mend after having Tommy John surgery that spring.

Johnson got into 43 games down the stretch for the Braves and hit .270. He would get fairly regular time with Prado moving all over the field and helped to give the Braves their first real backup option to Bourn during the 2012 season. Both Prado and Bourn would be gone the next winter and would be replaced by Justin and Melvin "B.J" Upton Jr. Johnson, a free agent, liked Atlanta enough to return for a second year. He missed all of August with Achilles tendinitis, but missed even more time because Johnson was not a regular in the mix for the Braves even with the failures of the elder Upton. Instead, Johnson took a back seat to Jordan Schafer, who had returned after being claimed on waivers, and rookie Evan Gattis, who occasionally played left field to get his bat into the lineup more often. Johnson received five fewer plate appearances than Gerald Laird during the 2013 season and Johnson struggled to connect the bat to the ball with any authority.

During his year-and-a-half with the Braves, Johnson hit .256/.308/.332 with one homer, a pinch-hit two-run shot off former Braves farmhand Todd Redmond - then a member of Johnson's first team, the Jays. Johnson would struggle during a 2014 season spent as a reserve in Miami and continued his tour through the NL East with a stop in Washington next. A torn tendon in his left calf limited him to just 17 games with the Nats. He returned to DC the following year, but failed to make the roster coming out of camp last spring. I do not know if he's given up the dream of playing baseball again or not, but at 40 years-old, it seems unlikely that he'll continue his career.

His time with the Braves was short and ultimately uneventful. In the end, like many of Wren's deals, it just never worked like it should have. Of course, the Braves ended up re-acquiring Arodys Vizcaino from this deal so it cost precious little for Atlanta - even if it wasn't the deal they wanted.

Previous Throwbacks...
Mike Mordecai (1994-97)
David Ross (2009-12)
Ryan Langerhans (2002-03, 2005-07)

...or view ALL of them.

Braves Bring Back the Meds

By Keith Allison on Flickr (Original version) UCinternational
(Crop) [CC BY-SA 2.0], via Wikimedia Commons

In 2013, the Atlanta Braves had finally come together. Frank Wren's team was young - Dan Uggla was its only starter over 30. Frank Wren's team was also very powerful and bashed 181 homers led the league. Sure, they struck out a lot, but they also scored runs in bunches.

But lost in all of the feast-or-famine articles about the Braves' offense was its fine pitching staff. While Brandon Beachy would miss most of the season, the Braves got breakout years from Mike Minor and Julio Teheran. Young Alex Wood also pitched in, which became important when Eric Young Jr. shattered Tim Hudson's ankle one night in Flushing.

The 2013 Braves also had a righty who had finally stayed healthy all year and earned an every-fifth-day assignment in the rotation in Kris Medlen. "Meds" had been lethal down the stretch in 2012 after finally receiving a late promotion to the rotation. The Santa Ana College alum followed it up with career highs in most categories in 2013.

But then, like Breachy, Medlen would not make it out of the 2014 spring training before needing a second Tommy John surgery. It was the first couple of dominoes to fall in what would be a franchise-altering season. Wren would be fired and a rebuild would be ordered - one that would not include Medlen, as he was non-tendered after the 2014 season.

There was some hope the Braves might bring him back, but two weeks after Atlanta cut him loose, the Kansas City Royals promised him $8.5 million to come to the midwest. His rehab took a long time, but Medlen finally returned to the majors on July 20, 2014. He had a few stinkers mixed in over a 15-game run with the Royals, but still pitched his way onto KC's postseason roster. He would pitch twice - once as a long reliever after Johnny Cueto got blasted and the other time in KC's World Series Game Three loss to the Mets.

The hope was that Medlen would stabilize a Royals' pitching staff in 2016 that would lose Cueto and was thin beyond newcomer Ian Kennedy, veteran Edinson Volquez, and young Yordano Ventura (may he rest in peace). Instead, Medlen would struggle over six starts - especially with uncharacteristic wildness. His shoulder was hurting, which put him on the shelf He made a pair of comeback attempts, but was never able to get back to the Royals. His final outing of the year included retiring just one of the five Oklahoma City Dodgers he faced before being lifted with a line of 0.1 ING, 4 H, 4 R, 4 ER.

Let's try to compare the Medlen the Braves loved so dearly with the Medlen whose 2017 option was declined by the Royals. Pitch-wise, little has changed as far as usage and velocity go. He relies heavily on a low-90's sinker, throwing it 38% of the time last year. In fact, when you combine his four-seamer, about every other pitch on average is a fastball. He'll supplement that with a biting curveball that flutters to the plate at about 78 mph along with a changeup that has averaged 2-3 ticks faster since leaving Atlanta. He started to use a cutter toward the end of his Braves' stay and used it a lot more last year to mixed results.

One clear difference in Medlen since leaving Atlanta is related to release point, which the chart to the right shows courtesy of Brooks Baseball. In 2013, the ball was between roughly 5'9" and almost 6" feet off the ground when Medlen released the ball. Once he returned in 2015, he was releasing at more of a lower 3/4's rather than the high 3/4's of 2013. As a sinker-baller who depends on controlling the ball low-in-the-zone, not being able to get on top of his pitches won't help his effectiveness.

Medlen is a nice lottery ticket for the Braves to add - even as a relief option rather than a starter. If they can straighten his mechanics and get him to drop his changeup from the 84-85 mph range, it would be a big boost. Whether it was losing feel, the different arm slot, of Royals' coaching, Medlen lost his best pitch when he left Atlanta. In 2012, his changeup had a 16.6 wCH as far as pitch value goes. He didn't have enough innings to qualify for the ERA title so he didn't make the lead leaders list, but that pitch value would have ranked second. The next year, his breakout starter campaign, his changeup had a 12.6 wCH pitch value. That ranked sixth. It was his one true dominant pitch and it's been worth -2.4 since. That has to change.

At his best, Medlen can fool hitters with his fastballs and changeups and go to his curveball for strike outs. We haven't seen that version of Medlen since 2013. If the Braves are lucky, we could see it again in 2017, though it won't be until midseason at the earliest. Until then, it's nice to hope.

Braves Can McDowell

By EricEnfermero (Own work) [CC BY-SA 4.0
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0)], via Wikimedia Commons

After eleven seasons spanning three managers, Roger McDowell will no longer be the pitching coach of the Atlanta Braves. For a franchise that rarely sees turnover in the coaching staff, the last several months have been a change-of-pace. The in-season firing of Fredi Gonzalez, the very real chance that the interim manager Brian Snitker won't be in charge in 2017, and now McDowell's dismissal might point to one thing - John Coppolella is willing to change up the team a bit more than the last two general managers the Braves had.

McDowell replaced Leo Mazzone in 2006 after the latter left for Baltimore. Three years ago, McDowell nearly left the Braves following the 2013 season, but former general manager Frank Wren gave McDowell a boost in pay along with a long-term contract (for coaches) to keep him away from the Phillies. While with the Braves, McDowell pieced together bullpens with castoffs like Eric O'Flaherty, David Carpenter, and more recently - Jim Johnson, who cited his comfortability with McDowell as one of his reasons to forego free agency and reup with the Braves.

One criticism related to McDowell was a similar one lobbed at Mazzone - he didn't relate well with young starters and they rarely seemed to blossomed under his tutelage. Jair Jurrjens and Tommy Hanson both saw their careers slide into mediocrity after All-Star worthy beginnings. Others like Kyle Davies and Jo-Jo Reyes never developed. Another criticism of McDowell was found in the belief that his pitchers too often went under the knife, a stark change from the Mazzone years. When on the mound, righties Kris Medlen and Brandon Beachy - along with southpaw Mike Minor - could be excellent. However, they were frequently on an operating table rather than throwing strikes.

Both criticisms are a bit lacking in my mind. Young pitchers flame out all the time. I'm sure McDowell did struggle to reach certain prospects, but on the other hand, he got his fair share out of Julio Teheran, Alex Wood, Craig Kimbrel, Jonny Venters, and some of the aforementioned oft-injured pitchers. Furthermore, considering the rate of pitcher injuries - especially those that result in Tommy John surgery - is skyrocketing, can we really look at McDowell and blame him for that?

McDowell won't be without a job for too long. He's had too much success with the Braves, including a 2007 year where he pieced together a pitching staff that included Chuck James, Buddy Carlyle , Oscar Villarreal, Tyler Yates, Chad Paronto, and the previously mentioned Davies and Reyes and the Braves still finished third in the league in ERA. It was the first-of-seven years in which the Braves finished in the Top 5 in the National League in ERA, including a 3.18 ERA in 2013 to pace the league.

This dismissal means two things. One, the Braves do want a new voice to lead a very young pitching staff. Johnson is the only pitcher on the Braves roster who is definitely going to be on next year's team and is over the age of 30. Sixteen different pitchers took the ball for the Braves this year who were in their Age-25 year or younger. Pitchers like Sean Newcomb and Lucas Sims are a good spring camp away from entering the picture. Whether McDowell did have issues with reaching younger pitchers or not, the Braves definitely want the guy in charge of their young pitchers to have an exemplary record with young guns.

The other thing this firing immediately makes you think of - the Braves might be moving away from Brian Snitker as next year's manager and will be giving the next Braves manager a chance to build his own staff. That could be Bud Black, though I am not very excited by that idea. There is a good chance McDowell is just the tip of the ice berg and long-running coaches like Eddie Perez and Terry Pendleton will also be headed out.

I don't necessarily disagree with letting McDowell go. I think he was very good at his job and the fact that this 2016 team wasn't at the bottom of the league in ERA despite starting 16 different pitchers is impressive (four NL teams finished with an ERA worse than the Braves). Still, I am a firm believer in giving a manager the leeway to bring his guys in and build the coaching staff how he sees fit. Letting him go now simply allows McDowell even more time to secure employment for 2017 - which is actually a pretty good parting gift when you think about it.

Fare thee well, Second Spitter. May you land with an American League team and enjoy your time there.

Worst 5 Braves Drafts Since 2000 - #2

With the 2016 draft tomorrow, it's time to get to the end of this series. Just three more articles remain after this one.

Best/Worst Drafts since 2000
Worst: #5, 2009 | #4, 2004 | #3, 2013 | #2, 2011 | #1, 2001
Best: #5, 2010 | #4, 2015 | #3, 2007 | #2, 2002 | #1, 2000

2nd Worst Draft Since 2000 - The 2011 Draft 

Gilmartin | By Kaotate [GFDL or CC BY-SA 3.0],
via Wikimedia Commons

On one hand, Atlanta's haul in the 2011 draft produced eight major leaguers. On the other hand, the Frank Wren/Tony DeMacio-led approach of cheap, sign-able college players effectively reduced the chance that the Braves would bring an impact player into the system. The 2011 edition would possibly be their worst draft together.

Flash back to 2010. The Atlanta Braves would win 91 games in Bobby Cox's final year and were batting on the young duo of Tommy Hanson and Jair Jurrjens to lead their rotation while the also young core of Brian McCann, Martin Prado, Jason Heyward, and the just-arrived Freddie Freeman would give the Braves a big boost at the plate. The Braves also had high hopes for the foursome of Mike Minor, Arodys Vizcaino, Randall Delgado, and Julio Teheran. You could forgive Wren and DeMacio if they felt they had a dynasty on their hands.

Of course, they didn't and the 2011 draft certainly didn't help matters. Their first pick finally came with the 28th overall selection. As they had done two years before, they went with a left-hander out of a big southern college program. But Sean Gilmartin wasn't Minor - who certainly raised his share of eyebrows when the Braves drafted him. Minor's floor was noticeably higher than Gilmartin for one. Gilmartin was a borderline Top 50 player heading into the draft. He was a perfectly fine second rounder, but the Braves played it safe as they had done so often during the Wren years. Either there was an edict that they needed to compete and needed cheap depth players to fill in the gaps rather than hope for the best with an 18 year-old out of high school or the Braves were just flatout missing. Regardless, Atlanta made the choice to knowingly give up on the high reward and play the chances that they have grabbed a high enough floor guy to play in the majors.

They were successful. They also had very bad drafts as a result. 2011 stands out because the Braves not only drafted a college player in the first round once again, they did so in 18-of-the-first-19 rounds. They went with smart kids out of UConn (Nick Ahmed) and Gonzaga (Cody Martin) along with smaller school standouts like Kyle Kubitza and Tommy La Stella. The draft could have just easily been a winner. Instead of Joe Panik or Henry Owens, it was Gilmartin in the first round. Instead of Andrew Susac in the second, it was Ahmed. Instead of Carter Capps, it was Kubitza in the third. Rather than draft Greg Bird in the fifth, they took Nick DeSantiago. Could have had Ken Giles, but took Martin in the seventh.

Is this unfair? You betcha. But 2011 showed just how warped the Braves valued talent in the draft under Wren and DeMacio. I'm not a guy who buries Wren. I think he shoulders too much of the blame. But when it came to the draft, the Braves simply were missing and missing badly.

Here is a sign that something went wrong. The 2011 draft was just five years ago. Nobody from the draft remains the system. Some, like Gilmartin and Martin, were given away. As was J.R. Graham, who the Braves lost voluntarily in the Rule 5 draft. Kubitza and La Stella were traded for arms with higher upside. John Cornely and Gus Schlosser were sent packing. As was Ahmed, though at least he was a piece that helped the Braves acquire Justin Upton.

If a year stands out as a reason to not play it safe and draft for need, it's 2011. The Braves got exactly what they sought - good bets to make it to the majors. Eight of them did that - so far. But their roles in the majors reflect the conservative draft philosophy the Braves followed. Each player that has made it to the bigs has little chance of developing into much more than they were when they were drafted.

Worst 5 Braves Drafts Since 2000 - #5

With the 2016 draft less than a month away, I am going to take a look back at the Braves' drafts since 2000 with the Top 5 and Worst 5 in tandem order starting with the latter. If that is confusing, after the fifth worst draft today, the next article in this series will look at the fifth best draft. Clear enough? I hope so.

Best/Worst Drafts since 2000
Worst: #5, 2009 | #4, 2004 | #3, 2013 | #2, 2011 | #1, 2001
Best: #5, 2010 | #4, 2015 | #3, 2007 | #2, 2002 | #1, 2000

(Dis)Honorable Mentions go to the 2006 and 2008 drafts.

5th Worst Draft Since 2000...The 2009 Draft

By LWYang on Flickr (Original version)
UCinternational (Crop)
[CC BY 2.0], via Wikimedia Commons

For the first time in nearly two decades, the Braves had a Top 10 pick. It wasn't supposed to happen that way. The Braves had missed the playoffs in 2007, but had added Mark Teixeira and were hoping for a return to glory for a team with a young core of Brian McCann, Kelly Johnson, Yunel Escobar, and Jeff Francoeur. The problem was that John Schuerholz had neglected to build a starting rotation. He turned the team over to Frank Wren, who did acquire Jair Jurrjens, but that was not enough to piece together a winning ballclub in 2008. They would lose 90 games, guaranteeing the team a high-value pick.

With the young nucleus that now included Jurrjens and also had Jason Heyward, Tommy Hanson, and Freddie Freeman developing in the minors, a big splash with the seventh overall selection of the 2009 draft could have been a helpful springboard for the team into the future. They surrendered their 2nd round pick (56th overall) to sign Derek Lowe, which helped mute the overall value the Braves could expect from the 2009 draft. Still, with a marquee selection, the Braves could make the entire draft look good by grabbing a potential superstar.

Of course, had that happened, we wouldn't be talking about this draft as the fifth worst. The 2009 draft was an odd one for Atlanta. It was Roy Clark's last draft and Wren's second draft as general manager. The discord between the two led both to Clark's defection and an odd dynamic where neither were on the same page. Further, two years before, the draft-and-follow system had been abolished. The system, which had been big for finding value in late round picks like Hanson, allowed teams "control" over a player for nearly a full calendar year. It gave teams a long time to evaluate a player - usually after he went to junior college - before deciding whether or not to sign him. Other changes were coming with the compensation system, which seriously cut into how many picks a team was awarded. 2009 was the first draft after Type C free agents had been abolished.

That was the backdrop, but there was also an unusual focus the Braves took going into the 2009 draft. They knew they wanted pitching and they wanted it quick. The top college pitcher was Stephen Strasburg - a generational talent. That left other second-tier starters like Mike Leake, Aaron Crow, Alex White, and a lefty from Vanderbilt named Mike Minor. However, Atlanta's bread-and-butter for years was high-ceiling prep stars from the southeast and there were a pair available in Donavan Tate and Zack Wheeler. Other high school kids like pitchers Jacob Turner and Tyler Matzek were on the board.

The expectation entering the draft was that the Braves would focus on more young prep talent over the more polished college players in the draft. After all, since 2003, the Braves had taken one college player (Joey Devine) in the first round (10 total picks). But 2009 would buck the trend early and often as Atlanta played it conservative and picked Minor with the seventh overall pick. It was a shocking move, especially for a team with only two picks in the Top 100, to settle for a college star with a high floor, but limited ceiling. However, Minor came with this tagline - near major-league ready. That's what Atlanta wanted.

They would continue that trend with their second pick, third round-selection David Hale. A Princeton grad, Hale hadn't even played at a high level of college competition, but was a prime target because he was "near major-league ready." Atlanta wouldn't select their first high school kid until the tenth round, when they picked Aaron Northcraft with the 298th overall pick. In between Hale and Northcraft, they played it safe with Miami-Dade College's Mycal Jones (118th), Newberry College righty Thomas Berryhill (148th), and George Perimeter College outfielder Robby Hefflinger (208th). Atlanta surprised on-lookers again as Northcraft didn't begin a cascade of prep stars as Atlanta stuck with the college kids like Chris Masters (328th), Cory Harrilchak (418th), and even Riaan Spanjar-Fustenburg (478th). Of their first 21 picks, just two were coming out of high school. Their 21st pick was Ryan Weber, a righty out of St. Petersburg College. He would not only be the last player signed out of this draft to make it to the majors, he is the only player still with the system eight years later.

Why the obsession with college players? The Braves had a young core, a Hall of Fame third baseman, and were attempting to compete quickly rather than build a farm system. Adding college guys who could provide depth for the major league team was a way of achieving that. Further, college players typically cost less because, often, you don't have to convince them to sign rather than continue their amateur careers like you do with high school players. Atlanta saved money and felt they were adding talent that could cycle up to the major league team within a few years. Only three players did so and only Minor did it in a relatively short amount of time.

Let's focus again on the first round lefty. Suffice it to say, he had his ups and downs with the Braves. He did make it to the majors quickly and started his first game in the bigs just 14 months after being drafted. He would not establish himself for good until 2012. The next year, he began to look like a potential fixture of the Braves' organization for years with a 3.21 ERA over 32 starts. However, injuries and ineffective play would limit his 2014 before he was sidelined the entirety of 2015. He is just now beginning his rehab with the Royals' organization as he tries to get back on a major league for the first time since September 20, 2014.

Hale arrived in Atlanta in 2013 and was a regular bullpen asset in 2014, though his metrics painted a picture of a guy who was lucky to have a 3.30 ERA. The new Braves regime agreed and traded him to the Rockies for catching prospect Jose Briceno. Hale would spend most of 2015 hurt and has already been designated for assignment this season before being picked up by the Orioles, where he is pitching in AAA.

Minor did help propel the Braves to the 2014 NL East title and has the distinction of being the only Braves pitcher with a playoff win since the end of the 2011. That alone bumped this draft up to fifth worst because precious little major league talent was produced from Atlanta's safe picks. Let 2009's draft be an example on never drafting for need. Always focus on best player available. If Atlanta's spot comes up this June and they pick a high school pitcher, don't despair. They were selecting the best player available, not drafting for the need (supposedly, college-age hitters). When you sacrifice your chance at the best player available, you lose your shot at guys like A.J. Pollock (#17th overall in 2009).

At the time of the draft, Keith Law ranked the Braves' haul the fifth worst. To put their super conservative choices into context, not only did just three make it to the bigs, the Braves paid $4 million less in signing bonuses than what Strasburg got. Granted, Strasburg was again a generational talent and signed a major league deal with a $7.5 million signing bonus, but Atlanta spent under $4M to add their talent. The only plus was that they signed 20 of their first 22 picks. However, if you are going to invest in safe, college-age picks, you are doing so because their path to the majors is expected to be quick and a likely to happen. Atlanta failed at that. Their conservative drafts that followed continued this trend with two more drafts of the Wren years appearing in this countdown to come.

Like it is on the baseball field, if you don't play to win, you will lose. In 2009, the Braves should have learned that to build a productive minor league system out of the draft, you need both safe picks and high-ceiling picks. Unfortunately, too often over the next few years, that lesson was forgotten.

Random Former Prospect Sunday - J.R. Graham

During the season, Sundays are set aside to take a look at a prospect at random, but with the minor league season over, I wasn't sure what to do for my Sunday article until this nugget of an idea came my way. How about we look at players who ranked in Baseball America's Top 100 while part of the Braves' organization, yet never appeared for the Braves? Over the next few months, I'll take a look at the prospects that were traded or simply faded away and just to keep up with my theme, I randomized the players.

Bruce Hemmelgarn/Getty

There was a time where Braves fans penciled J.R. Graham's name into future rotations. A right-hander with three quality pitches including a mid-90's fastball, Graham reached Mississippi just a year after the Braves grabbed him in the 4th round of the 2011 draft. He was a big asset in a system with a dwindling amount of pitching prospects once the Big Four of Mike Minor, Julio Teheran, Randall Delgado, and Arodys Vizcaino either made it to the bigs or were traded. But...that's how far the story goes. Well, with the Braves at least.

Originally selected in the 46th round of the '08 draft by the A's, the California-born Graham decided to attend Santa Clara University instead. The Broncos have produced a lot of draftees (160 total), but only three have gone on to have a 10 WAR or better career according to Baseball-Reference with Randy Winn their most notable player. The last time the Braves selected a player from Santa Clara was back in 1990 when they selected generic infielder Ed Giovanola. But in 2011, Graham was still available for the Braves in the 4th round. The #146th overall pick was ranked by Baseball America as the 120th best prospect heading into the draft so that was good value for Frank Wren's team.

After signing, Graham blitzed the APPY League over nearly 60 innings. He carried an impressive 4 K/BB ratio and gave up no homers in that time frame. His maturity and quick success prompted the Braves to push Graham past Rome so that he could start 2012 with the Lynchburg Hillcats. It worked rather well. In 17 starts, he duplicated his 4 K/BB rate in a bigger sample size (102.1 ING). His K's fell, but so did his walks. He pitched well beyond his years and it almost seemed like he had yet to be challenged. Atlanta sought to solve that by promoting him to Mississippi to finish the year. The Braves under Wren often attached accelerated timetables to the college pitchers they selected and Graham was no different. With about 205 innings under his belt, he was just a step away from the majors.

At that time, Graham had an impressive collection of pitches with a mid-90's fastball that had heavy sink on it. He kept hitters off balanced with a nice change-of-pace plus a swing-and-miss slider. If he could only stay healthy, he was going to remain a big part of the picture for the Braves.

Ah, but there's the rub. 2013 was an eight-start shortened season where he dealt with shoulder issues, which caused his velocity to tail off. Going through adversity is not uncommon for Graham. He was born three months prematurely at just 2 pounds. He even stopped breathing in his father's hands before being revived. Graham fights for every little thing he achieves and plays with a chip on his shoulders. An aggressive hurler, he earns the reputation as a bulldog. Now that he had control of his stuff, he wasn't going to let an injury keep him down for long.

Unfortunately, his body disagreed. While theoretically healthy during much of 2014, shoulder problems are a very difficult thing for a pitcher to shake. The Braves tried to baby him, giving him a strict pitch limit to keep his innings down. He didn't reached 70 pitches until his tenth start and after a good start to his season, his numbers began to decline. Graham would miss nearly a month of baseball before a late July return. After four brief starts, he moved to the bullpen and didn't have much success there either. All told, he had a 5.58 ERA in 71 innings with a 1.9 K/BB rate.

After the season, the Braves and their new front office had some Rule 5 decisions to make. They chose to protect Yean Carlos Gil and Williams Perez over Graham and Cody Martin, another successful ex-college pitcher. While Gil would later be designated for assignment, keeping Perez turned out to be the right move as he would start 20 games for the Braves in 2015. Martin would pass through the Rule 5 draft and briefly looked good in the majors before being shipped out in a trade. Graham didn't last nearly as long. The Twins selected him in the Rule 5.

A full-time move to the pen and a good offseason returned a lot of the velocity Graham had been missing. He was back in the mid-90's with max speeds of 98 mph. A lot of people were upset with the Braves for letting him go for nothing. His early success with the Twins gave their disappointment more validity. After 1.1 innings with a K against the Reds on July 1, Graham had a 2.92 ERA over his first 22 games and 37 innings. The walks (11) were a bit high and homers (6) stood out, but he was showing some good things. He even made a spot start against the Brewers on June 6, going 4 innings and allowing a run on a homerun. However, things got ugly after July 1. Over his final 17 games, he gave up 23 runs in 26.2 ING. Relegated to only low-leverage innings, he pitched sparingly over the final weeks especially with the Twins trying to stay alive in the Wild Card race. He also missed a little time toward the end of August with shoulder troubles.

Much was made about the Braves' decision to not protect Graham. Most of this is attached to fans overvaluing their team's prospects. The Braves had a pitcher who, while clearly talented, was being sidetracked by shoulder issues. In today's modern medicine world, it's just a reality that it's easier to fix ligament damage than shoulder trouble. The Braves made that point clear by picking Daniel Winkler in the same Rule 5 draft where Graham went to the Twins. Winkler, who was recovering from Tommy John surgery, was viewed as an asset to bet on versus Graham.

The Twins now don't have to feel the need to keep Graham in the majors to satisfy the Rule 5 rules so we might see Graham back in the minors when 2016 opens. Always the fighter, it's easy to root for Graham. But the chances that the Braves will regret losing him are pretty slim.

Previous Random Former Prospects...
Elvis Andrus
Bobby Smith
Bubba Nelson
Neftali Feliz
Gorkys Hernandez
Matt Belisle
Matt McClendon

Reviewing Hart's Trades: The Craig Kimbrel Deal

The Braves have been active in John Hart's first season at the helm to the tune of SIXTEEN TRADES! Sixteen deals involving major league talent going one direction or in both. Sixteen deals that include over 50 different players, a few draft picks, lots of cash, and two Uptons. It's been friggin unreal to see what the Braves have done.

With most of the season in our rear view, it's time to start reviewing each one of these trades. This series is going take a little while to get through, but hey, it gives me something to write about.

Trades Already Reviewed
La Stella for Vizcaino
Heyward/Walden for Miller/Jenkins
Varvaro for Kurcz
J. Upton for Jace Peterson and prospects
Carp/Shreve for Banulos
Kubitza/Hyatt for Sanchez
Gattis for Foltynewicz and Ruiz
Hale for Briceno
Elander for Cahill and Lots of Cash

The Trade
Craig Kimbrel and Melvin Upton to the Padres for Cameron Maybin, Matt Wisler, Carlos Quentin, Jordan Paroubeck, and a 2015 draft choice (Austin Riley). I looking at those leaving and coming at this blog and a deeper look over at About.com.

The Rationale
A month ago, as I went over the Justin Upton trade, I wrote this: "(A.J.) Preller could say he held out and didn't give the Braves the pitcher they really wanted - Matt Wisler. Of course, that would change when Preller got so desperate to put a bow on his first offseason, but we'll get to that deal later." Welcome to later. It's hard to decide what was the most surprising thing about this trade. That the Braves had moved Kimbrel, who we were told was untouchable? That the deal came hours before the season was set to begin? Or, if you were like me, was it that the Braves found a team so desperate - so foolish - to take on an additional $50 million in payroll just to get an elite closer?

Jim McIssac | Getty

A lot of people hated this trade, but not for its impact on the Braves team so much as losing yet another homegrown, popular player. Sure, losing the despised elder Upton and his contract helped matters, but Kimbrel was loved in Atlanta who had broken the franchise record for saves before he turned 27. He was the last remaining piece of the super successful O'Ventbrel with southpaws Jonny Venters and Eric O'Flaherty. He was our chosen one who sat in a bullpen in Los Angeles while Fredi Gonzalez arbitrarily counted the amount of outs Kimbrel was "good for" even as the 2013 season went down in flames.

But even the greatest closer in franchise history only throws 60-70 innings. Closers are overvalued because of their mystique. Was Kimbrel overpaid? Not according to the market, but was he too expensive for the Braves? Absolutely. He was about to enter Year 2 of his 4 year, $41M contract with a team option that could increase it to $52M. The Braves saw a chance to clear the books and while they stuck with the company line that they loved Kimbrel and wouldn't trade him, even they saw future payrolls and wondered if Kimbrel was worth it.

Getting rid of Upton just made the exchange easier. A big red mark on Frank Wren's time in Atlanta, Upton had been offered $75M over five years to come to Atlanta despite a .255 career batting average and .298 OBP in his walk year with the Rays. The Braves basically put $75M on red during roulette. They would either come out of it looking like roses or things would go about as bad as you could imagine.

Of course, it went the latter. In two seasons, Upton slashed .198/.279/.314 with 21 HR, 32 SB, and 324 strikeouts. The Braves were desperate to find a taker for the $46.5M left on his contract. The Cubs flirted with the idea of sending Edwin Jackson to the Braves for Upton, but nothing materialized. It was a foregone conclusion that even if the Braves traded Upton, they would be taking on some, if not the majority of, the remaining salary.

But that's where the Padres stepped in. A.J. Preller had been nearly as active as the new Braves front office during the offseason. He had already traded for Justin Upton from the Braves while adding Wil Myers and Matt Kemp because defense is totally optional. With James Shields, Derek Norris, and Will Middlebrooks also in place, Preller assumed he had built a juggernaut. He assumed very wrong, but as the season was about to open, he saw an opportunity to put a cherry on the top. Mr. Kimbrel. Sure, the Pads still had Joaquin Benoit, who was more than capable, but he was no Kimbrel. Plus, with Kimbrel, the bullpen would be much deeper. Sure, they would have to add the other Upton, but they already had a glut of outfielders, as the rest of the deal showed.

Getting rid of Maybin and Quentin cleared up things for the Padres, who also had Will Venable. With Melvin missing the first couple of months, it allowed the Padres plenty of time to work him in slowly while keeping Venable in a 4th outfielder role because their super duper outfield was, well, super duper. Of course, where Melvin fit in was confusing, but KIMBREL!

Maybin was a bust in San Diego after signing a long-term deal when he first became arbitration-eligible. He had played in 109 games over the previous two years and had a .665 OPS over four years with the Padres. They didn't have a place for him and were glad to shed his salary. Quentin's inclusion was weird because the Braves released him soon after, but the latter was part of the plan. Quentin had no-trade protection and wanted to get the freedom to try to jumpstart his career elsewhere, preferably with a team that played 95% of their games with a DH. My friend Bryce theorized the inclusion of Quentin was so that the deal would get done without the need for commissioner approval rather than the Braves packaging money to help pay for the Padres to release Quentin themselves.

Paroubeck was an interesting prospect in the long-term. Incredibly raw with athletic ability off the charts, Paroubeck was a second-rounder in 2013, who didn't make his debut until the following season. The production was there, but again, as interesting as he was, it was like adding another draft choice to the organization considering how little he had played and how young he was. Speaking of draft choices, we didn't know it at the time, but the 41st selection of the 2015 draft would quickly pay dividends.

As for the guy the Braves had wanted for Melvin's older brother earlier in the offseason, Wisler was ticketed for a return trip to El Paso before the trade. It's where he landed the previous spring and after sulking because he felt he deserved a look over the pitchers the Padres kept, Wisler was demoted back to AA to try to jumpstart his season. Overall, he had finished with a 5.01 ERA in AAA. Even with that in mind, Baseball America ranked him the #34 prospect in baseball. He was one of just two Padres prospects ranked by BA, Baseball Prospectus, and MLB.com in the top 100 (Hunter Renfroe was the other).

Short-Term Results
The Padres remade their team and won three fewer games in doing so. Adding Kimbrel aided the pen, which was fairly good as a result. He struggled early (for him), but Kimbrel turned it on late. Homers were a bit of a problem, but a career-high rate in HR/FB may have been a bit flukish. It turns out to be his worse full season in the majors both in saves and xFIP/SIERA. However, Kimbrel's so damn good that having 39 saves, a 2.46 xFIP, and 2.21 SIERA is considered a down year. But the Padres learned what the Braves already were aware of - having a great closer is a luxery, but only makes a bad ballclub moderately better.

Of more interest was Melvin's resurgence. Sure, he was limited to just 87 games, but he slashed .259/.327/.429 with a 110 RC+. His last three years in Tampa averaged a 109 RC+ so that was impressive. I'm not sold on it continuing as Melvin's .348 BABIP was his highest since his 2007-08 days when he walked a lot and hit for a good average. That said, a pull rate that leaped over 50% might suggest that Upton's clunky approach at the plate was adjusted and gave him a better chance at getting around on balls, which led to a career-best line drive rate.

Just to touch on a few of the short-timers...Quentin caught on with the Mariners organization, but quickly decided that enough was enough and hung up his spikes at the ripe old age of just 32. Paroubeck was traded before he played a game in the organization. Nursing an injury, he was moved, along with Caleb Dirks, to the Dodgers on July 2 for an international bonus slot that helped the Braves sign their pair of high-priced international guys.

Now, to the meat. Maybin had a wonderful first half, but fell off the map in the second half, which led to a .267/.327/.370 final slash with 10 HR, 23 steals, and defensive metrics sour on him. He did play in 141 games after 109 the previous two seasons so that was a plus. His first half numbers were exciting, too. Who doesn't want .289/.356/.418 from your center fielder who, I wager, is better in the field that the -5.3 adjusted defensive rating Fangraphs gave him.

As for Wisler, there were both good and bad parts of his game this season. he remained a durable arm and threw 109 innings in the majors along with 65 in Gwinnett. Curiously, his strikeout rate fell from the 8.6 per nine rate he had been pulling before 2015 to a bit over 6 per nine. In addition, his xFIP and SIERA were not pretty (both around 5.00). While his late season starts look good, the results are not really supported in the numbers, though the same size is VERY VERY SMALL.

Finally, there is Riley, the prep pitcher who just wanted a chance to hit. The Braves gave him that chance and he smacked a dozen homers in 60 games. He has received some aggressive rankings since then (including #11 by me) and it might be premature for a guy who K'd a quarter of his plate appearances, but you just don't see many 18 year-olds brutalize the Appalachian League.

Long-Term Outlook
The Padres are on the hook for at least two more seasons of both Kimbrel and Melvin, though they have been rumored to be at least listening to offers on Kimbrel. And there in lies the accepted conundrum with Kimbrel. As good as he is, you still feel kind of dumb paying $24M for the next two innings for 130 innings. Granted, if you have an endless payroll, screw it. But for teams like the Padres and Braves, does paying that much money for so few actual innings make financial sense?

On the flipside, if Melvin keeps hitting, regardless with what happens with Kimbrel, the Padres will at least have that to hang their hat on. Yay...

Atlanta is stocked with veteran outfielders in 2016 and Maybin could be on the market, though I tend to think the Braves like the idea of letting Mallex Smith get a spring under the veterans, a few more months in Gwinnett to buy another pre-arbitration season, and bring up their hot prospect only after things clear up in Atlanta. It allows the Braves more depth to limit Michael Bourn and Nick Swisher's at-bats to keep their vesting options from triggering (which, if they produce, could help their trade value). I'm sure Atlanta will listen to offers on Maybin, but they need an upgrade to the roster to make a deal - not just more prospects.

The bigger picture rests on the arm of Wisler and the bat of Riley. Will Wisler clean up his game to become the middle-of-the-staff force many felt him capable of? It's definitely possible and if he makes that step in 2016, all the better. Atlanta could use the depth behind the projected rotation of Shelby Miller, Julio Teheran, zombie Mike Minor, and...well, that's it. Meanwhile, power is a commodity that the Braves are short on and while Riley is a number of years away from likely getting into the picture, Atlanta could use his presence.

All in all, this deal might be the best one the Holy John Trinity made in their first year. Yeah, a certain Diamondbacks deal ranks very high, but this particular trade was a franchise changer. It moved bad contracts while only adding Maybin's affordable contract post-2015. It brought two big young players to the system and it gave the Braves a chance to move beyond the awfulness of watching Melvin suck.