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Showing posts with label Hart. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hart. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 29, 2017

“Is Schuerholz running the club or are Hart and Coppolella running it?”

In an article for The Athletic, Ken Rosenthal points to possible dissension within the Atlanta Braves front office. The article is behind a paywall so I won't quote it word-for-word, but the general perception is that Braves general manager John Coppolella and John Hart, the President of Baseball Operations, could be in a bit of a power struggle with Team Vice Chairman - and former GM and Team President - John Schuerholz. Rosenthal cites unnamed sources in the organization that suggest a number of internal shuffling of Schuerholz hires like Roy Clark and Dave Trembley as a possible sign that Coppy is either trying to squash dissent in the front office or at least see how many changes they can push past Schuerholz, who seemingly retains a good amount of team control.

One unnamed team official offers this particularly worrisome quote:
“It’s a power struggle over who is running the club...is John Schuerholz running the club or are John Hart and John Coppolella running it?”
If true...this is a bad sign for the Braves' organization. Worse - it's nothing new.

Jeff Morris - Follow on Twitter
It can be difficult for guys who are used to calling the shots to move to the side so that new decision makers are given the proper autonomy to lead an organization. That seems to run especially true for Schuerholz, who spent nine seasons at the helm of the Royals before 17 years as the Braves general manager. Rather than retire at the age of 67 when he finally moved aside for Frank Wren after the 2007 season, Schuerholz simply moved to a different position as the Team President. For an additional eight years, he held that spot before being promoted (?) to his new position of Team Vice Chairman in March of last season. The new role was created specifically for Schuerholz to keep him in the loop, but also keep him at an arm's reach as Schuerholz entered his late 70's.

It was supposed to be the Hart/Coppy show for the Braves with Hart providing leadership while Coppy handled the day-to-day grind that would likely make the young general manager lose his hair - if he had any to speak of, that is. However, things don't appear to have actually moved in that direction. And again, this is really nothing new for Schuerholz and "The Braves Way" culture, which has a stranglehold on the Braves' decision-making.

When Schuerholz moved up to the Team President role, he handpicked his successor in Frank Wren. Despite a contentious previous run as the Orioles' GM, Wren was lauded for his baseball mind and had spent a number of years providing support to Schuerholz in an assistant role. You couldn't blame the Braves for valuing consistency over a new direction of the franchise which had run off division title after division title from 1991 to 2005. The team still had Chipper Jones, John Smoltz, and Bobby Cox in the fold along with a young nucleus led by Brian McCann and Jeff Francoeur. Wren was given the keys, but Schuerholz's watchful eye was never far away.

According to many reports, Wren was difficult to work with and the culture shock soon grew hard on longtime Braves employees. Many, like Roy Clark, left the organization in droves. The most high profile defection would have been Cox himself, who nearly quit the Braves during their first spring training with Wren in charge. It took Schuerholz smoothing things over to keep the future Hall of Fame manager in charge. Major league managers with the kind of pull Cox had have often used the threat of their resignations to enact change. It took Jim Leyland blowing up and threatening to leave to avoid a Barry Bonds-to-the-Braves trade in March of 1992. Cox, known for a short temper, was agitated by what he felt was a micro manager trying to butt his nose where it didn't belong. Of course, considering that Wren joined the Braves eight years before becoming its general manager, why was his style such a surprise for so many people in the organization?

Despite the problems, the two put their differences aside and Wren eventually gave Cox a team that was playoff worthy in Cox's final year and third year with Wren calling the shots. Moving forward, whether Wren made the choice of who replaced Cox is debatable. Considering how much dissension would develop between Wren and Fredi Gonzalez, I tend to believe it wasn't Wren's choice - or at least it wasn't his choice alone. Instead, Schuerholz and Cox intervened with Cox essentially afforded the opportunity to select his successor in Gonzalez. Just 48 hours after Cox's final game as Braves' manager, the team had already named a new manager without even pretending to perform a search. Both the Schuerholz-to-Wren transition and the Cox-to-Gonzalez one were reflective more of a college football team replacing coaches with "coach-in-waiting" picks rather than a professional team seek out the best possible candidates available.

Wren and Gonzalez were not a good mix. The team that Wren wanted to build was one of power and pitching. The team Gonzalez wanted to coach was more traditional - one that put down bunts and put the ball in play. This was never more evident than in 2013 when Wren built the All-or-Nothing Braves, a team capable of big home runs and offense - and a lot of strikeouts. This was simply not the kind of team Gonzalez ever felt comfortable with. The two forces were never meant to co-exist and as the Braves collapsed in 2014, Wren wanted to fire Gonzalez for a manager better suited to take the young-and-talented mix he had built into contention for 2015. It was Cox who stepped in and saved the job of his handpicked successor by appealing to Schuerholz. Instead, it was Wren that fired.

What happened next was another sign that the Braves' organization was not too interested in radical change. Instead, they sought reverting back to "The Braves Way," something they felt Wren was never interested in following. Before announcing John Hart as the future choice to lead the Braves, the organization staged a GM search with Cox, Hart, and Schuerholz as the search team. It was a sham as Schuerholz and Cox simply convinced Hart to take the job full-time while they organized a power-sharing agreement with John Coppolella. The system was simple. Hart would take the hit as the organization blew the team up. Gone would be popular members of the Braves like Jason Heyward, Justin Upton, Evan Gattis, and Craig Kimbrel. The deals would have Hart's name on it, allowing the Braves to protect Coppy, who was the guy actually putting the trades together for Hart to sign off on. It was a convoluted process from the beginning.

Even before announcing the Hart/Coppy grouping, the Braves began to reshape the front office with Schuerholz calling the shots. He brought Roy Clark back into the mix, named Clark disciple Brian Bridges as scouting director, and Dave Trembley as the Farm Director. And frankly, the process began the year before with hires that were largely made without Wren's input the previous winter (including Hart as a senior adviser and Rick Williams as a special assistant to the GM). Once again, Schuerholz was putting his guys into place, which cuts the legs out from a GM making similar decisions.

All the while, the Braves kept Gonzalez at the helm. Well, of course, they did. They had Cox on the search team after all. It would take a truly rotten start to the 2016 team to finally stain Gonzalez enough to get rid of him. The Braves named long-term organizational filler Brian Snitker as his replacement. At the end of 2016, Snitker seemed like a longshot to return despite a solid end to the 2016 season. The Braves were valuing heavyweights like Ron Washington and Bud Black and Snitker just seemed overmatched. He also seemed like a questionable fit with Coppolella, who took a more innovative and nuanced approached to baseball than a traditionalist like Snitker (or Washington and Black for that matter). Instead of a more exciting younger hire, Snitker was promoted to full-time manager and Washington was brought on for added experience.

But the team only gave Snitker one year. It screamed of compromise, but why? Freddie Freeman had joined the ranks of baseball's elite in 2016 while dynamic young stars like Dansby Swanson, Ozzie Albies, and Sean Newcomb were either already in the majors or very close. The Braves seemed on the rise and the farm system was only getting better. The job had to be enticing with a new park, a winning tradition, and so many pieces in place. Why had the Braves settled for an organizational lifer as their manager? Why had they been so focused on guys like Black and Washington over younger and hungrier - not to mention better fits - like Dave Martinez, the longtime second-in-command under Joe Maddon? None of it made much sense.

Perhaps today's article by Rosenthal speaks to why these strange decisions have been made. For all of his flaws, could you really blame Wren for wanting to run the organization the way he wanted? For wanting the manager he wanted? For wanting to be the general manager the way he wanted to be a general manager? I would say no.

Three years later, many of the same figures are in place in high-profile or, at least, influential positions. Could we really blame Coppy for wanting more of an active role in deciding the makeup of the Braves front office - decisions he was not allowed the luxury of making after Wren's sacking in 2014? And if there is any truth to the idea that Coppy is testing the waters, what might come next? Could the Braves scrub most of the coaching staff, including its beleaguered manager, and start anew in 2018?

And shouldn't that be his decision anyway? After all, when the 2015 season concluded, the Braves elevated Coppolella to the general manager position. Isn't it about time the organization give him the responsibilities it once handed Schuerholz so willingly?

A lot of this is perception, I admit. We are not privy to the closed door meetings taking place. Perhaps Schuerholz has voluntarily moved to the side while telling his former pupil to, "call if you ever need to bounce ideas off someone." Maybe the article over-exaggerates the idea that there is any sort of power struggle between the two camps. I would like to believe that is the case, but we've seen this script before. Again, Wren had many flaws and made a number of poor decisions along the way. In no way am I suggesting that his firing wasn't appropriate. Nevertheless, the Braves did him few favors by micromanaging him nearly as much as he attempted to micromanage the organization. It would be a shame for them to do the same to such a capable GM in Coppolella.

After all, it's his team now.

Right?

Tuesday, November 17, 2015

Reviewing Hart's Trades: Gomes for Valenzeula

The Braves have been active in John Hart's first season at the helm to the tune of SIXTEEN TRADES! Sixteen deals involving major league talent going one direction or in both. Sixteen deals that include over 50 different players, a few draft picks, lots of cash, and two Uptons. It's been friggin unreal to see what the Braves have done.

With most of the season in our rear view, it's time to start reviewing each one of these trades. This series is going take a little while to get through, but hey, it gives me something to write about.

Trades Already Reviewed
La Stella for Vizcaino
Heyward/Walden for Miller/Jenkins
Varvaro for Kurcz
J. Upton for Jace Peterson and prospects
Carp/Shreve for Banulos
Kubitza/Hyatt for Sanchez
Gattis for Foltynewicz and Ruiz
Hale for Briceno
Elander for Cahill and Lots of Cash
The Craig Kimbrel Trade
Callaspo for Uribe
Gosselin for Touki
KJ/Uribe for Whalen/Gant
The Hector Olivera Trade
CJ for Bourn/Swish

The Trade
Johnny Gomes and about $380K to the Royals for Luis Valenzuela.

The Rationale
Kevin C. Cox | Getty
Gomes had been added before the season as a platoon/bench option, something he had historically been very successful at. The problem was that the Braves never really had a left-handed bat to platoon with him. Zoilo Almonte failed to make the team, Kelly Johnson was needed elsewhere, and Eric Young Jr. completely bombed. That left the Braves with Gomes getting the most starts in left field - 48. Perhaps had KJ stayed healthy and played more left field or had Eury Perez and Todd Cunningham produced, it would have helped. For his part, Gomes was pretty good. He hit just .240, but walked frequently and hit 5 of his 7 homers against lefties, giving him an .857 OPS against lefties.

However, there was no reason to keep Gomes for the whole season. The Braves were going nowhere and Gomes retained value as a lefty masher/clubhouse presence. The Braves tried to send him packing before the trading deadline, but nobody offered enough for them to make the deal. That was pretty good because it gave us a chance to watch Gomes pitch in late-August.

The Royals, meanwhile, were looking for a bat down the stretch to give them an alternative to Alex Rios, who sucked most of the season. Paulo Orlando wasn't doing much better, either. Adding Gomes was a smart addition and it cost them precious little. Luis Valenzuela hadn't flashed on anyone's prospects lists and with good reason.

Short-Term Results
Gomes would only play in 12 games, mostly as a RF, for the Royals. He had just five hits in 30 at-bats, which didn't influence the Royals to keep him on their playoff roster. Still, Gomes remained the great cheerleader and clubhouse presence he is known for. Plus, he does a great wrestling promo.

Valenzuela only played in a half-dozen games after the trade with Rome and nearly doubled the amount of hits Gomes had (9-for-21, 2B, HR. Overall, Valenzuela hit over .340 in A-ball this season, which should garner some attention, though he only played in 62 overall games (including 8 games at rookie).

Long-Term Outlook
The Royals won the World Championship and in this trade, were forced to give up precious little. How much Gomes helped them win is a complete mystery considering he did precious little on the field, but having Gomes around is, as we grew to know, an absolute joy. He didn't have Eric Hinske's timely hits, but it was hard not to feel the same thing about Gomes that we felt about Hinske. He enters free agency weeks before his 35th birthday looking for another team seeking a platoon guy with 162 career homeruns.

Valenzuela will get a chance to repeat his success from 2015. He had played precious little in 2012-13 before slashing .259/.306/.370 in 2014. On the high end, he's probably Pedro Ciriaco with less speed. On the low end, he's...I dunno...Tyler Pastornicky-lite?

Monday, November 16, 2015

Reviewing Hart's Trades: Johnson for Swish/Bourn/CASH

The Braves have been active in John Hart's first season at the helm to the tune of SIXTEEN TRADES! Sixteen deals involving major league talent going one direction or in both. Sixteen deals that include over 50 different players, a few draft picks, lots of cash, and two Uptons. It's been friggin unreal to see what the Braves have done.

With most of the season in our rear view, it's time to start reviewing each one of these trades. This series is going take a little while to get through, but hey, it gives me something to write about.

Trades Already Reviewed
La Stella for Vizcaino
Heyward/Walden for Miller/Jenkins
Varvaro for Kurcz
J. Upton for Jace Peterson and prospects
Carp/Shreve for Banulos
Kubitza/Hyatt for Sanchez
Gattis for Foltynewicz and Ruiz
Hale for Briceno
Elander for Cahill and Lots of Cash
The Craig Kimbrel Trade
Callaspo for Uribe
Gosselin for Touki
KJ/Uribe for Whalen/Gant
The Hector Olivera Trade

The Trade
Chris Johnson to the Indians for Michael Bourn, Nick Swisher, and cash. There's a review of this trade over at About.com.

The Rationale
Classic Johnson!
Scott Cunningham | Getty
I once pondered how big of a mistake Chris Johnson's extension was. Turned out it was a pretty big one. Frank Wren, with the assistance of John Hart and at least John Coppolella in the room, chose to extend Johnson at the wrong time. After a 2.5 fWAR 2013 campaign, the Braves seemed to think that would suddenly become the norm after posting a 0.8 fWAR in over 300 games in the majors before that. It was dumb. He followed with a 0.2 fWAR year in 2014 and was doing even worse in 2015. Some point to the BABIP and that certainly was a big factor, but every other metric declined except K% (it went up).

The Braves looked at his salary of $7.5M in 2016 and at least $10M in 2017 (including a $1M buyout for 2018). Yeah, 2017 - the magical season. No way were they on board with guys who suck getting paid in 2017.

But getting paid in 2016? Sure! The Indians conversely wanted financial freedom in 2016 and saw a chance to cut some salary (and get rid of a pair of veterans). Nick Swisher was super productive with the Yankees (124-134 RC+ from 2009-12) so the Indians weren't completely idiotic to sign him after the 2012 season. Nor were they totally stupid to sign Michael Bourn after a 6.2 fWAR year in 2012 with the Braves. Still...four years each with vesting options and a combined $104M? Here's a clip from Scrubs to explain my thoughts.

Both teams saw a way to get financial freedom. The Indians sent either $10M (if you believe Cot) or $15M (if you believe David O'Brien), giving the Braves essentially a free Swisher and when you take away what Johnson was going to make anyway, the Braves added $6.5M or $11.5M in salary for 2016. The Braves didn't add much provided the vesting options don't, ya know, vest. Meanwhile, they got rid of the disgruntled Johnson. The Indians didn't save much money, but did turn two roster spots held up by overpaid veterans into one spot...held up by an overpaid veteran.

Short-Term Results
Unsurprisingly, none of the players in this deal did much after the trade. Swish did belt four homers and walked a crapload in 149 PA, putting up a 99 RC+ compared to the 51 before the trade. He also gave the Braves a decent enough option at first base where he is historically an average defender.

Bourn actually played a little worse at the plate, but did play better in the field, albeit in small sample sizes. As good as Bourn played center in 2012, his defensive metrics have trended toward bad in Cleveland and with him not the speed threat he once was, Bourn might be limited to left field if you want him to be a competent defender.

Johnson got off to a fast start in Cleveland, but cooled off down the stretch. Some will look at his .289 average and say he was "back," but he needed a .391 BABIP to do that and even with it, he still posted a 87 RC+ in 27 games. With his defense, he needs 2013-level RC+ (127) to be a plus player in the big leagues. He did play more first base after the trade than third base and would have played in more games, but a spider bite kept him off the team for a few weeks. Unfortunately, it appeared to give him no spidey senses.

Long-Term Outlook
The Braves would love if another team wants to take Bourn and/or Swisher off their hands and with the investment by the Indians, they could conceivably add in some cash themselves to facilitate a deal, but they would have to find a team interested. Maybe they could take on a bad salary that's less than either player and pay the difference, but chances are there is little chance that a trade helps them in any way.

The early thought was that the Braves would platoon Bourn and Swisher in left field, which could limit at-bats and keep their vesting options for 2017 from vesting. But with Hector Olivera moving out to left field, that put another wrench in the plans. Cameron Maybin could be dealt, opening up at-bats for Bourn until Mallex Smith takes over. Of course, if the Braves completely self-destruct the roster with trades like sending Freddie Freeman packing, that would allow Swisher a bigger opportunity for at-bats.

Either way, neither player can be allowed to have their contracts vest ($14M for Swish, $12M for Bourn). This not only keeps the Braves from paying big salaries to veterans unlikely to deserve it, but if either is remotely reproductive, the Braves would retain higher trade value if the chances of a vesting option actually vesting is remote.

Meanwhile, Johnson could be traded himself though Cleveland doesn't have a wealth of better options either. Carlos Santana will likely either DH or play first base while 23 year-old Giovanny Urshela is well-liked, but OPS'd .608 in his rookie season. Right now, there would appear to be at-bats for Johnson if he doesn't get moved, but either way, I doubt we see his 2013 season duplicated. He needed a special set of circumstances to fall his way to achieve that success and to his credit, he cashed in on an extension while the Braves were handing them out like Oprah hands out cars.

It was a mistake to extend Johnson and the Braves' answer to that mistake may have not been a brilliant one. On one side, it's easier to deal players with one year-deals (the Braves needed to take two bad players to get rid of a two-year deal after all). On the other end, taking up two spots seems like an unnecessary evil to deal with one bad player. How this works out is anyone's guess, but from a fan's perspective, it was just nice to get rid of a problem that had exhausted patience.

Saturday, November 14, 2015

Reviewing Hart's Trades: The Hector Olivera Leap of Faith

The Braves were active in John Hart's season at the helm to the tune of SIXTEEN TRADES! Sixteen deals involving major league talent going one direction or in both. Sixteen deals that include over 50 different players, a few draft picks, lots of cash, and two Uptons. It's been friggin unreal to see what the Braves have done.

With the season in our rear view, it's time to start reviewing each one of these trades. This series is going take a little while to get through, but hey, it gives me something to write about.

Trades Already Reviewed
La Stella for Vizcaino
Heyward/Walden for Miller/Jenkins
Varvaro for Kurcz
J. Upton for Jace Peterson and prospects
Carp/Shreve for Banulos
Kubitza/Hyatt for Sanchez
Gattis for Foltynewicz and Ruiz
Hale for Briceno
Elander for Cahill and Lots of Cash
The Craig Kimbrel Trade
Callaspo for Uribe
Gosselin for Touki
KJ/Uribe for Whalen/Gant

The Trade
As part of a three-team trade, Braves trade Bronson Arroyo, Luis Avilan, Jim Johnson, Jose Peraza, Alex Wood, and cash to the Dodgers for Hector Olivera, Paco Rodriguez, Zachary Bird, and a 2016 draft choice (35th overall, but subject to change) from the Marlins, who also sent Mat Latos and Mike Morse to the Dodgers for Victor Araujo, Jeff Brigham, and Kevin Guzman. Yep, profiled that trade.

The Rationale
Scott Cunningham | Getty Images
Crushes die hard. Last winter, as Olivera worked out for a number of ballclubs, the Braves were a surprise team that was looking to invest big on the Cuban import. A .323/.407/.505 hitter in Cuba, Olivera was considered one of the best hitters left on the island before his defection. He had a silver medal in the Olympics and was part of the disappointing Cuban World Baseball Classic squad in 2009 that finished sixth.

The Braves pursued Olivera hard, but their offer wasn't close to the Dodgers' $62.5M offer over six years ($28M was a signing bonus). Olivera had some medical issues (blood disorder before his defection and a minor UCL tear), but was still considered a stout offensive player.

Like I said...old crushes die hard. The Braves wanted Olivera and considered him a future cog in their lineup. They appeared willing to make it happen and paid a steep price. Jose Peraza was the Braves' top prospect heading into 2015. His game had actually regressed since his 2013 season with Lynchburg. His walks percentage was cut in half and with no power to speak of, he was completely dependent on his bat control to get on base so that he could use his best weapon - his speed. But even his stolen base numbers had declined from 64 and 60 the previous two years to 36 in 2015. Injuries were a factor. The Braves saw a guy who had not advanced and with Jace Peterson a stopgap at second and Andrelton Simmons a fixture at short (right?), Peraza was considered a guy who while useful, was maybe not the impact prospect many had felt he was.

Alex Wood had been very good since arriving in the majors in 2013, but there were some concerns. His fastball velocity had declined (though he never brought much heat). His herky-jerky motion had always been a worry and his strikeouts had fell from nearly a quarter of all batters in 2014 to 18% at the time of the trade. His WHIP had reached 1.41. With a plethora of pitching prospects on the way, the Braves saw Wood as expendable.

The Dodgers also saw Olivera as expendable...at least when it came to winning a title with their bloated roster in 2015. With Justin Turner exceeding all expectations at third base and Corey Seager on the way (not to mention adding Peraza in this deal), the well-sought after Olivera felt more like an extra piece than one that would be a six-year starter. They may have also grew quickly tired of Olivera's hamstring and other concerns that kept him from making his debut with the Dodgers. Furthermore, they needed pitchers. While they had two of the top starters in baseball and a surprisingly durable Brett Anderson, the rest of the staff was unknown in the wake of Brandon McCarthy's early-season injury and Brandon Beachy's quick flameout shortly before the deadline. Adding both Wood and Latos solidified the staff while getting Johnson and Avilan was supposed to make the bullpen deeper. Johnson had been a great add for the Braves and had even filled in as closer due to Jason Grilli's injury, but his return to closer was short-lived. Avilan had went from surprising in 2012 to "how's he succeeding?" in 2013 to "ugh, he actually sucks" in 2014. He was closer to the better Avilan in 2015, but was prone to blow it and blow it big.

Back to Atlanta - they added a pair of pitchers in this deal with Bird and Paco. The latter would eventually need to go under the knife and we will have to wait until 2017 to see him pitch for the Braves. Good thing, too, because that 2017 team is going to be awesome (or so I hear). Bird is an athletic righty who is still raw. He's struggled with control, but has flashed strikeout potential.

Oh, yeah, the Marlins were in this deal. They shed some salary, got a few prospects, and gave the Braves a draft choice. Yay.

I almost forgot about Arroyo. I recently talked about how he came to the Braves. He's just a guy getting paid.

Short-Term Results
Olivera didn't impress in the minors, but when rosters expanded, he finally got a callup and...well, didn't impress that much in the majors either. Still rusty with the bat, Olivera looked damn near puzzled in the field. The Braves had hoped for a springboard September and got more questions than answers. Overall, he slashed .253/.310/.405 in 24 games and lost at-bats to Adonis Garcia.

On the farm, Bird was pushed to AA as the Braves are super aggressive with their prospects. He only started three games and struggled to throw strikes in each one. He was shut down after a 5-run, 5-walk two-inning outing against Mobile on August 13. He should be on schedule to resume his AA career when 2016 opens up.

The Dodgers acquired seven players in this deal and none of them were all that good. Dodgers did quickly pushed Wood to scrap his four-seamer and use his two-seamer along with more spiked curves. He got more grounders as a result, but didn't pitch any better. He appeared in one game in the NLDS and got lit up for four runs, including a three-run homer by Yoenis Cespedes which recently landed in Iowa. Avilan was used to get out lefties, which he does a good job against. He also appeared in the playoffs and retired all four batters he faced. Johnson went to hell in LA. He gave up three homers in 18.2 ING along with a ridiculous 32 hits. Now, he was unlucky to the most extreme degree, but that provided the Dodgers little solace. Peraza appeared in seven games, but hamstring troubles sidelined him ahead of the playoffs. He was the second youngest player in the NL last season.

I don't really care about the other players in this deal because they don't relate to the Braves much at all.

Long-Term Outlook
I know I call this series John Hart's trades, but this was John Coppolella's big money gamble. Even if the Braves were going to move Wood and/or Peraza regardless, doing so for Olivera took a lot of faith. While every scouting report has said that Olivera has the bat to be a productive major leaguer, scouting reports can and have been wrong.

The deal took a hit by the news that Olivera was moving to the outfield next season. Solidifying third base added value to this trade as finding plus-production at third base is not an easy task. Only a half-dozen qualified third baseman had a 120 or better RC+ in each of the last three seasons. The number isn't that different for left field, but it's considered an easier position to formulate a productive platoon than third base. Olivera's move to the outfield caused many, including myself, to re-question this deal and ask this question - just how wrong were the Braves about Olivera? If they were wrong that he could play a competent third base, are they wrong on his hitting?

Bird is a good lottery ticket. His fastball/slider suggests an eventual move to the bullpen, but if he can get either his change or curve to be a true #3 pitch, he could remain in the picture at starter as a bottom-of-the-rotation guy with the chance to progress a bit more. As for Paco, if healthy in 2017, he's a nice weapon. When he was at his best in 2013, he had an 82 cFIP. On a scale of 100, an 82 is 18% better than the league average and the exact mark that Noah Syndergaard had this year. However, he's only appeared in 37 games in the majors since. If healthy and back to his 10 K/9, 50% groundball form, he'll be a weapon through 2019, the final year of team control.

As an aside, it's difficult to preview the #35th overall pick and for that matter, I've seen others call it the #34th. Teams that sign players who were offered a qualified offer could lose their first round pick, which would make this selection even higher. For funsies, here's a list of selected players selected from #30-#35 over the last five years: Braxton Davidson, Jason Hursh, Aaron Judge, Brian Johnson, and Kevin Plawecki.

Meanwhile, the Dodgers will enter 2016 with Avilan, Peraza, and Wood and room for all three on their roster. The results immediately after the trade didn't benefit them, but while Avilan might be serviceable enough (the Dodgers could non-tender him), Peraza and Wood each could play a big role on the next Dodgers team. Or they could be trade bait.

This epic trade ultimately looks less important as we move toward the Hot Stove season just a few months later. The Dodgers made the playoffs, but lost to the Mets. The Braves were already a sinking ship and losing Wood only prompted them to give a guy like Ryan Weber a look. Peraza could have been useful as an alternative to Peterson, but with Peraza failing to advance as a player, maybe the best thing was to cut bait while his value was high. Olivera was going to be the third baseman, but he's not a third baseman. Paco's hurt even before he pitches.

Some call this deal stupid. I wouldn't go that far, but I remain unconvinced that it was the right deal for the Braves. However, if Olivera hits .285/.340/.480 next season, I'll be a bit more on board with the gamble.

Wednesday, November 4, 2015

Reviewing Hart's Trades: KJ and Uribe for Gant and Whalen

The Braves have been active in John Hart's first season at the helm to the tune of SIXTEEN TRADES! Sixteen deals involving major league talent going one direction or in both. Sixteen deals that include over 50 different players, a few draft picks, lots of cash, and two Uptons. It's been friggin unreal to see what the Braves have done.

With the season in our rear view, it's time to start reviewing each one of these trades. This series is going take a little while to get through, but hey, it gives me something to write about.

Trades Already Reviewed
La Stella for Vizcaino
Heyward/Walden for Miller/Jenkins
Varvaro for Kurcz
J. Upton for Jace Peterson and prospects
Carp/Shreve for Banulos
Kubitza/Hyatt for Sanchez
Gattis for Foltynewicz and Ruiz
Hale for Briceno
Elander for Cahill and Lots of Cash
The Craig Kimbrel Trade
Callaspo for Uribe
Gosselin for Touki

The Trade
Kelly Johnson, Juan Uribe, and $500K to the Mets for John Gant and Robert Whalen. I looked at this deal at my other blog when it happened.

The Rationale
Scott Cunningham | Getty Images
Sometimes, it's difficult to really explain both sides of a trade - especially when you follow just one of the teams. In this case, this was a simple trade that comes down to one side wanting to better their chances to win now and the other looking to turn soon-to-be free agents into possible players for the future. The Braves weren't going anywhere and thankfully acknowledged that by dealing away two veterans.

KJ was a fun signing last offseason that actually turned into a big pickup. He had hit .264/.346/.430 as a Brave from 2005-09, but had been non-tendered following a .692 OPS in '09. He remained a regular starter through 2013 before transitioning into a backup role with three AL East teams in 2014. However, he hit just .215 with a .659 OPS. Those struggles allowed the Braves to swoop in with a minor league contract and a spring training invite. He got off to a poor start, but hit well enough over the final few weeks to make the roster. An oblique strain cost him some time, but KJ slashed .275/.321/.451 with 9 HRwhile playing a lot of left and filling in for an injured Freddie Freeman at first.

I looked at the Uribe deal a few days ago, but again, he caught fire with the Braves and slashed .285/.353/.464. Through a pair of deals, the Braves secured three young arms with the aid of Uribe. Pretty good haul.

We forget that at the time of this deal that the Mets were three backs at the end of July 24, which was the day this trade was announced. They were just a game over .500 and even trailed the Wild Card.

The haul they surrendered wasn't all that significant. We have heard a lot about their young pitching in the majors and with good reason. They are very solid. Trading young prospects like Gant and Whalen, neither a vital member of their projected future roster, was a pretty good exchange for them and also for the Braves because both pitchers had at least something that made them interesting.

Whalen, a 2012 12th round pick, was considered the better prospect of the two. Armed with a heavy fastball, Whalen is a control guy with the high-end ability of being a bit like 2015 Garrett Richards (20% K%, 9% BB%, 55% GB%, 12% HR/FB). Of course, that's the high-end. At the time of the trade, he was going through his second consecutive season of a K rate falling and a GB rate falling with it. Still, he had a 1.28 WHIP with St. Lucie and was young for the level.

A teammate of Whalen earlier in the year, Gant had made a half-dozen starts before being sent back to AA. He wasn't doing so hot there before or after the demotion to St. Lucie. The belief was that while Whalen had stuff that needed to be refined, Gant had guts and a deceptive delivery that kept hitters off balance. Gant was a guy you take a chance on, but it seemed like Whalen was the bigger get here.

Short-Term Results
Well, the Mets went to the World Series so there's that. KJ wasn't quite as good with the Mets, but he did provide depth at all four infield positions along with playing both corner outfield slots. He went 1-for-9 in the playoffs with 4 K's and a HBP. Uribe also saw his numbers decline post-trade, slashing .219/.301/.430 before missing a month with a chest injury that kept him out until Game 3 of the World Series.

But their value extended beyond filling in for injured Mets like David Wright if you read what the New York media focused on. Both players indicated to the fans and the team alike that the Mets were willing to add to their team in hopes of competing. While later pick-ups like Yoenis Cespedes and Tyler Clippard played bigger roles, it shouldn't be ignored what adding KJ and Uribe did for the culture and feeling around the team.

Meanwhile, Whalen headed to Carolina, but his time with the Mudcats was cut short by an injury in his third outing. He later posted a picture to Twitter about his injury and while I'm not sure exactly what the injury is, both knees were operated on and he pointed out later that he was glad to be running pain-free for the first time in two seasons. He'll be aiming for a return by spring training.

While Whalen went under the knife, Gant excelled. In seven starts for the Mississippi Braves, Gant struck out over a batter an inning and 3 K's for every walk. Meanwhile, he allowed just one homer and finished with a 1.03 WHIP and 1.99 ERA as a member of the Braves. Four of his outings ended with at least seven K's, including a 6 ING, 1 H, 9 K outing against Montgomery.

Long-Term Outlook
This trade completely shifts toward the Braves perspective now as both KJ and Uribe were granted free agency. Can Gant sustain his success to finish the year? He'll be eligible for the Rule 5 draft, though I imagine the Braves will add him to the 40-man roster to protect him. He could even be a darkhorse next spring, though it's far more likely that he'll be ticketed for a trip to Gwinnett.

As for Whalen, it's all going to be about health for him. He's avoided arm trouble and hand and knee injuries aren't typically that important, but not pitching 100 innings in a season four years into your career as a starter is. He'll likely return to Carolina, though he might be ready for Mississippi. Either way, if he's healthy and back on his game, Whalen gives the Braves another good prospect for the future to be used for trade fodder or as depth for the roster.

All in all, this was a good deal at the time and remains so. Neither Whalen, nor Gant, will be super impressive or garner a lot of prospect attention, but each is better than seeing KJ and Uribe produce for a bad ballclub.

Monday, November 2, 2015

Reviewing Hart's Trades: Gosselin for Touki

The Braves have been active in John Hart's first season at the helm to the tune of SIXTEEN TRADES! Sixteen deals involving major league talent going one direction or in both. Sixteen deals that include over 50 different players, a few draft picks, lots of cash, and two Uptons. It's been friggin unreal to see what the Braves have done.

With the season in our rear view, it's time to start reviewing each one of these trades. This series is going take a little while to get through, but hey, it gives me something to write about.

Trades Already Reviewed
La Stella for Vizcaino
Heyward/Walden for Miller/Jenkins
Varvaro for Kurcz
J. Upton for Jace Peterson and prospects
Carp/Shreve for Banulos
Kubitza/Hyatt for Sanchez
Gattis for Foltynewicz and Ruiz
Hale for Briceno
Elander for Cahill and Lots of Cash
The Craig Kimbrel Trade
Callaspo for Uribe

The Trade
Philip Gosselin to the Diamondbacks for Touki Toussaint and Bronson Arroyo

The Rationale
This one is easy to explain from Atlanta's point-of-view. They turned a backup infielder who had a .665 major league OPS to go with a minor league OPS of about .735 into a Top 100 prospect. The trouble is rationalizing this from the Diamondbacks' perspective.

Kevin C. Cox | Getty Images
On one end, the Diamondbacks shed about $10M in salary with this move from the roughly $5.5M Arroyo was owed for the remainder of 2015, plus a $4.5M buyout for 2016. So, there was some payroll flexibility here. And maybe Arizona had second thoughts on Toussaint a year after drafting him with the #16th overall pick of the 2014 draft. At the time of the draft, you could argue that Toussaint had as high of a ceiling as any other pitcher in that draft. The question was how far was he from reaching it because he was so raw.

But even with those potential concerns, the Diamondbacks essentially sold a great prospect to the Braves and in an environment where there are caps on draft slots and international bonus money, acquiring a guy a year removed from being a first round pick without having to pay from any of the pools of money that go to draft picks and signings was a coup for the Braves.

Losing Gosselin only hurt because Goose was a likeable high-effort guy who made the most out of not having a lot of talent. He had hit .266 the previous year while spelling Tommy La Stella against lefties and had got off to a good start in 2015 before fracturing his thumb about a month before this trade was completed.

Short-Term Results
Gosselin did make it back for a 24-game run to finish the year and hit the cover off the ball (.303/.382/.545). Chances are not good that 17% of his flyballs continue to leave the park, though Gosselin did do a better job at elevating the ball when he returned to live action.

Arroyo never played for the Braves and was later traded to the Dodgers in a mega deal that will be discussed soon enough. That one's going to take a lot of words.

Only 18, Toussaint continued to pitch A-ball after the trade. In ten games with Rome, he struggled with his control (6.1 BB/9) and gave up too many homers. There were times where he showed his A-game, though. On July 20, Toussaint faced Lakewood and shut them down over six hitless innings where he walked four and struck out eight. However, his next start was a nine-run stinker where he pitched just 3.1 ING. He was shut down for precautionary reasons in late August, which only cost him a start or two. His last game was a six-inning quality start where he gave up just one run and struck out five.

Long-Term Outlook
I suppose Goose could surprise us all and continue to hit, but I imagine he'll see his numbers travel toward a .700 OPS. He's got value as a super utility guy who can play short in a pinch and has moved out to left field. He even played some center during spring training. He's a guy who it's easy to root for even if he plays for the Diamondbacks now.

Arroyo has some post-2015 effect on the Braves depending on how their accounting works. As part of the Dodgers covering all of Hector Olivera's contract, the Braves chipped in to pay all but $500K of the remaining $3.4M on his 2015 salary. The Braves are also responsible for the $4.5M buyout for 2016.

But this trade comes down to Touki. Dave Stewart, when he defended this deal, balked at someone saying Touki could get it up to 96 mph. Maybe he was mad that someone short-changed Touki, who reached 98 with Rome. While he remains incredibly raw and won't have his training wheels taking off any time soon, the Braves have a lot of reason to love Toussaint and what he brings. He has ace potential in his right arm, but control will determine how close he comes to reaching it. One promising thing is that his pitches show flashes of greatness. The hard velocity with his fastball will get outs if he can control it. His changeup has a mature deception to it where he maintains his arm speed, but it too often misses high (translation: ball go far when that happens). His third pitch, a curve, has great biting action when he controls it and might become his best strikeout pitch

Regardless if Touki becomes a middle reliever or a starter at the major league level, this deal was a win by just taking a chance on him. He's got a chance to be tremendous and the Diamondbacks just gave him away. If the Craig Kimbrel trade wasn't the best deal the Braves completed since Frank Wren's firing, buying Touki off the D'Backs was.

As an aside, if you piggy-back this onto the Travor Cahill and Victor Reyes trades (the latter I didn't profile), the Braves effectively turned Josh Elander, Reyes, Gosselin, and about $15M in cash into Cahill, Arroyo, Touki, and the 75th overall pick of the 2015 draft - A.J. Minter, who missed his first season coming back from Tommy John. To put that into another streamlined way, they turned depth players into a pair of high-end prospects. You do that every day of the week if you can.

Reviewing Hart's Trades: Callaspo for Uribe

The Braves have been active in John Hart's first season at the helm to the tune of SIXTEEN TRADES! Sixteen deals involving major league talent going one direction or in both. Sixteen deals that include over 50 different players, a few draft picks, lots of cash, and two Uptons. It's been friggin unreal to see what the Braves have done.

With the season in our rear view, it's time to start reviewing each one of these trades. This series is going take a little while to get through, but hey, it gives me something to write about.

Trades Already Reviewed
La Stella for Vizcaino
Heyward/Walden for Miller/Jenkins
Varvaro for Kurcz
J. Upton for Jace Peterson and prospects
Carp/Shreve for Banulos
Kubitza/Hyatt for Sanchez
Gattis for Foltynewicz and Ruiz
Hale for Briceno
Elander for Cahill and Lots of Cash
The Kimbrel Trade

The Trade
Alberto Callaspo, Juan Jaime, Eric Stults, and Ian Thomas to the Dodgers for Juan Uribe and Chris Withrow

The Rationale
Justin K. Aller | Getty Images Sport
This was an odd trade. On May 27, the Braves and Dodgers were due to begin a three-game series in Los Angeles, but before the first game, this trade was announced. It seemed like the Dodgers were taking some of Atlanta's trash while the Braves were grabbing a guy who was a bit disgruntled with his playing time. But as the Braves did often in 2015, they made the Dodgers give a bit more than they got in return when Los Angeles gave up Withrow, who while hurt, might possess the most dynamic future of any of the six traded.

Callaspo had been the Braves' stopgap measure for second base, but when Jace Peterson had a good spring, Callaspo was relegated to third base where he shared time with the equally awful Chris Johnson. Callaspo played in 37 games with the Braves at the time of the trade and while he was doing a pretty stout job at third base, he had provided little in terms of offense.

But the Dodgers were good with Callaspo because they wanted to trade away Uribe. Even though Uribe had been productive as a Dodger, the team preferred the cheaper Callaspo along with moving a player who, while dealing with a hamstring issue, was wondering why he was sharing time with Justin Turner when had hit .295/.334/.439 with 21 HR during the 2013-14 seasons.

The deal started from the Uribe-for-Callaspo template, but didn't get very far after Callaspo denied to give the Braves permission to deal him. While he didn't have a no-trade clause, rules state that a player who has signed a free agent contract cannot be traded without his permission until June 15. Callaspo quickly reconsidered and why wouldn't he? Atlanta wanted to trade him so they didn't want him and they would deal him eventually. Why stay with them for a few more weeks?

The trade morphed beyond the two players. Ian Thomas was an interesting left-handed reliever out of indy ball who had made the Braves opening day roster in 2014, but had struggled to establish himself as a decent LOOGY. Juan Jaime was a hard-throwing righty who had already been designated for assignment and exposed to waivers earlier in the season. His triple digit heat was enticing, but he never had a grasp on where the ball was headed. As for Eric Stults, he had struggled badly after beating out Wandy Rodriguez in spring training. None of the players the Braves surrendered looked like keepers.

But the Braves did get a keeper in return by acquiring Withrow. A righty with great velocity, Withrow was almost a year removed from Tommy John surgery, which fans jokingly said was the reason the Braves targeted him. Well, it wasn't. What the Braves sought was the guy who had a 11.2 K/9, 3.4 BB/9, and 0.95 WHIP in 26 games with the Dodgers in 2013. He struggled with his control before going under the knife in his follow-up season, but the former 2007 1st rounder was heavy on potential. There was talk that Withrow would be a possibility for the Braves in the second half.

Short-Term Results
The Dodgers got very little out of this deal. Callaspo hit .260 after the trade with a .637 OPS before being released in late August. Thomas appeared in nine games, including a start. Overall, the numbers are not bad, nor good, because we're talking about only 18 innings. His minor league work wasn't much to write home about.

Jaime appeared with five different minor league stops after the trade. It was like the Dodgers were trying to work with him, though his control remains suspect. I imagine he'll be headed to the world of minor league free agency. Stults never appeared in the majors after the trade and instead split time between Tulsa (AA) and Oklahoma City (AAA). He was actually pretty good and will likely be hunting for another spring invite this winter.

While the Dodgers struck out, the Braves got Uribe's power, which helped a punchless lineup. He settled in as the regular third baseman while also providing high-caliber defense that CJ wasn't capable of. During a 46-game run with the Braves, he hit .285/.353/.817 with 7 HR. Fangraphs grades his time with the Braves as a 1.4 fWAR. Over a 162-game sample, that's a nearly 5 fWAR. True, he wouldn't have done that over a full season, but it does mean that he played at a high level when he was a Brave.

That production allowed the Braves to flip Uribe, along with Kelly Johnson, to the Mets for a couple of pitching prospects before the deadline.

Long-Term Outlook
You could add the Mets deal as an extension of this trade and how the two ex-Mets, John Gant and Robert Whalen, pitch for the Braves in the future will help in grading this deal long-term.

More importantly, how will Withrow do once he's finally back on the mound? He seems on track to pitch for the Braves this spring and could be a big part of Atlanta's hope to have a much-improved bullpen heading into 2016. Out of options, the Braves need Withrow to step back into form. He's also Super 2-eligible this offseason even though he only has 56 innings in the majors. Chances are that he won't get a lot more than the minimum.

Friday, October 30, 2015

Reviewing Hart's Trades: The Craig Kimbrel Deal

The Braves have been active in John Hart's first season at the helm to the tune of SIXTEEN TRADES! Sixteen deals involving major league talent going one direction or in both. Sixteen deals that include over 50 different players, a few draft picks, lots of cash, and two Uptons. It's been friggin unreal to see what the Braves have done.

With most of the season in our rear view, it's time to start reviewing each one of these trades. This series is going take a little while to get through, but hey, it gives me something to write about.

Trades Already Reviewed
La Stella for Vizcaino
Heyward/Walden for Miller/Jenkins
Varvaro for Kurcz
J. Upton for Jace Peterson and prospects
Carp/Shreve for Banulos
Kubitza/Hyatt for Sanchez
Gattis for Foltynewicz and Ruiz
Hale for Briceno
Elander for Cahill and Lots of Cash

The Trade
Craig Kimbrel and Melvin Upton to the Padres for Cameron Maybin, Matt Wisler, Carlos Quentin, Jordan Paroubeck, and a 2015 draft choice (Austin Riley). I looking at those leaving and coming at this blog and a deeper look over at About.com.

The Rationale
A month ago, as I went over the Justin Upton trade, I wrote this: "(A.J.) Preller could say he held out and didn't give the Braves the pitcher they really wanted - Matt Wisler. Of course, that would change when Preller got so desperate to put a bow on his first offseason, but we'll get to that deal later." Welcome to later. It's hard to decide what was the most surprising thing about this trade. That the Braves had moved Kimbrel, who we were told was untouchable? That the deal came hours before the season was set to begin? Or, if you were like me, was it that the Braves found a team so desperate - so foolish - to take on an additional $50 million in payroll just to get an elite closer?

Jim McIssac | Getty
A lot of people hated this trade, but not for its impact on the Braves team so much as losing yet another homegrown, popular player. Sure, losing the despised elder Upton and his contract helped matters, but Kimbrel was loved in Atlanta who had broken the franchise record for saves before he turned 27. He was the last remaining piece of the super successful O'Ventbrel with southpaws Jonny Venters and Eric O'Flaherty. He was our chosen one who sat in a bullpen in Los Angeles while Fredi Gonzalez arbitrarily counted the amount of outs Kimbrel was "good for" even as the 2013 season went down in flames.

But even the greatest closer in franchise history only throws 60-70 innings. Closers are overvalued because of their mystique. Was Kimbrel overpaid? Not according to the market, but was he too expensive for the Braves? Absolutely. He was about to enter Year 2 of his 4 year, $41M contract with a team option that could increase it to $52M. The Braves saw a chance to clear the books and while they stuck with the company line that they loved Kimbrel and wouldn't trade him, even they saw future payrolls and wondered if Kimbrel was worth it.

Getting rid of Upton just made the exchange easier. A big red mark on Frank Wren's time in Atlanta, Upton had been offered $75M over five years to come to Atlanta despite a .255 career batting average and .298 OBP in his walk year with the Rays. The Braves basically put $75M on red during roulette. They would either come out of it looking like roses or things would go about as bad as you could imagine.

Of course, it went the latter. In two seasons, Upton slashed .198/.279/.314 with 21 HR, 32 SB, and 324 strikeouts. The Braves were desperate to find a taker for the $46.5M left on his contract. The Cubs flirted with the idea of sending Edwin Jackson to the Braves for Upton, but nothing materialized. It was a foregone conclusion that even if the Braves traded Upton, they would be taking on some, if not the majority of, the remaining salary.

But that's where the Padres stepped in. A.J. Preller had been nearly as active as the new Braves front office during the offseason. He had already traded for Justin Upton from the Braves while adding Wil Myers and Matt Kemp because defense is totally optional. With James Shields, Derek Norris, and Will Middlebrooks also in place, Preller assumed he had built a juggernaut. He assumed very wrong, but as the season was about to open, he saw an opportunity to put a cherry on the top. Mr. Kimbrel. Sure, the Pads still had Joaquin Benoit, who was more than capable, but he was no Kimbrel. Plus, with Kimbrel, the bullpen would be much deeper. Sure, they would have to add the other Upton, but they already had a glut of outfielders, as the rest of the deal showed.

Getting rid of Maybin and Quentin cleared up things for the Padres, who also had Will Venable. With Melvin missing the first couple of months, it allowed the Padres plenty of time to work him in slowly while keeping Venable in a 4th outfielder role because their super duper outfield was, well, super duper. Of course, where Melvin fit in was confusing, but KIMBREL!

Maybin was a bust in San Diego after signing a long-term deal when he first became arbitration-eligible. He had played in 109 games over the previous two years and had a .665 OPS over four years with the Padres. They didn't have a place for him and were glad to shed his salary. Quentin's inclusion was weird because the Braves released him soon after, but the latter was part of the plan. Quentin had no-trade protection and wanted to get the freedom to try to jumpstart his career elsewhere, preferably with a team that played 95% of their games with a DH. My friend Bryce theorized the inclusion of Quentin was so that the deal would get done without the need for commissioner approval rather than the Braves packaging money to help pay for the Padres to release Quentin themselves.

Paroubeck was an interesting prospect in the long-term. Incredibly raw with athletic ability off the charts, Paroubeck was a second-rounder in 2013, who didn't make his debut until the following season. The production was there, but again, as interesting as he was, it was like adding another draft choice to the organization considering how little he had played and how young he was. Speaking of draft choices, we didn't know it at the time, but the 41st selection of the 2015 draft would quickly pay dividends.

As for the guy the Braves had wanted for Melvin's older brother earlier in the offseason, Wisler was ticketed for a return trip to El Paso before the trade. It's where he landed the previous spring and after sulking because he felt he deserved a look over the pitchers the Padres kept, Wisler was demoted back to AA to try to jumpstart his season. Overall, he had finished with a 5.01 ERA in AAA. Even with that in mind, Baseball America ranked him the #34 prospect in baseball. He was one of just two Padres prospects ranked by BA, Baseball Prospectus, and MLB.com in the top 100 (Hunter Renfroe was the other).

Short-Term Results
The Padres remade their team and won three fewer games in doing so. Adding Kimbrel aided the pen, which was fairly good as a result. He struggled early (for him), but Kimbrel turned it on late. Homers were a bit of a problem, but a career-high rate in HR/FB may have been a bit flukish. It turns out to be his worse full season in the majors both in saves and xFIP/SIERA. However, Kimbrel's so damn good that having 39 saves, a 2.46 xFIP, and 2.21 SIERA is considered a down year. But the Padres learned what the Braves already were aware of - having a great closer is a luxery, but only makes a bad ballclub moderately better.

Of more interest was Melvin's resurgence. Sure, he was limited to just 87 games, but he slashed .259/.327/.429 with a 110 RC+. His last three years in Tampa averaged a 109 RC+ so that was impressive. I'm not sold on it continuing as Melvin's .348 BABIP was his highest since his 2007-08 days when he walked a lot and hit for a good average. That said, a pull rate that leaped over 50% might suggest that Upton's clunky approach at the plate was adjusted and gave him a better chance at getting around on balls, which led to a career-best line drive rate.

Just to touch on a few of the short-timers...Quentin caught on with the Mariners organization, but quickly decided that enough was enough and hung up his spikes at the ripe old age of just 32. Paroubeck was traded before he played a game in the organization. Nursing an injury, he was moved, along with Caleb Dirks, to the Dodgers on July 2 for an international bonus slot that helped the Braves sign their pair of high-priced international guys.

Now, to the meat. Maybin had a wonderful first half, but fell off the map in the second half, which led to a .267/.327/.370 final slash with 10 HR, 23 steals, and defensive metrics sour on him. He did play in 141 games after 109 the previous two seasons so that was a plus. His first half numbers were exciting, too. Who doesn't want .289/.356/.418 from your center fielder who, I wager, is better in the field that the -5.3 adjusted defensive rating Fangraphs gave him.

As for Wisler, there were both good and bad parts of his game this season. he remained a durable arm and threw 109 innings in the majors along with 65 in Gwinnett. Curiously, his strikeout rate fell from the 8.6 per nine rate he had been pulling before 2015 to a bit over 6 per nine. In addition, his xFIP and SIERA were not pretty (both around 5.00). While his late season starts look good, the results are not really supported in the numbers, though the same size is VERY VERY SMALL.

Finally, there is Riley, the prep pitcher who just wanted a chance to hit. The Braves gave him that chance and he smacked a dozen homers in 60 games. He has received some aggressive rankings since then (including #11 by me) and it might be premature for a guy who K'd a quarter of his plate appearances, but you just don't see many 18 year-olds brutalize the Appalachian League.

Long-Term Outlook
The Padres are on the hook for at least two more seasons of both Kimbrel and Melvin, though they have been rumored to be at least listening to offers on Kimbrel. And there in lies the accepted conundrum with Kimbrel. As good as he is, you still feel kind of dumb paying $24M for the next two innings for 130 innings. Granted, if you have an endless payroll, screw it. But for teams like the Padres and Braves, does paying that much money for so few actual innings make financial sense?

On the flipside, if Melvin keeps hitting, regardless with what happens with Kimbrel, the Padres will at least have that to hang their hat on. Yay...

Atlanta is stocked with veteran outfielders in 2016 and Maybin could be on the market, though I tend to think the Braves like the idea of letting Mallex Smith get a spring under the veterans, a few more months in Gwinnett to buy another pre-arbitration season, and bring up their hot prospect only after things clear up in Atlanta. It allows the Braves more depth to limit Michael Bourn and Nick Swisher's at-bats to keep their vesting options from triggering (which, if they produce, could help their trade value). I'm sure Atlanta will listen to offers on Maybin, but they need an upgrade to the roster to make a deal - not just more prospects.

The bigger picture rests on the arm of Wisler and the bat of Riley. Will Wisler clean up his game to become the middle-of-the-staff force many felt him capable of? It's definitely possible and if he makes that step in 2016, all the better. Atlanta could use the depth behind the projected rotation of Shelby Miller, Julio Teheran, zombie Mike Minor, and...well, that's it. Meanwhile, power is a commodity that the Braves are short on and while Riley is a number of years away from likely getting into the picture, Atlanta could use his presence.

All in all, this deal might be the best one the Holy John Trinity made in their first year. Yeah, a certain Diamondbacks deal ranks very high, but this particular trade was a franchise changer. It moved bad contracts while only adding Maybin's affordable contract post-2015. It brought two big young players to the system and it gave the Braves a chance to move beyond the awfulness of watching Melvin suck.