Last week, the Owners of Major League Baseball and the Player Union agreed to terms on a new Collective Bargaining Agreement, avoiding a possible lockout. There's a lot to dive into and it's worth the effort to learn about this CBA, but if you want a quick-and-dirty look at how it pertains to the Atlanta Braves, here you go. Note - I'm not an expert on the ins-and-outs of CBA language so feel free to point me in the right direction if I go astray.
Scheduling
-I've talked about service time a great deal because for a team with so many young players, it becomes a bit of an important detail. Starting in 2018, it will be a bit easier to reach the needed 172 days to count as a full year of service. The regular season will increase from 183 to 187 days with off days accounting for the extra days along with the season beginning a bit earlier. That leaves a total of at least 16 days that a player will have to remain in the minors to buy an extra year of team control.
All-Star Game Fiasco
-Remember new Hall of Fame member Bud Selig's bright idea about making the All-Star Game count by awarding Home Field Advantage to the winner? Yeah, that's gone - which is awesome because why should the Braves be forced to not have home field advantage after winning 120 games in 2019 and going to the World Series where they beat the expansion Las Vegas Express? (ed: don't bet money on the last thing happening. 120-42 is nearly impossible)
Easier DL decisions
-Gone is the 15-day DL. In its place, welcome the 10-Day DL. Instead of worrying about losing your player for two weeks just to deal with a strain, you can lose him for a smaller time frame. I look at this as a good thing as a lot of players for those players who are good-to-go after a week or so on the DL, but have to wait it out.
Clubhouse Health
-This area was a well thought-out change that I hope, over time, is pushed down the ladder to the minors. Clubs will be required to provide a sports psychologist and a registered dietitian that can help provide guidance on nutrition and dietary supplements. The former is just smart as it helps remove the stigma of the big, manly men who can't seek out help to deal with the things in their life. Shocker: happier baseball players = more productive baseball players. The dietitian part, I believe, has become more and more important as the drug testing increasingly gets refined (more tests are included in this CBA). We have a lot of players who don't even understand what they are putting into their bodies. They are subsequently busted for PED offenses. That's not to say all players who have been busted fit into that, but some do and baseball (and its union) should be taking care of them to try to help them avoid costly suspensions. Unfortunately, the minor leaguers, who need guidance the most, will likely be shut out. Another helpful addition - no more hazing of rookie players. I know we all laugh when we see players dressed in drag, but really, it's 2016. Time to grow up.
Draft Pick Compensation Changes
-The qualified offer compensation system was a bust. While it fixed the issue of long relievers being offered arbitration when they were a Type A free agent, it ruined the markets of some very good free agents. Now, there are a lot of particulars involved here and I don't want to bog you down with all of the details. The Braves are unlikely to spend enough to reach the Competitive Balance Tax, or CBT, which begins at $195M in 2017 and gradually increases to $210M by 2021. CBT Payors receive the harshest punishment (lose second-highest and fifth-highest selections, plus lose $1M in international signing money) when they sign a free agent formerly offered a qualified offer.
-Specific to the Braves - and important to draft pick compensation - is that they are no longer considered a market disqualified team. Basically, that's a way of saying that instead of taking part in revenue sharing, the Braves could end up keeping it. Where this becomes slightly important is that it may mean that the Braves would forfeit just their third highest remaining selection in the amateur draft rather than their second-highest. The latter also sees its international signing bonus pool decreased by $500K.
-Further, receiving compensation also changes. Ignoring the CBT Payor Club, if the Braves are non-market disqualified, they could receive a pick immediately following the first round IF that player receives a contract worth at least $50M. What happens if the Braves become a market disqualified club or a player doesn't sign for at least $50M? That's not so clear just yet, but it looks like all other compensation would come after the Competitive Balance Round B concludes (after the second round).
The Draft Itself
-Remember how people said the Braves were tanking for the #1 pick? Well, it failed because of the second half surge and now, it won't even as valuable to tank. The bonus slot system has been tweaked to reduce such a difference between #1 and #2 and so on. In fact, the suggested slot bonus for the first overall pick is lower than it has been the last four years. While teams will still be incentivized to live within the limitations of a draft system in which going under-slot early allows a team to pay over-slot later, it shouldn't be as bad.
Going International
-Sad news: The Braves will not be able to avoid the punishment and restrictions from spending so much on the previous international signing period to get Kevin Maitan and others. So, for the next two seasons, the Braves will be limited to signing bonuses of $300K and lower (exempting bonuses of $10K and lower).
-Now, the good news. While the international draft was scrapped, something pretty amazing happened. For the first time, the players were open to a salary cap. Probably had something to do with getting tired of watching guys get $20-$25M guaranteed despite never playing in the majors. Instead of that, teams will start with a $4.75M bonus signing pool. Teams that receive a Competitive Balance Pick will have pools of either $5.25M or $5.75M based on where their pick is. Pools can grow with "industry revenue," but let's ignore that for the time being.
-Teams can trade up to 75% of their pools in the next two years and 60% after that. This part is key because the Braves will likely not get close to their $4.75M pool in July 2017 or July 2018 as they deal with their restrictions. However, they can be on the reverse side of what they did in 2015. That year, they traded players for bonus slots so that could increase their bonus pool allotment enough to avoid penalties on future years. Now, they can use their extra pool money to potentially get a prospect or two from another team.
-Foreign players under 25 fall under the scope of the international signing period. This might effect Shohei Otani the most. Otani is a freak of nature who hit 22 homers and had a 1.86 ERA in 140 innings last year. Otani doesn't turn 23 until next July. With the strict international limits meaning the most he could receive would be a shade under $10M, he'll stay in Japan until he comes of age unless an exception is built into the CBA at some point.
-By the way, if you are caught cheating - and the Red Sox were last year - you can lose up to 50% of your allotment for the life of the deal.
No Roster Changes
-There were rumors about a 26-man roster or alterations to the September callups. I've never been a fan of changing that as I'm one of the few that enjoys September callups - especially over the last two years of watching the Braves rebuild.
There will be more details released as everything is finalized, but this is a start. There are things to like about this CBA and the biggest one is that baseball assures itself of labor peace for another five years. There is just too much money to be made by everyone involved to chance it, but people get stupid. Luckily, everyone worked to a rational decision of compromise in this deal. Of course, there are already rumors that 2021 will see a nuclear war between the owners and players that will result in a strike, a lost season, the sky falling, and so on. But for now, let's just enjoy the ride.
Showing posts with label Articles. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Articles. Show all posts
Monday, December 5, 2016
Friday, May 27, 2016
"It feels like every move has backfired."
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| By Arturo Pardavila III on Flickr (Original version) UCinternational (Crop) [CC BY 2.0], via Wikimedia Commons |
Fans are fanatical because they love the team hard and let their failures cloud their judgement. It's easy to focus on the negative especially when you are essentially writing a column about how awful things are right now. But there is little thought given to the other side of things during the column. Actually, that's wrong. There is NO thought given to what the Braves are doing outside of the things that aren't working.
I get it. A lot of bad things occurring together makes it difficult at times to support the franchise. The move to Cobb County was a curious one given Turner Field's age and the location of the new ballpark, but on the other hand, is anyone making an argument that Turner Field was a benefit for the Braves? Not really. Instead, we are given the old standby that a team from that city should be based in that city. The Giants and Jets don't even play in the state of New York, but somehow, no one cares about that.
The article focuses so much on the negative, but where it really loses me when it suggests that "fans who have been with the team for years may not be with them" when they do start to win and fill up Suntrust again. While certainly some have given up on the Braves for good, most fans will forget their misgivings over this rebuild when the team wins. Every rebuilding team makes the bet that they may struggle with attendance and might even lose some fans in the process, but the result will be worth it. Do you need to watch how fans passionately followed the Royals last fall for that to ring true?
One other small tangent before I focus on my bigger theme. One fan, Chris Nicholson, said that he thought "Bobby Cox cried the day he traded Dale Murphy. Well, okay! That’s my general manager. He feels the way I feel. I think [GM John] Coppolella traded Simmons to show everyone he could do it." Ignoring the absurdity of the last point - and that Remington repeats it - what is ignored is that people are far more cynical than they once were. Since Cox's trade of Murphy and the alleged tears that followed, our society has lived through a Strike, a steroid scandal, the rise of sabermetrics, and that doesn't even get into the things that have robbed us of much of our innocence unrelated to baseball. We don't expect the general manager of our team to cry when he makes a trade. We expect him to do his job and build a better team. By the way, the trade of Simmons does that, but we'll get back to that, I'm sure.
Let's focus on the one quote that really prompted to write this diatribe. "It feels like every move has backfired."
Disclaimer: I certainly realize that the statement is a generalization. It's an exaggeration of events built upon the Braves' failures this year. But that doesn't excuse the statement, only explain it away.
Has every move backfired? Last fall, I went over the many trades of John Hart's first year when he was "in charge." Of course, John Coppolella was mostly responsible for engineering the trades, but Hart had final say. Did trading Jason Heyward and Justin Upton backfire? It made the Braves worse in 2015, but it requires a leap of faith to believe that the Braves would have been able to scratch together a competent rotation to make having Heyward and Upton worthwhile in 2015. Have the deals backfired? Well, Shelby Miller was wonderful for the Braves and was cashed in for three highly valuable players (the article only mentions Aaron Blair and not in a positive light). Mallex Smith is the current starting leftfielder for the Braves from the Upton trade and while we still need to see if the other two prospects from the trade take off (Max Fried and Dustin Peterson), it is difficult to accept that either trade backfired for the Braves. Instead, they have helped the Braves.
Did the Evan Gattis trade backfire? Only if you believe Gattis should be a major league full-time catcher.
How about the Craig Kimbrel move? Matt Wisler's advancement this year and the dominance of Arodys Vizcaino (another trade acquisition) makes that clear. The trade also produced a draft choice, which Atlanta used to draft Austin Riley, and another player in Jordan Paroubeck, who Atlanta later traded for international bonus slots to avoid penalties for their two top pickups last summer from the international signing period.
The better question should be - what moves HAVE backfired? The Hector Olivera one, certainly. And?
Keeping Fredi Gonzalez around? I don't believe that holds water, but I'm struggling to come up with another move that really backfired. You could argue, as the article does, that it's the Andrelton Simmons trade that has backfired based on the play of Erick Aybar. But that implies the trade was made for Aybar, which it wasn't. Was Simmons' contract team-friendly as the article suggests? The point is debatable. From a WAR standpoint, certainly. But the Braves were on the hook for an additional $53 million through 2020 for a player who had hit .252/.301/.357 over his first three full seasons. Certainly, watching Aybar totally forget how to play baseball has been rough, but paying Simmons $6M this year to make a tremendous amount of outs and $47M for the next four years does little to help, either. Oh, and the Braves picked up two good pitching prospects in the trade.
The Braves of 2016 wouldn't have had Heyward and Upton, would be paying large amounts of money to Kimbrel and Melvin Upton, and still would be bad. The only real difference between that hypothetical Braves team and the current one is that the latter actually has a future. Sure, buying heavy into Olivera was a mistake - though it could be made better by whoever Atlanta drafts with the choice they acquired last July from the trade. Bringing back A.J. Pierzynski might have backfired, though adding Tyler Flowers didn't. And neither has - to this point - adding Gordon Beckham. Bringing back Jim Johnson and Eric O'Flaherty - yuck - but those moves get massively overshadowed by the additions of Dansby Swanson and Sean Newcomb to the organization.
Alex Remington sought to talk specially about the major league team in 2016. The problem is that focusing solely on the 2016 team misses the point. The Braves aren't trying to be good in 2016. They are trying to build a long-term successful team that can generate not just talent from their minor leagues each year, but impact talent. I agree that the team built is largely unwatchable. Some of that is awful luck, some of it was bad decisions. Mostly, however, it's that the focus of the organization is currently not on building a competitive major league team. We knew that coming in 2016. Teams interested in being a .500 squad or competing for a Wild Card spot don't include signing Emilio Bonifacio or Jeff Francoeur as their big free agent pickups.
The key to watching the 2016 team is to ignore the win-loss record and focus on the future. If you are going to ignore the minor leagues, that becomes increasingly difficult, but you can still watch Wisler and get excited. You can rejoyce when Mike Foltynewicz throws a good game and "gets it" a bit more. You can watch Vizcaino finally realize his potential that made the Yankees excited about him all those years ago. Julio Teheran is having a solid bounceback campaign and Ender Inciarte is a keeper. Oh, and you have to know that Mallex Smith is going to be better at swiping bases than we have seen so far.
"Diehards" may hate this team right now and certainly it's difficult to watch every game.
A rebuild happened. Whether it was right or not can be questioned, but once the rebuild started, losing perspective on why moves were made will only makes things worse. The Heyward trade was not made for 2016. Neither was the Justin Upton trade, the Gattis move, or even the Simmons trade. If you are a casual fan or even a "diehard" that doesn't consider why the moves were made and what the future can bring, you will hate the team more than you need to.
That's okay, though. More times than not, they come back when the winning does. Jim Tremayne and Chris Nicholson may hate the team right now, but the smart money is on them cheering as loudly as anyone when the winning comes.
Sunday, January 3, 2016
Murray Chass Is A Bitter Man
There are times when I read an article where I curse the fact that FireJoeMorgan.com is no longer maintained. As I read each word of the aforementioned article, all I think is "if only this article got the FJM treatment, it would be both hilarious and infuriating instead of only the latter." I'd like to believe I have half of the talent those guys do, though that almost certainly is an inflated sense of self.
As I perused "A Name of Shame and the Hall of Fame" this morning, that thought process returned. Damn, if only Ken Tremendous and company were around for this. For brevity, I've excluded some sections of the post that would be filler otherwise and indicated so with an ellipses.
Is anyone here familiar with the name Dan Szymborski? Does anybody know Dan Szymborski? Has anyone ever spoken to or communicated in any way with Dan Szymborski? Does anyone know why Dan Szymborski hates me?
I doubt he hates you. He probably just thinks you're a bitter old hack that is an example of how some baseball writers are desperately trying to drag down the level of intellect and open-mindedness in the field while attacking anything that challenges previously accepted thought as heresy. I mean, hate is a pretty strong word.
I never heard the name Dan Szymborski until very recently. I had no idea who Dan Szymborski was. In truth, I didn’t know if his name was Dan Szymborski or Dan Szymbobski. But my grandson enlightened me.
My grandson scans the Internet much more than I do. He knows a lot more than I do, especially about web sites and digital dandies. When I asked him if he knew who Dan Szymborski was, he filled me in. Dan Szymborski, he informed me, though he didn‘t use the term – I have made it up and applied it to Dan Szymborski – is a digital dandy.
So, Murray Chass, who began his blog "Murray Chass on Baseball" in 2008 doesn't use the internet all that frequently and doesn't know how to google or use Wikipedia. Starting to see what part of Chass's problem is.
Chass, by the way, doesn't call his blog "a blog." He hates blogs.
It's still a blog, though. So, by extension, he hates his own blog. We share that in common.
Dan Szymborski has written for ESPN.com, which used to have more class than to have Dan Szymborski write for its web site.
Yeah, because ESPN was the center of class in sports when it hired Rush Limbaugh to give his opinion on football. Or when Gregg Easterbrook complained about Jewish executives not being considerate enough of the Holocaust in 2003.
Dan Szymborski, my grandson further told me, came up with some cockamamie (again, my word) mathematical formula – yeah, one of those – by which he concocts player performance projections.
For clarification, it's called ZiPS. And he doesn't "concoct" the projection. The system he created and helps refine projects performance.
I don’t know what his system is – believe me, I don’t want to know – but presumably it prompted him to write an article for ESPN.com that produced the headline “Mike Mussina one of the casualties of a broken HOF voting process.”
Doubtful considering ZiPS has never been used (and never should be used) to come to a decision on whether a player is worthy of induction into the Hall of Fame. But Chass, who has been "blogging" since 2008, doesn't know what the system is nor can he bother to perform a ten second search to figure out what it is. You know...before wildly speculating, most journalists who honed their craft with The New York Times such as Chass would like to know what the hell they are talking about. But by his own admission, Chass doesn't want to know.
...
I had not seen his comments about me because unlike Szymborski, I do not use Twitter. I leave tweeting to the twits.
Ha...ha...ha...don't use an universally accepted means for promotion and engagement because only twits like the Pope use it.
But my grandson researched Szymborski’s comments and came up with these:
Stop being so subjective and vote in the candidates that fit within your own odd criteria, Murray Chass.
In the end, Murray Chass is an example of the BBWAA. Arrogant, narrow-minded, and shallow. Worse than any metric monster he can think of, Chass is convinced that he already knows everything he needs to and any new information is not worth his time. That's the basic problem with the old guard of the BBWAA. They have convinced themselves that the statistical analysis is hokum - a waste of time. Even Chass falls victim to the old standby that these NERDS are stuck inside on their computers crunching numbers all day.
It's fine for Chass to hate the way the game is headed. What is a concern is how Chass then holds his power as a member of BBWAA hostage when the game appears to not be up to his liking. The only good thing that can be said is that when the FireJoeMorgan guys were doing this, people like Chass dominated the landscape. Now, he's part of a vocal and increasingly petulant subsection that has to share the stage with the colleagues he seems to despise. The people who concurred with him are dropping each year either from retirement or enlightenment (or...let's face it...death).
So, I understand why Chass has been desperate to remain relevant and fight the good fight, however misguided. But instead of attacking those he doesn't understand and the analytical side of baseball that has progressed, it might behoove Chass to just give it up. Go to a game. Have a hot dog. And just let this whole BBWAA thing lapse and stop blogging. Just enjoy the human beings playing the game. Isn't that all he really wants anyway?
P.S. Not even touching that deranged ISIS comparison.
As I perused "A Name of Shame and the Hall of Fame" this morning, that thought process returned. Damn, if only Ken Tremendous and company were around for this. For brevity, I've excluded some sections of the post that would be filler otherwise and indicated so with an ellipses.
Is anyone here familiar with the name Dan Szymborski? Does anybody know Dan Szymborski? Has anyone ever spoken to or communicated in any way with Dan Szymborski? Does anyone know why Dan Szymborski hates me?
I doubt he hates you. He probably just thinks you're a bitter old hack that is an example of how some baseball writers are desperately trying to drag down the level of intellect and open-mindedness in the field while attacking anything that challenges previously accepted thought as heresy. I mean, hate is a pretty strong word.
I never heard the name Dan Szymborski until very recently. I had no idea who Dan Szymborski was. In truth, I didn’t know if his name was Dan Szymborski or Dan Szymbobski. But my grandson enlightened me.
My grandson scans the Internet much more than I do. He knows a lot more than I do, especially about web sites and digital dandies. When I asked him if he knew who Dan Szymborski was, he filled me in. Dan Szymborski, he informed me, though he didn‘t use the term – I have made it up and applied it to Dan Szymborski – is a digital dandy.
So, Murray Chass, who began his blog "Murray Chass on Baseball" in 2008 doesn't use the internet all that frequently and doesn't know how to google or use Wikipedia. Starting to see what part of Chass's problem is.
Chass, by the way, doesn't call his blog "a blog." He hates blogs.
It's still a blog, though. So, by extension, he hates his own blog. We share that in common.
Dan Szymborski has written for ESPN.com, which used to have more class than to have Dan Szymborski write for its web site.
Yeah, because ESPN was the center of class in sports when it hired Rush Limbaugh to give his opinion on football. Or when Gregg Easterbrook complained about Jewish executives not being considerate enough of the Holocaust in 2003.
Dan Szymborski, my grandson further told me, came up with some cockamamie (again, my word) mathematical formula – yeah, one of those – by which he concocts player performance projections.
For clarification, it's called ZiPS. And he doesn't "concoct" the projection. The system he created and helps refine projects performance.
I don’t know what his system is – believe me, I don’t want to know – but presumably it prompted him to write an article for ESPN.com that produced the headline “Mike Mussina one of the casualties of a broken HOF voting process.”
Doubtful considering ZiPS has never been used (and never should be used) to come to a decision on whether a player is worthy of induction into the Hall of Fame. But Chass, who has been "blogging" since 2008, doesn't know what the system is nor can he bother to perform a ten second search to figure out what it is. You know...before wildly speculating, most journalists who honed their craft with The New York Times such as Chass would like to know what the hell they are talking about. But by his own admission, Chass doesn't want to know.
...
I had not seen his comments about me because unlike Szymborski, I do not use Twitter. I leave tweeting to the twits.
Ha...ha...ha...don't use an universally accepted means for promotion and engagement because only twits like the Pope use it.
But my grandson researched Szymborski’s comments and came up with these:
- That he was *ever employed as a journalist is just embarrassing.
- Murray Chass hired to be on next ‘Survivor’ but it turns out to be just a ruse to leave him on an abandoned Pacific island. #2014hopes
- And yes, Murray Chass was given a Spink award. Which is like Jenny McCarthy getting the Nobel Prize for Medicine.
- Murray Chass is the Donald Trump of baseball journalism. That may actually be too unfair to *Trump*.
- Some of the bad sportswriters can at least claim to be decent *writers*. Chass writes like a third-grader.
- Every spink award winner except chass should get a second one. insulting to tell writers they are of equal honor to murray chass.
On second thought, maybe Szymborski does hate you. In his defense, I'm getting where he's coming from.
...
In the nearly 45 years I have been eligible to vote for the Hall of Fame, the most peculiar development I have seen is the growing movement to erase completely the limit of 10 players writers can vote for or failing that, an increase in the maximum number.
I don’t get it. What kind of standards can my colleagues have if they want to elect 12 or 15 or even 10 players whom they believe were good enough to merit plaques in the Cooperstown shrine? I voted for one player this year, Griffey. I thought there were some other good players on the ballot of 32 but no other great ones. I believe only the great ones belong.
Last year I voted for the three players who received the most votes – Randy Johnson, Pedro Martinez and John Smoltz. I did not vote for Craig Biggio, who was also elected, because I had heard too much from respected sources about his alleged use of PEDs and I don’t vote for players who have allegedly cheated.
The "full-ballot movement" Chass eludes to is a direct result of people like Chass who only vote for one deserving candidate for the Hall of Fame under the guise of respecting the "standards" of the Hall of Fame or not voting for deserving candidates because someone said they "cheated." By his own admission, he declined to vote for Biggio not because there was any proof, but "respected sources" alleged that the former Astro used PEDs. There were WMD's in Iraq, after all. Some respected sources told us. Everybody Loves Raymond is a funny program. Some respected sources told me so.
By the way, they were wrong.
Ken Griffey Jr. is an incredibly deserving candidate and ought to be elected with 100% of the vote, but to look at this year's ballot and only come away with one candidate is why there's a backlog of candidates. Because the self-righteous blowhards like Chase choose to make it that way.
...
The full-ballot voters, on the other hand, haven’t given up. In fact, it appears they are just getting started. They are growing in numbers, and their views have filled the Internet in the weeks leading to the announcement of the 2016 election results.
They proudly post their ballots in their blogs, and many of them would list 12 or 15 names if they were allowed. But 10 will have to suffice for now.
What really bothers me is writers whom I have respected for their coverage are among the full-ballot voters. How can you cover baseball for years and think all of the players you mark on the ballot are worthy of the Hall of Fame? Standards, gentlemen, standards. Re-evaluate your standards.
One of the full-ballot voters, Richard Justice of MLB.com, quoted Joe Torre recently: “It’s the Hall of Fame. It’s not supposed to be easy to get into.” However, by voting for 10 players, Justice and the others are making it far easier for unworthy players to break through the Hall’s doors.
I agree that there is no need for an increase in the ballot size from a maximum of ten selected players to 12, but there wouldn't exist a backlog of candidates if people like Chass were doing their job. Sensible people can have sensible criteria for choosing which candidates should be in the Hall of Fame, but when those candidates double and triple in number because their colleagues choose to not vote in candidates out of some misplaced need to police the game, what do you expect will happen? Candidates will continue to fill their ballots while others that are available for election will add to it.
By the way, does it strike anyone else as strange for Chass to mention "they proudly post their ballots in their blogs?" Why shouldn't they? You did.
...
Those headlines represent opposite points of view on one of the best closers in history, Trevor Hoffman, and there is no right and wrong. It’s a subjective matter. The problem posed by the metrics monsters is that in their fantasy world there are not two sides. There is only one side, and it’s theirs.
Here's where things get really funny. What Chass doesn't get is that "metric monsters" don't even all agree. Their proudly public ballots are an example of that. But sure, continue.
This column will only incite further derogatory remarks about the writer, but someone has to tell what these geniuses are about.
They are arrogant, narrow minded and shallow. It means nothing to them that human beings play the game. They don’t talk to the people who play the game. They don’t need to. They have their computers and their statistical formulas, and they don’t have to emerge into the world where the sun shines on day games and the ball park lights illuminate night games.
Plus, they have a tendency to live in their mother's basement, eat a steady diet of Ramen and Funyuns, and drink Mountain Dew.
If you didn't know, Chass really despises that people don't look at baseball as this romantic unexplained phenomenon. The idea that we can quantify it angers him to no end. But what about talking to the people who play the game, he screams. We ought to, certainly, and most with the credentials to do so will talk to players, but is Freddie Freeman going to provide much relevant commentary on advanced statistical analysis? He might, but I doubt it. Chances are Freeman, like most ballplayers, will spout some cliched answers that make you recall the bus scene from Bull Durham.
Either way, it might surprise Chass to know that sabermetric writers absolutely love going to baseball games - even when it's sunny and our skin burns. Baseball in person is fun. We can bring our families (yes, we even procreate) and if it's not for work, we can turn off our analytical side and even enjoy the tried-and-true experience of seeing a baseball game.
Our love of baseball didn't just end because we compared John Smoltz's cFIP to Curt Schilling's. In fact, we love the game so much that we become obsessed with it. We dive deeper and deeper into it. Baseball is a drug and we don't care about giving it up. We need more and we need the highest quality.
They especially detest baseball writers and the Baseball Writers Association of America, in large part, I believe, because we vote for the Hall of Fame and MVP and Cy Young awards and they don’t. I offer evidence of their view in the form of an online article I came across in my research for this column.
Written nearly two years ago by Luis Torres, a name unknown to me, it is titled “The Biggest Enemies of the Advancement of Baseball (Part 1): The BBWAA.” An excerpt, faulty grammar included:
The BBWAA are masters at creating narratives that obscure the facts. As long as they continue to do so, we will need to educate the public on what they’re doing so that they can learn to see right through it. Then the analytical writers of the world will be unhindered in elevating the public’s understanding of baseball. It WILL happen. One day, we will look back at the AL MVP voting and other injustices caused by the BBWAA, and shake our heads. Those writers that chose obstinacy over progression? History will judge them poorly, possibly even ridicule them. Just look at Murray Chass right now. As Dan Szymborski put it, he has declined into self-parody. They had the information at hand, and chose to ignore it. Fans today have access to a virtually endless supply of information and data on baseball. The writers know that we can do better than them, and they’re scared of becoming obsolete. After all, if the public figures out that their insider knowledge isn’t worth anything, what good will they be?
With the additional thought that it sounds frighteningly like an ISIS polemic threatening to take over the world, I rest my case.
For what it's worth, Luis Torres is on Twitter...which I guess makes him a twit. But Chass completely misses the point of what Torres said to make a rather absurd argument. "They," meaning people who seek to use analytical means to help justify their position, are, according to Chass, essentially jealous because the BBWAA has the ability to vote for postseason awards. His evidence, such as it is, only shines on Chass's ignorance of the underlying point. When the BBWAA do things like keep out a player only to prevent him from achieving "first-ballot" status (Roberto Alomar, Barry Larkin), don't vote for Greg Maddux simply because he played in the steroid era, or make the lackluster argument that Jack Morris was a deserving candidate because you would give him the ball in a Game Seven - something is amiss with the BBWAA.
When, as is the case with postseason awards, the BBWAA voters use stats to back up their position (such as RBIs for an MVP award), but choose to not use numbers with more analytical value despite the ease of accessing such data, it's a sign that something is wrong. Surely, Mr. Chass's votes for the Cy Young and MVP awards have been impacted by "metrics." This guy drove in 125 runs. This guy won 21 games. Whatever the case, it's not like you are arriving at your decision by just talking to players. You didn't decide who receives your vote solely by going to games. You checked the leaderboards. All Torres and others are asking is that you go beyond simply looking at the classic baseball card stats and make the leap into slightly more advanced stats, especially those that take into account the league, year, and parks you played in.
In the same post that Chass is convinced that Jack Morris was a worthy candidate, yet Curt Schilling and Mike Mussina aren't, here is a example of how we can compare the three. FIP isn't all that advanced, but it makes for an easy graph to help show the difference.
In the end, Murray Chass is an example of the BBWAA. Arrogant, narrow-minded, and shallow. Worse than any metric monster he can think of, Chass is convinced that he already knows everything he needs to and any new information is not worth his time. That's the basic problem with the old guard of the BBWAA. They have convinced themselves that the statistical analysis is hokum - a waste of time. Even Chass falls victim to the old standby that these NERDS are stuck inside on their computers crunching numbers all day.
It's fine for Chass to hate the way the game is headed. What is a concern is how Chass then holds his power as a member of BBWAA hostage when the game appears to not be up to his liking. The only good thing that can be said is that when the FireJoeMorgan guys were doing this, people like Chass dominated the landscape. Now, he's part of a vocal and increasingly petulant subsection that has to share the stage with the colleagues he seems to despise. The people who concurred with him are dropping each year either from retirement or enlightenment (or...let's face it...death).
So, I understand why Chass has been desperate to remain relevant and fight the good fight, however misguided. But instead of attacking those he doesn't understand and the analytical side of baseball that has progressed, it might behoove Chass to just give it up. Go to a game. Have a hot dog. And just let this whole BBWAA thing lapse and stop blogging. Just enjoy the human beings playing the game. Isn't that all he really wants anyway?
P.S. Not even touching that deranged ISIS comparison.
Monday, November 10, 2014
HuffPost Goes Full Barve
I like the Huffington Post. In full disclosure, I'm a socialist tree-hugger so HuffPo (as we readers call it) speaks to me. Plus, I prefer my titles long, often unrelated, and oddly disproportionately about Jennifer Lawrence. So imagine my joy when my Braves were mentioned on my uber-progressive blog of choice. A political science professor from LaGrange College in Georgia named John A. Tures asked the question NO ONE ever needed to ask before. "Are Baseball Writers Discriminating Against Craig Kimbrel?" So...yeah...there's that. If you're curious, RateMyProfessor.com has Tures as a 3.5. I'm sure he knows political science very well. That's good since he needs a day job to fall back on because his baseball acumen doesn't come over very well here.
Once again, baseball writers are about to discriminate against a talented player for merely being the best at his position. If the sport was more about being a meritocracy, we would have a few more votes for Atlanta Braves relief pitcher Craig Kimbrel for the Cy Young Award, and maybe the Most Valuable Player (MVP) award in Major League Baseball.
Okay, even if I buy the idea that Kimbrel was deserving of more recognition for those awards, why would he be discriminated against "for merely being the best at his position?" Aren't you essentially arguing that his position, namely as a closer, is causing the discrimination? I do like your PoliSci background coming over in the usage of the word "meritocracy," though again, it doesn't really apply. Must admit I do look forward to you making the argument that Kimbrel's ability as closer is more important than Clayton Kershaw's ability as a starting pitcher.
...
Kershaw may have been the first starting pitcher to lead the major leagues in ERA (for four consecutive years) and had the lowest ERA for a starting pitcher since Greg Maddux. But he would have to give up fewer earned runs in a nine-inning game to top Kimbrel.
Craig Kimbrel's ERA for 2014 was 1.61, lower than Kershaw's and Maddux's. The year before, it was 1.21. In 2012, his ERA was 1.01. In 2011, his first full year, when he was the Rookie of the Year, it was 2.10. In four full seasons from 2011-2014 (he pitched in 21 games in 2010), Kimbrel's average ERA is 1.43. His save totals are 46, 42, 50 and 47. His average strikeouts per nine innings are 14.8 (in 2014 it was 13.9), while his K-to-walk ratio is 4.41 (in 2014, it was 3.65). Regardless of how well the Atlanta Braves are doing, Kimbrel gets the job done.
So, this is going to be your argument, huh? There is so much to go over here that it's going to hurt my brain. Let's ignore for a second that you are comparing ERA between relievers and starters...you used the term "average ERA"...DO YOU KNOW WHAT THE "A" IN "ERA" STANDS FOR? Now, I get that PoliSci majors aren't typically math minors, but b-ref will do the math for you. His ERA for those four years is actually 1.51...but I just think that it's so hilarious that you couldn't do that much. Oh, shit, now you're talking average K/9 and average K/BB...seriously, why even try, dude? For the record, Kimbrel's K/9 and K/BB for 2011-14 is 14.6 and 4.74.
Now let's compare Kimbrel's record to Kershaw's. Kershaw had his second 20-win season for his career this year. His ERA has never been lower than Kimbrel's, and is 2.48 for his career (2.28, 2.53, 1.83, 1.77). His average strikeout total per nine innings was 10.8 last year, boosting his career totals to 9.4. His K-to-walk ratio was better than Kimbrel's last year (7.71), but for his career, it's 3.41.
Please stop. There is no consistency in the comparison here and I don't understand why that is, especially for a PoliSci guy. I mean, you have to have some background in political statistics and while it's not exactly the same thing as baseball stats, I can tell you from experience that consistency in a comparison is important. So, anyway...ignoring this average BS you add, here's the numbers you were looking for, starting with Kimbrel to keep the numbers close. For a four-year sample of 2011-14, Kimbrel has a 1.51 ERA, 14.6 K/9, and 4.74 K/BB. Kershaw, for the same four-year sample, has a 2.11 ERA, 9.5 K/9, and 4.74 K/BB. Oh, and he threw 627 more innings than Kimbrel did, but that's not important, I guess.
Kershaw's statistics are good numbers, of course. And Kershaw's been rewarded with two Cy Young Awards and a second-place finish. But they aren't as good as Kimbrel's.
Ervin Santana had good numbers last year. Kershaw's numbers are ridiculously good. They are so good that nobody else comes close. Not to wreck this average ERA nonsense with fancy stats, but if we bring up FIP, Kershaw leads the majors (among qualified pitchers) over the last four years. Felix Hernandez is second. The gap looks like this: 1) 2.41...2) 2.79...but yeah, that's still not as good as Kimbrel. If I take the qualification down to 200 IP, Kimbrel leads the pack with a 1.52 FIP. So, you got me there.
No doubt, Dodger fans will argue that Kershaw has to throw more innings. Braves fans could counter that Kimbrel can't afford to make a mistake, where every inning is a pressure inning. Dodger fans can talk about how Kershaw has pitched deeper for his team into the playoffs (with disappointing results for the Dodger starter in the postseason) while Kimbrel backers can point out that Kershaw often pitches with a stronger batting lineup.
I hope no Braves fan would ever make that dumbass argument.
We could play these games forever. But when it comes to comparable statistics, like ERA, strikeouts per nine innings and per walk, Kimbrel has the edge. And yet Kimbrel can't seem to get a top-three finish for the Cy Young Award.
Not so sure you understand the definition of comparable, especially in this context. Just because they both have the statistic doesn't mean we can compare them with much confidence. Yes, Kimbrel is amazing at his job. Yet, Kershaw is amazing at his. What still seems lacking in this argument is whether a closer should be comparable to a starting pitcher in value. This is the argument you need to make. Please make it soon.
How does Kimbrel compare to other relief pitchers who have won the Cy Young Award?
Or do that, I guess.
Bruce Sutter won the Cy Young Award in 1979. He had 37 saves, an ERA of 2.22, a strikeout per nine inning statistic of 9.8, and a K-to-walk ratio of 3.44.
For what it's worth, Sutter finished second in fWAR that season to J.R. Richard of the Astros. Granted, the fWAR stat wasn't around. Sutter was amazing, but I don't get why Richard was screwed out of the award. Though, at least Sutter should have been in the discussion.
Steve Bedrosian of the Philadelphia Phillies got the Cy Young Award in 1987. He had 40 saves, an ERA of 2.83, a strikeout per nine inning statistic of 7.5, and a K-to-walk ratio of 2.64.
Yeah...and he shouldn't have won. Thank you for pointing that out. But basically, this seems to come down to no single starter pulling ahead. Voters couldn't hold their nose and vote for Nolan Ryan and his 8-16 record. Hilariously, Bedrocks blew eight save chances that season, too. There is a real argument that he was handed an award he didn't earn.
In 1984, Willie Hernandez of the Detroit Tigers captured the Cy Young Award. He had 32 saves, an ERA of 1.92, a strikeout per nine inning statistic of 7.2, and a K-to-walk ratio of 3.11.
He also "captured" the AL MVP that year because the voters in the 80's did a lot of coke. Sports writers showed how little they thought of Bert Blyleven that year. He even gave them a traditional smorgasbord of numbers (19-7, 2.87 ERA, 170 K's) and couldn't take home a Cy Young. In fact, he couldn't even finish behind Hernandez. Another closer, Dan Quisenberry, did that.
San Diego Padres' reliever Mark Davis took the Cy Young Award home in 1988. He had 44 saves, an ERA of 1.85, a strikeout per nine inning statistic of 8.9, and a K-to-walk ratio of 2.97.
Err, it was actually 1989. Again, we're talking about how no starter really pulled ahead of another. That said, Rob Dibble was a more deserving reliever that year and damn you HuffPo for praising that douchenozzle.
There's Eric Gagne of the Los Angeles Dodgers, who was awarded the Cy Young honor in 2003. He had 55 saves, an ERA of 1.20, a strikeout per nine inning statistic of 15, and a K-to-walk ratio of 6.85. Only Gagne's numbers on this list are comparable to Kimbrel's. Statistics from Dennis Eckersley and Rollie Fingers are also similar to Kimbrel's and they were honored with a Cy Young Award.
"Comparable?" Try better. Gagne was a roid-head, but he was better than every version of Kimbrel except for 2012 Kimbrel, which is really the year Kimbrel deserved more recognition. But Gagne did have the fortunate circumstance of a down year for starters. Both of the primary contenders, Mark Prior and Jason Schmidt, missed time leaving full-year starter Russ Ortiz to get votes for the Cy Young award. Ugh. Voters simply weren't going to award guys who were hurt and missed 4-5 starts and weren't Kershaw dominant.
So why is Kimbrel not receiving the same consideration as other pitchers? There are a few reasons. Kimbrel has had to compete with some good starting pitchers for these awards, like Kershaw and Adam Wainwright. Atlanta may be a small market team, but that didn't keep John Smoltz, Greg Maddux, Tom Glavine and Chipper Jones from getting awards.
Did you not see that outside of Gagne, all of those awards took place from 1979-89? Sportswriters were enthralled with the idea that a closer was extra special. Part of this was due to bullpens not being so specialized. Sutter didn't have a team of guys getting the ball to him. B-Ref has tried to go back into the past and update game logs with the stat "hold." I don't know how accurate it is, but the Cubs had 14 as a team. Jordan Walden had 20 just last year. As such, closers threw 100 innings and often took the ball from the starter. Their importance was greater.
Small market team? The last four NL MVP's include players from Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, and Cincinnati. Of the last five AL Cy Young winners, we have a Royal, Ray, and Mariner. And when the hell did the ninth largest media market in the country, Atlanta, become classified as "small market?"
Now, you did stumble on a big reason why closers struggle to win the Cy Young. Who are they competing with? Is there a clear and deserving starting pitcher like Waino or Kershaw? Yes? Sorry, Kimbrel. And since you never made the argument, here it is for you. Kimbrel is great at his job. More accurately, he is elite. But as is Kershaw. So which is one is more important?
In this post, the word that is used with consistency is "comparable." The reason why this word is brought up so often is because there are numbers that can't be compared. Chief among them is that Kimbrel tossed 61.2 ING this season. 131 pitchers in the National League threw more innings than Kimbrel. Including Kershaw, who threw 198.1. Amount of innings is important. You wouldn't award the NFC MVP to Dan Bailey even if he is the best. Why? Because even if Bailey is the best at his job, his job isn't the most important one. Same idea with Kimbrel. He might be the best...that contention is arguable, by the way...but his job is of less importance than other jobs that require more innings. It's the same reason why I'm not a big fan of pitchers winning the MVP, by the way. It's all about value. That guy playing 120 more games is simply more valuable.
Now, to read about that substitute teacher that had sex with one of her students on her first day...seriously, HuffPo, this is what I expect out of you.
Once again, baseball writers are about to discriminate against a talented player for merely being the best at his position. If the sport was more about being a meritocracy, we would have a few more votes for Atlanta Braves relief pitcher Craig Kimbrel for the Cy Young Award, and maybe the Most Valuable Player (MVP) award in Major League Baseball.
Okay, even if I buy the idea that Kimbrel was deserving of more recognition for those awards, why would he be discriminated against "for merely being the best at his position?" Aren't you essentially arguing that his position, namely as a closer, is causing the discrimination? I do like your PoliSci background coming over in the usage of the word "meritocracy," though again, it doesn't really apply. Must admit I do look forward to you making the argument that Kimbrel's ability as closer is more important than Clayton Kershaw's ability as a starting pitcher.
...
Kershaw may have been the first starting pitcher to lead the major leagues in ERA (for four consecutive years) and had the lowest ERA for a starting pitcher since Greg Maddux. But he would have to give up fewer earned runs in a nine-inning game to top Kimbrel.
Craig Kimbrel's ERA for 2014 was 1.61, lower than Kershaw's and Maddux's. The year before, it was 1.21. In 2012, his ERA was 1.01. In 2011, his first full year, when he was the Rookie of the Year, it was 2.10. In four full seasons from 2011-2014 (he pitched in 21 games in 2010), Kimbrel's average ERA is 1.43. His save totals are 46, 42, 50 and 47. His average strikeouts per nine innings are 14.8 (in 2014 it was 13.9), while his K-to-walk ratio is 4.41 (in 2014, it was 3.65). Regardless of how well the Atlanta Braves are doing, Kimbrel gets the job done.
So, this is going to be your argument, huh? There is so much to go over here that it's going to hurt my brain. Let's ignore for a second that you are comparing ERA between relievers and starters...you used the term "average ERA"...DO YOU KNOW WHAT THE "A" IN "ERA" STANDS FOR? Now, I get that PoliSci majors aren't typically math minors, but b-ref will do the math for you. His ERA for those four years is actually 1.51...but I just think that it's so hilarious that you couldn't do that much. Oh, shit, now you're talking average K/9 and average K/BB...seriously, why even try, dude? For the record, Kimbrel's K/9 and K/BB for 2011-14 is 14.6 and 4.74.
Now let's compare Kimbrel's record to Kershaw's. Kershaw had his second 20-win season for his career this year. His ERA has never been lower than Kimbrel's, and is 2.48 for his career (2.28, 2.53, 1.83, 1.77). His average strikeout total per nine innings was 10.8 last year, boosting his career totals to 9.4. His K-to-walk ratio was better than Kimbrel's last year (7.71), but for his career, it's 3.41.
Please stop. There is no consistency in the comparison here and I don't understand why that is, especially for a PoliSci guy. I mean, you have to have some background in political statistics and while it's not exactly the same thing as baseball stats, I can tell you from experience that consistency in a comparison is important. So, anyway...ignoring this average BS you add, here's the numbers you were looking for, starting with Kimbrel to keep the numbers close. For a four-year sample of 2011-14, Kimbrel has a 1.51 ERA, 14.6 K/9, and 4.74 K/BB. Kershaw, for the same four-year sample, has a 2.11 ERA, 9.5 K/9, and 4.74 K/BB. Oh, and he threw 627 more innings than Kimbrel did, but that's not important, I guess.
Kershaw's statistics are good numbers, of course. And Kershaw's been rewarded with two Cy Young Awards and a second-place finish. But they aren't as good as Kimbrel's.
Ervin Santana had good numbers last year. Kershaw's numbers are ridiculously good. They are so good that nobody else comes close. Not to wreck this average ERA nonsense with fancy stats, but if we bring up FIP, Kershaw leads the majors (among qualified pitchers) over the last four years. Felix Hernandez is second. The gap looks like this: 1) 2.41...2) 2.79...but yeah, that's still not as good as Kimbrel. If I take the qualification down to 200 IP, Kimbrel leads the pack with a 1.52 FIP. So, you got me there.
No doubt, Dodger fans will argue that Kershaw has to throw more innings. Braves fans could counter that Kimbrel can't afford to make a mistake, where every inning is a pressure inning. Dodger fans can talk about how Kershaw has pitched deeper for his team into the playoffs (with disappointing results for the Dodger starter in the postseason) while Kimbrel backers can point out that Kershaw often pitches with a stronger batting lineup.
I hope no Braves fan would ever make that dumbass argument.
We could play these games forever. But when it comes to comparable statistics, like ERA, strikeouts per nine innings and per walk, Kimbrel has the edge. And yet Kimbrel can't seem to get a top-three finish for the Cy Young Award.
Not so sure you understand the definition of comparable, especially in this context. Just because they both have the statistic doesn't mean we can compare them with much confidence. Yes, Kimbrel is amazing at his job. Yet, Kershaw is amazing at his. What still seems lacking in this argument is whether a closer should be comparable to a starting pitcher in value. This is the argument you need to make. Please make it soon.
How does Kimbrel compare to other relief pitchers who have won the Cy Young Award?
Or do that, I guess.
Bruce Sutter won the Cy Young Award in 1979. He had 37 saves, an ERA of 2.22, a strikeout per nine inning statistic of 9.8, and a K-to-walk ratio of 3.44.
For what it's worth, Sutter finished second in fWAR that season to J.R. Richard of the Astros. Granted, the fWAR stat wasn't around. Sutter was amazing, but I don't get why Richard was screwed out of the award. Though, at least Sutter should have been in the discussion.
Steve Bedrosian of the Philadelphia Phillies got the Cy Young Award in 1987. He had 40 saves, an ERA of 2.83, a strikeout per nine inning statistic of 7.5, and a K-to-walk ratio of 2.64.
Yeah...and he shouldn't have won. Thank you for pointing that out. But basically, this seems to come down to no single starter pulling ahead. Voters couldn't hold their nose and vote for Nolan Ryan and his 8-16 record. Hilariously, Bedrocks blew eight save chances that season, too. There is a real argument that he was handed an award he didn't earn.
In 1984, Willie Hernandez of the Detroit Tigers captured the Cy Young Award. He had 32 saves, an ERA of 1.92, a strikeout per nine inning statistic of 7.2, and a K-to-walk ratio of 3.11.
He also "captured" the AL MVP that year because the voters in the 80's did a lot of coke. Sports writers showed how little they thought of Bert Blyleven that year. He even gave them a traditional smorgasbord of numbers (19-7, 2.87 ERA, 170 K's) and couldn't take home a Cy Young. In fact, he couldn't even finish behind Hernandez. Another closer, Dan Quisenberry, did that.
San Diego Padres' reliever Mark Davis took the Cy Young Award home in 1988. He had 44 saves, an ERA of 1.85, a strikeout per nine inning statistic of 8.9, and a K-to-walk ratio of 2.97.
Err, it was actually 1989. Again, we're talking about how no starter really pulled ahead of another. That said, Rob Dibble was a more deserving reliever that year and damn you HuffPo for praising that douchenozzle.
There's Eric Gagne of the Los Angeles Dodgers, who was awarded the Cy Young honor in 2003. He had 55 saves, an ERA of 1.20, a strikeout per nine inning statistic of 15, and a K-to-walk ratio of 6.85. Only Gagne's numbers on this list are comparable to Kimbrel's. Statistics from Dennis Eckersley and Rollie Fingers are also similar to Kimbrel's and they were honored with a Cy Young Award.
"Comparable?" Try better. Gagne was a roid-head, but he was better than every version of Kimbrel except for 2012 Kimbrel, which is really the year Kimbrel deserved more recognition. But Gagne did have the fortunate circumstance of a down year for starters. Both of the primary contenders, Mark Prior and Jason Schmidt, missed time leaving full-year starter Russ Ortiz to get votes for the Cy Young award. Ugh. Voters simply weren't going to award guys who were hurt and missed 4-5 starts and weren't Kershaw dominant.
So why is Kimbrel not receiving the same consideration as other pitchers? There are a few reasons. Kimbrel has had to compete with some good starting pitchers for these awards, like Kershaw and Adam Wainwright. Atlanta may be a small market team, but that didn't keep John Smoltz, Greg Maddux, Tom Glavine and Chipper Jones from getting awards.
Did you not see that outside of Gagne, all of those awards took place from 1979-89? Sportswriters were enthralled with the idea that a closer was extra special. Part of this was due to bullpens not being so specialized. Sutter didn't have a team of guys getting the ball to him. B-Ref has tried to go back into the past and update game logs with the stat "hold." I don't know how accurate it is, but the Cubs had 14 as a team. Jordan Walden had 20 just last year. As such, closers threw 100 innings and often took the ball from the starter. Their importance was greater.
Small market team? The last four NL MVP's include players from Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, and Cincinnati. Of the last five AL Cy Young winners, we have a Royal, Ray, and Mariner. And when the hell did the ninth largest media market in the country, Atlanta, become classified as "small market?"
Now, you did stumble on a big reason why closers struggle to win the Cy Young. Who are they competing with? Is there a clear and deserving starting pitcher like Waino or Kershaw? Yes? Sorry, Kimbrel. And since you never made the argument, here it is for you. Kimbrel is great at his job. More accurately, he is elite. But as is Kershaw. So which is one is more important?
In this post, the word that is used with consistency is "comparable." The reason why this word is brought up so often is because there are numbers that can't be compared. Chief among them is that Kimbrel tossed 61.2 ING this season. 131 pitchers in the National League threw more innings than Kimbrel. Including Kershaw, who threw 198.1. Amount of innings is important. You wouldn't award the NFC MVP to Dan Bailey even if he is the best. Why? Because even if Bailey is the best at his job, his job isn't the most important one. Same idea with Kimbrel. He might be the best...that contention is arguable, by the way...but his job is of less importance than other jobs that require more innings. It's the same reason why I'm not a big fan of pitchers winning the MVP, by the way. It's all about value. That guy playing 120 more games is simply more valuable.
Now, to read about that substitute teacher that had sex with one of her students on her first day...seriously, HuffPo, this is what I expect out of you.
Monday, January 13, 2014
Google Alert alerted me to Ignorance
Every day, I get a Google Alert about the Braves. Often, the articles are not noteworthy and are made up of analysis of a recent acquisition, or during the season, of a recent game. This offseason has seen a lot of articles about the pending move to Cobb County in 2017 and most recently, articles talking about how awesome Greg Maddux was or in Tom Glavine’s case, how frustrating #47 made it on hitters.
But today, two articles garnered my attention. While most recent articles about Maddux tout his accomplishments, the Denver Post’s Joan Niesen focuses on his “flops.” I am all for more women in sports journalism, but this kind of analysis makes her look like Woody Page writing under a female pen name.
In an article apparently about Peyton Manning’s postseason failures, Niesen touches on former Nuggets coach George Karl, whose teams never missed the playoffs but only once got past the first round. I don’t know a lot about the NBA, but the Nuggets never seemed like a contender to the crown. In a sport where 16 teams go to the playoffs, a good team that keeps its core together should be able to make trips to the playoffs. But like I said, I don’t follow the NBA that closely. Niesen next touches on Alex Rodriguez (again, the article is supposedly about Peyton Manning). After other famous “chokers in sports,” Niesen finally comes up with what she considers a tremendous comparison for Manning – Greg Maddux.
“Maddux, arguably one of the greatest pitchers of all time, was voted into Cooperstown this past week.” Wait, arguably? “His Atlanta Braves teams made the playoffs over and over and over again, but what we forget — Manning already is jealous — is that he won one only World Series.” Who forgets that? Certainly not the litany of fans of other teams. And what do you mean "he won only one World Series?" This isn't tennis. The team either wins or loses. “Like Manning, Maddux was consistently lights-out in the regular season. He too was dorkily terrifying, winning an average of 18.3 games from 1992 to 2000, with his ERA hovering from 1.56 to 3.57. Maddux, like Manning, was likeable, but intense, seeming as smart as he was talented — and once the calendar turned to October, things just weren't quite the same. ERAs ticked upward, win counts down, and seasons petered out.”
I will ignore for the time being that win-loss record and ERA are pretty awful judgments of a player. Career ERA for Maddux – 3.16. Postseason ERA – 3.27. Yes, his win-loss record looks miserable (11-14), but it ignores several instances where Maddux posted great numbers. He took a 3-2 loss in Game 6 of the 1996 World Series despite giving up just three runs in 7.2 ING. Those three runs were helped by a RBI triple by Joe Girardi…to center field. Maddux took the loss the following year in Game 5 of the NLCS despite giving up two runs in seven innings. He gave up two runs in five innings during Game Three of the NLCS, taking the loss. Oh, he came back two days later and got a save. He gave up two runs in seven innings during Game 5 of the 1999 NLCS, but got a no-decision. Two runs in the 2001 NLCS Game One while going seven innings, but he gets a loss. In the 2003 NLDS against the Cubs in Game Three, he surrendered two runs and took the loss.
Was Maddux as good in the postseason as he was during the regular season? It appears not on the surface, but he still pitched rather well. He gave his team a chance to win in many of these games, but the offense and defense often did not come to his assistance. To call Maddux a choker is to follow the narrative of the weak-minded. It does not pass the test of true logic.
Elsewhere, Alex Chitty is upset to hear any comparison that includes both Bobby Cox and Joe Torre. The comparison is not fair to Torre, Chitty argues, because the Yankees won the World Series a few times. The Braves didn’t. And that’s all that matters.
Here’s the problem with that argument. Torre coached the Mets for five years and they never won the series. Coached the Braves three years…they never won it all. Was with the Cards for four full season and two other partial years…they never even got to the playoffs. So, suddenly, Torre was a genius in New York? Why, for seven years, despite not winning fewer than 94 times, did the Yankees not win a World Series from 2001-07. This argument loses its luster very quickly. In three years with the Dodgers, Los Angeles never won a title.
But what the Yankees did have was money. They finished second in payroll ($5M more than ATL) during 1996. Not a big difference. They led the league in 1997 in payroll ($10M more than ATL). In 1998, when the Yankees got their second title, the difference between the two was $5M as the Yankees finished second in payroll. The following season, 1999, when the Braves and Yankees once again met in the series, the Yankees led baseball in payroll…$13M more than the Braves. The Yankees would again lead baseball in payroll during their final championship season, 2000, $9M more than the Braves.
Why did the Yankees not win anymore? Their core was getting older. So was the Braves, but they didn’t have the extra cash to supplement the rest of their squad. Nevertheless, by 2004, the Yankees doubled the Braves in payroll, but they weren’t getting much deeper into the playoffs. Torre’s mojo was either lost or his players weren’t as good as they once were (despite being well-compensated).
I’m not going to argue that Cox was better than Torre…God knows I have my issues with Cox. However, I will give Cox credit when he deserves it. I saw Torre more than a few times not fight for his players. Especially A-Rod. Now, A-Rod is a jackass, but his manager should be out there fighting for him. Cox would have hated A-Rod, but he would have fought for his guy. Cox got the most out of his players. A blank check gave Torre the most.
That's not to take away from Torre, who was a fine manager. He never struck me as a genius, but he was still rather good at his job and at the end of the day, Torre has three more rings than Cox. Does that make him the better manager? If that’s all that matters to you, I guess it does. To me, I prefer context as it tells a story. The story does not provide for any consensus on who was better. But to argue that the comparison between the two is unfair to Torre is ignorant.
But today, two articles garnered my attention. While most recent articles about Maddux tout his accomplishments, the Denver Post’s Joan Niesen focuses on his “flops.” I am all for more women in sports journalism, but this kind of analysis makes her look like Woody Page writing under a female pen name.
In an article apparently about Peyton Manning’s postseason failures, Niesen touches on former Nuggets coach George Karl, whose teams never missed the playoffs but only once got past the first round. I don’t know a lot about the NBA, but the Nuggets never seemed like a contender to the crown. In a sport where 16 teams go to the playoffs, a good team that keeps its core together should be able to make trips to the playoffs. But like I said, I don’t follow the NBA that closely. Niesen next touches on Alex Rodriguez (again, the article is supposedly about Peyton Manning). After other famous “chokers in sports,” Niesen finally comes up with what she considers a tremendous comparison for Manning – Greg Maddux.
“Maddux, arguably one of the greatest pitchers of all time, was voted into Cooperstown this past week.” Wait, arguably? “His Atlanta Braves teams made the playoffs over and over and over again, but what we forget — Manning already is jealous — is that he won one only World Series.” Who forgets that? Certainly not the litany of fans of other teams. And what do you mean "he won only one World Series?" This isn't tennis. The team either wins or loses. “Like Manning, Maddux was consistently lights-out in the regular season. He too was dorkily terrifying, winning an average of 18.3 games from 1992 to 2000, with his ERA hovering from 1.56 to 3.57. Maddux, like Manning, was likeable, but intense, seeming as smart as he was talented — and once the calendar turned to October, things just weren't quite the same. ERAs ticked upward, win counts down, and seasons petered out.”
I will ignore for the time being that win-loss record and ERA are pretty awful judgments of a player. Career ERA for Maddux – 3.16. Postseason ERA – 3.27. Yes, his win-loss record looks miserable (11-14), but it ignores several instances where Maddux posted great numbers. He took a 3-2 loss in Game 6 of the 1996 World Series despite giving up just three runs in 7.2 ING. Those three runs were helped by a RBI triple by Joe Girardi…to center field. Maddux took the loss the following year in Game 5 of the NLCS despite giving up two runs in seven innings. He gave up two runs in five innings during Game Three of the NLCS, taking the loss. Oh, he came back two days later and got a save. He gave up two runs in seven innings during Game 5 of the 1999 NLCS, but got a no-decision. Two runs in the 2001 NLCS Game One while going seven innings, but he gets a loss. In the 2003 NLDS against the Cubs in Game Three, he surrendered two runs and took the loss.
Was Maddux as good in the postseason as he was during the regular season? It appears not on the surface, but he still pitched rather well. He gave his team a chance to win in many of these games, but the offense and defense often did not come to his assistance. To call Maddux a choker is to follow the narrative of the weak-minded. It does not pass the test of true logic.
Elsewhere, Alex Chitty is upset to hear any comparison that includes both Bobby Cox and Joe Torre. The comparison is not fair to Torre, Chitty argues, because the Yankees won the World Series a few times. The Braves didn’t. And that’s all that matters.
Here’s the problem with that argument. Torre coached the Mets for five years and they never won the series. Coached the Braves three years…they never won it all. Was with the Cards for four full season and two other partial years…they never even got to the playoffs. So, suddenly, Torre was a genius in New York? Why, for seven years, despite not winning fewer than 94 times, did the Yankees not win a World Series from 2001-07. This argument loses its luster very quickly. In three years with the Dodgers, Los Angeles never won a title.
But what the Yankees did have was money. They finished second in payroll ($5M more than ATL) during 1996. Not a big difference. They led the league in 1997 in payroll ($10M more than ATL). In 1998, when the Yankees got their second title, the difference between the two was $5M as the Yankees finished second in payroll. The following season, 1999, when the Braves and Yankees once again met in the series, the Yankees led baseball in payroll…$13M more than the Braves. The Yankees would again lead baseball in payroll during their final championship season, 2000, $9M more than the Braves.
Why did the Yankees not win anymore? Their core was getting older. So was the Braves, but they didn’t have the extra cash to supplement the rest of their squad. Nevertheless, by 2004, the Yankees doubled the Braves in payroll, but they weren’t getting much deeper into the playoffs. Torre’s mojo was either lost or his players weren’t as good as they once were (despite being well-compensated).
I’m not going to argue that Cox was better than Torre…God knows I have my issues with Cox. However, I will give Cox credit when he deserves it. I saw Torre more than a few times not fight for his players. Especially A-Rod. Now, A-Rod is a jackass, but his manager should be out there fighting for him. Cox would have hated A-Rod, but he would have fought for his guy. Cox got the most out of his players. A blank check gave Torre the most.
That's not to take away from Torre, who was a fine manager. He never struck me as a genius, but he was still rather good at his job and at the end of the day, Torre has three more rings than Cox. Does that make him the better manager? If that’s all that matters to you, I guess it does. To me, I prefer context as it tells a story. The story does not provide for any consensus on who was better. But to argue that the comparison between the two is unfair to Torre is ignorant.
Saturday, July 6, 2013
Is Justin Upton Injured?
A pair of articles on fangraphs have brought me to the conclusion. Either Justin Upton has severe mechanical issues or he's hurt and because of that injury, he is displaying severe mechanical issues. First, in his MASH Report, fantasy sports contributor Jeff Zimmerman sought to introduce a new number called SLOW. Here is how he explains his arrival at the number.
Now, mechanics could explain all of this. Sometimes, a hitch develops in a swing and the hitter has considerable trouble getting the bat through the zone. B.J. Upton, who also appears high on the SLOW list, has well-documented issues with his swing and its timing. A possible switch to a lighter bat could help, but a bigger issue is that if it is that the younger Upton is having mechanical issues, how much is due to a possible injury?
Fredi Gonzalez recently sat Upton due to a sore hand and he had thumb issues last season. Could that explain it? Another contributor mentioned witnessing a particularly rough swing-and-miss from April. Players can play through oblique strains, but it will affect the player's abilities in the box to some degree. Andruw Jones had quite a few issues himself with hurting his sides on his corkscrew swings.
If Upton is hurt, sitting through the All-Star Break would be advisable. He had parlayed a huge start into a prime position for a spot in the All-Star Game, though it seemed likely that spot would fall before the final voting results were announced. Regardless, he ought to stay home and rest so that he could hopefully jump-start the rest of his season.
Course, that is under the pretense that he actually is hurt. It could all be mechanical.
The basic parameters for the pitches examined are:Upton leads this season chart by a good deal and has shown the second biggest change since 2012. Another fantasy contributor followed with an article of his own which goes a little further. The report is out on Upton and it's not exactly glowing. According to the numbers, Upton can't hit a fastball even if it's delivered in the strikezone. As a Braves fan, these numbers provide some clarity to what I thought I saw a lot of. I don't have a subscription to watch the Braves routinely, nor the time, but when I do watch them, it has seemed that I have witnessed a good deal of Upton swinging through fastballs, even badly placed, in the strikezone.
1. Pitches thrown into the heart of the plate (I don’t want to look at a chase rate)
2. Fastballs >=92 mph (looking for fastish fastballs)
I created the final metric using a weighted combination of:
1. Contact% (contact with the pitches)
2. Foul% (In play contact)
3. Pull angle on line drives and ground balls (is the hitter hitting the ball late)
Now, mechanics could explain all of this. Sometimes, a hitch develops in a swing and the hitter has considerable trouble getting the bat through the zone. B.J. Upton, who also appears high on the SLOW list, has well-documented issues with his swing and its timing. A possible switch to a lighter bat could help, but a bigger issue is that if it is that the younger Upton is having mechanical issues, how much is due to a possible injury?
Fredi Gonzalez recently sat Upton due to a sore hand and he had thumb issues last season. Could that explain it? Another contributor mentioned witnessing a particularly rough swing-and-miss from April. Players can play through oblique strains, but it will affect the player's abilities in the box to some degree. Andruw Jones had quite a few issues himself with hurting his sides on his corkscrew swings.
If Upton is hurt, sitting through the All-Star Break would be advisable. He had parlayed a huge start into a prime position for a spot in the All-Star Game, though it seemed likely that spot would fall before the final voting results were announced. Regardless, he ought to stay home and rest so that he could hopefully jump-start the rest of his season.
Course, that is under the pretense that he actually is hurt. It could all be mechanical.
Saturday, June 29, 2013
Atlanta Braves 2013 Myths: Part III
Earlier today, I touched on another myth I have seen and a couple of days ago, I began this series. Time to turn a corner and possibly find some truth in a myth.
Possibly.
1. Atlanta doesn't make productive outs because of strikeouts.
2. Atlanta seems to fall behind early and has to play catch-up.
3. Atlanta can't win if they keep striking out so much!
Commonly, we hear about the strikeouts being the Achilles's Heel of the Atlanta Braves by "experts" and "analysts" and "Harold Reynolds." In addition, the mantra is repeated often on message boards, twitter, and in the ballpark. There is some degree of truth, though not entirely related to the Braves. Often, especially in history, a plethora of strikeouts is a sign of a bad offensive ball club. However, the mantra itself does not tell us all that much. There are 7.53 strikeouts on average by a team per game this season. In 2000, the average was 6.45. To put that simply, every team in baseball, on average, is striking out one more time per game and 162 more times in a season than they were 13 years ago. Every year since 2005, MLB teams have struck out more than they did the year before.
Not all of that is due to hitters just not caring about strikeouts or whatever jibber-jabber they spout on MLB Tonight. There are some REALLY good fucking pitchers in today's game and every year, more of them seem to develop. People are throwing harder and with more movement than ever before. Now, hitters and teams have begun to adopt a model that downplays the importance of strikeouts for batters, focusing on value elsewhere. And let's be honest, strikeouts generally aren't that worse than any other out. In situational hitting, that truth can lose its effectiveness.
With that in mind, I decided to find if there was a certain number that truly defined the breaking point for the Atlanta Braves as far as strikeouts go. If they strikeout, say 10 times, are they more/less likely to win and does that data have much importance? And because I can totally kick butt at tables now, here's another one.
What's to gain here? Anything?
Well, from the raw data, if the Braves strikeout 10 times or more, they are 15-20 with only 10 of those wins coming in nine-inning games. If they strikeout less than 10 times, they are 32-14. However, the league average is 7.5 K's a game. Rounding that up to 8 and below, the Braves are 29-12.
If the Braves don't strikeout, they do win. However, is that truly the myth? Hell, if they strikeout 14 times or more, they are 4-3, sample size be damned. Regardless, you would have to assume that when the Braves strikeout more than the league average, they are often facing pretty good starters. Typically, that does play out. Anibal Sanchez, Jeff Samardzija, Matt Harvey, Madison Bumgarner (twice), Stephen Strasburg (twice), Patrick Corbin, Gio Gonzalez (twice), Zack Greinke, and Cliff Lee were some of the good starters they faced and most often, those starters had good game scores and the Braves were headed to a loss. The average game score in those games was 67 and the Braves were 4-8 in those games. Seems to make sense, right? If there is a good starter on the mound and he's dealing and you strikeout over 10 times, you lose. However, when the starter isn't dealing, the Braves tend to strikeout a lot regardless, but when they aren't striking out, they are getting hits, hitting homers, taking walks, and most importantly, scoring runs.
The strikeouts in themselves are not a problem. It goes way deeper than that. It's why the Braves can strike out 18 times and lose 10-0, but strike out 16 times and win 9-2. You are going to get strikeouts with this team and quite often, more than you can bear because the ones that you agonize over occur in close games, a good deal of which are lost. If only Dan Uggla had made contact...or one of the Uptons...or so on...and you come to the knee-jerk conclusion that the strikeouts are the problem. And they can be. But win-or-lose, the Braves are, on average, going to strike out 8.8 times a game. When they strike out less, they often are going to win, but remember, if a strikeout team isn't striking out, it typically means the opposing pitcher is crap or at least pitching like crap.
In the end, I came away from this little exercise surprised by the layout, expecting more victories with 10 or more strikeouts. However, the more I delved in, the more I saw that you have to see more than the strikeouts. Was the pitcher dealing or were the Braves simply striking out because that's part of their game? And in the end, all of this is sample size dependent. The biggest sample I can take from this is that in 57% of their games, the Atlanta Braves strike out 6-to-11 times, but that's a small sample to take from this. They have a blistering .695 in those games if you are curious.
Regardless, there is little evidence that striking out is the problem. For instance, the Atlanta Braves have had 10 games of 10 or more strikeouts this month, a month that has seen their R/G fall over a run from May. Despite 10 or more strikeouts in 27 games this month, the K rate is the lowest it has been all season (though it's still 8.2 K per game). Hell, they are walking a lot more and have a new month-high in steals this month. Why so few runs? Worst month for homers so far. That is the telling number about this team. They're going to strikeout and they will probably walk a good deal. I'm a little surprised they haven't been more proficient in stolen bases, but whatever. Their weapon of choice is the homer. If it's not coming, the Braves aren't scoring like they should.
However, with 6 homers in the last 5 games, maybe the Braves offense is getting back to their bread-and-butter.
Possibly.
1. Atlanta doesn't make productive outs because of strikeouts.
2. Atlanta seems to fall behind early and has to play catch-up.
3. Atlanta can't win if they keep striking out so much!
Commonly, we hear about the strikeouts being the Achilles's Heel of the Atlanta Braves by "experts" and "analysts" and "Harold Reynolds." In addition, the mantra is repeated often on message boards, twitter, and in the ballpark. There is some degree of truth, though not entirely related to the Braves. Often, especially in history, a plethora of strikeouts is a sign of a bad offensive ball club. However, the mantra itself does not tell us all that much. There are 7.53 strikeouts on average by a team per game this season. In 2000, the average was 6.45. To put that simply, every team in baseball, on average, is striking out one more time per game and 162 more times in a season than they were 13 years ago. Every year since 2005, MLB teams have struck out more than they did the year before.
Not all of that is due to hitters just not caring about strikeouts or whatever jibber-jabber they spout on MLB Tonight. There are some REALLY good fucking pitchers in today's game and every year, more of them seem to develop. People are throwing harder and with more movement than ever before. Now, hitters and teams have begun to adopt a model that downplays the importance of strikeouts for batters, focusing on value elsewhere. And let's be honest, strikeouts generally aren't that worse than any other out. In situational hitting, that truth can lose its effectiveness.
With that in mind, I decided to find if there was a certain number that truly defined the breaking point for the Atlanta Braves as far as strikeouts go. If they strikeout, say 10 times, are they more/less likely to win and does that data have much importance? And because I can totally kick butt at tables now, here's another one.
| # of K's | # of Times | Record | ExtIng |
| 3 | 1 | 1-0 | NA |
| 4 | 7 | 5-2 | NA |
| 5 | 3 | 3-0 | NA |
| 6 | 10 | 9-1 | NA |
| 7 | 10 | 6-4 | 0-1 |
| 8 | 10 | 5-5 | 1-1 |
| 9 | 5 | 3-2 | NA |
| 10 | 12 | 4-8 | 3-2 |
| 11 | 9 | 5-4 | NA |
| 12 | 4 | 2-2 | 2-0 |
| 13 | 3 | 0-3 | NA |
| 14 | 2 | 1-1 | NA |
| 15 | 1 | 1-0 | NA |
| 16 | 3 | 2-1 | NA |
| 18 | 1 | 0-1 | NA |
What's to gain here? Anything?
Well, from the raw data, if the Braves strikeout 10 times or more, they are 15-20 with only 10 of those wins coming in nine-inning games. If they strikeout less than 10 times, they are 32-14. However, the league average is 7.5 K's a game. Rounding that up to 8 and below, the Braves are 29-12.
If the Braves don't strikeout, they do win. However, is that truly the myth? Hell, if they strikeout 14 times or more, they are 4-3, sample size be damned. Regardless, you would have to assume that when the Braves strikeout more than the league average, they are often facing pretty good starters. Typically, that does play out. Anibal Sanchez, Jeff Samardzija, Matt Harvey, Madison Bumgarner (twice), Stephen Strasburg (twice), Patrick Corbin, Gio Gonzalez (twice), Zack Greinke, and Cliff Lee were some of the good starters they faced and most often, those starters had good game scores and the Braves were headed to a loss. The average game score in those games was 67 and the Braves were 4-8 in those games. Seems to make sense, right? If there is a good starter on the mound and he's dealing and you strikeout over 10 times, you lose. However, when the starter isn't dealing, the Braves tend to strikeout a lot regardless, but when they aren't striking out, they are getting hits, hitting homers, taking walks, and most importantly, scoring runs.
The strikeouts in themselves are not a problem. It goes way deeper than that. It's why the Braves can strike out 18 times and lose 10-0, but strike out 16 times and win 9-2. You are going to get strikeouts with this team and quite often, more than you can bear because the ones that you agonize over occur in close games, a good deal of which are lost. If only Dan Uggla had made contact...or one of the Uptons...or so on...and you come to the knee-jerk conclusion that the strikeouts are the problem. And they can be. But win-or-lose, the Braves are, on average, going to strike out 8.8 times a game. When they strike out less, they often are going to win, but remember, if a strikeout team isn't striking out, it typically means the opposing pitcher is crap or at least pitching like crap.
In the end, I came away from this little exercise surprised by the layout, expecting more victories with 10 or more strikeouts. However, the more I delved in, the more I saw that you have to see more than the strikeouts. Was the pitcher dealing or were the Braves simply striking out because that's part of their game? And in the end, all of this is sample size dependent. The biggest sample I can take from this is that in 57% of their games, the Atlanta Braves strike out 6-to-11 times, but that's a small sample to take from this. They have a blistering .695 in those games if you are curious.
Regardless, there is little evidence that striking out is the problem. For instance, the Atlanta Braves have had 10 games of 10 or more strikeouts this month, a month that has seen their R/G fall over a run from May. Despite 10 or more strikeouts in 27 games this month, the K rate is the lowest it has been all season (though it's still 8.2 K per game). Hell, they are walking a lot more and have a new month-high in steals this month. Why so few runs? Worst month for homers so far. That is the telling number about this team. They're going to strikeout and they will probably walk a good deal. I'm a little surprised they haven't been more proficient in stolen bases, but whatever. Their weapon of choice is the homer. If it's not coming, the Braves aren't scoring like they should.
However, with 6 homers in the last 5 games, maybe the Braves offense is getting back to their bread-and-butter.
Atlanta Braves 2013 Myths: Part II
Previously, I began a series to seek out the truth behind some of the comments typically made about the Braves, often from observational bias. Today, we continue as we try to find out more truth about the Atlanta Braves current philosophy.
1. Atlanta doesn't make productive outs because of strikeouts.
2. Atlanta seems to fall behind early and has to play catch-up.
I'm not entirely sure where this idea comes from, but I have seen it presented on message boards and on facebook, typically after a loss or even a come-behind win. Sometimes, commentators will add a sense that the players just don't care early, though the idea is rather absurd. Not that a player might not have his head elsewhere for a game, but truly, to believe these guys just don't care all that much whether or not they make an out or get on base is ridiculous.
But hysterics aside, the entire idea being presented is just wrong. Here is a breakdown for Atlanta's run-scoring abilities at different points in the game.
Hey, cool, a table. A crude one, but it's been several years since I have attempted a table. Go me! Anyway, the evidence doesn't support the notion that Atlanta turns it on late. In fact, they seem to turn it on middle. Course, there are several possible of reasons for that. Hitters are typically seeing the opposing starter for the second and third times in the middle of the game. That not only helps hitters time a pitcher, but pitchers make more mistakes when they are deeper into a game. The OPS for the team from the first time they see a pitcher vs. the 2nd rises 51 points. From the second to third time, the OPS rises an additional 80 points.
In addition, the little change between early and late in the game also is added up when you compare the first time the team sees a starter vs. the first time the team sees a reliever. Atlanta does fare slightly better in those situations (.693 OPS vs. 680), but there is not much difference.
I understand that we tend to associate what we think we see with the truth. Maybe for a week this season, Atlanta didn't seem to wake up until the seventh inning and after that, we seem to recall the instances where that also occurred. However, typically, this could not be more from the truth. The Braves might struggle early to get going, but once they get a look at a pitcher and what he is bringing that particular day, Atlanta's chances of producing rightfully improve. The more chances, the better it typically gets until the bullpen gets the call for the opposing squad.
Makes sense, right?
1. Atlanta doesn't make productive outs because of strikeouts.
2. Atlanta seems to fall behind early and has to play catch-up.
I'm not entirely sure where this idea comes from, but I have seen it presented on message boards and on facebook, typically after a loss or even a come-behind win. Sometimes, commentators will add a sense that the players just don't care early, though the idea is rather absurd. Not that a player might not have his head elsewhere for a game, but truly, to believe these guys just don't care all that much whether or not they make an out or get on base is ridiculous.
But hysterics aside, the entire idea being presented is just wrong. Here is a breakdown for Atlanta's run-scoring abilities at different points in the game.
| Innings | Runs Scored |
| 1-3 | 98 |
| 4-6 | 129 |
| 7-9 | 91 |
In addition, the little change between early and late in the game also is added up when you compare the first time the team sees a starter vs. the first time the team sees a reliever. Atlanta does fare slightly better in those situations (.693 OPS vs. 680), but there is not much difference.
I understand that we tend to associate what we think we see with the truth. Maybe for a week this season, Atlanta didn't seem to wake up until the seventh inning and after that, we seem to recall the instances where that also occurred. However, typically, this could not be more from the truth. The Braves might struggle early to get going, but once they get a look at a pitcher and what he is bringing that particular day, Atlanta's chances of producing rightfully improve. The more chances, the better it typically gets until the bullpen gets the call for the opposing squad.
Makes sense, right?
Wednesday, June 26, 2013
Atlanta Braves 2013 Myths: A New Series
I love numbers. I'm not naive to argue that "numbers never lie," but they, when properly used, can often strike down the evils of observational bias and provide some clear thinking based on actual facts. With that, let's start a new series on these myths. Each article in the series might answer one myth or maybe two myths. Did I mention I started a new series? How professional is this shit?
1. Atlanta doesn't make productive outs because of strikeouts.
A lot of the myths about the 2013 Braves stem from their frequency in strikeouts. The league average of all plate appearances ending in a strikeout is 20.1%. Atlanta has five starters above that mark along with often-used subs like Evan Gattis and Jordan Schafer. Atlanta has a whole strikes out 23.6% of the time, led by Dan Uggla's staggering 34.3% of the time. To put that in more expressive terms...
DAN UGGLA STRIKES OUT A THIRD OF THE TIME!!!!!
Holy crap, that's a lot. All those strikeouts must mean a lot of unproductive outs. Right? Well, considering this a "myth" column, I bet you know the answer. Baseball-reference tracks the statistic "Productive Outs" which goes a long way toward providing the evidence of the often talked about strategy. The number basically is found by adding up any of the following situations: Successful sacrifice for a pitcher with one out, advancing any runner with nobody out, or driving in a baserunner with the second out. Currently, the league average is in 32% of the situations, success is found. That runs in striking contrast to the mentality, perpetrated by probably 95% of baseball analysts, that making the productive out is the "easy" thing. To compare the league average, I picked three seasons from Atlanta Braves past (1985, 1995, 2005) to see, briefly, if there was any notable difference in the times. The league average for those three years were 34% success, 34% success, and 32% success in 2005. As the game has changed, the approach has altered, but only slightly. Someone with more time, resources, and a much better internet can do further research and my usage of the Productive Outs statistic is not to say it's a perfect statistic, but it can help to tell a story.
If the league average is 32% this season, and the Atlanta Braves strike out a lot, and Harold Reynolds says that strikeouts are highly unproductive, the Atlanta Braves must be failing tremendously to even be league average. Mediocre. Run-of-the-mill.
Observational bias is inherent and we all suffer from it. It is almost impossible to approach everything in life without it. In arguments with our significant others, we often only recall the things that help our side, ignoring everything else.
But baseball doesn't need to suffer from it with information so readily available. Again, the league average on productive outs is 32%. This number is pretty consistent with the last 18 years based on our sample. Atlanta is slightly below average in productive outs at 31%. However, if we just look at players who receive significant playing time, we come away with the conclusion that Atlanta, at worst, is at least average at the notion of productive outs. The trio of Andrelton Simmons, Dan Uggla, and Justin Uption have been successful in 35% or more of their productive outs opportunities. Freddie Freeman and Evan Gattis are both slightly above league average, Ramiro Pena slightly below. Jason Heyward, Chris Johnson, and B.J. Upton are both well below, especially the older Upton, who has only been successful in 3 of his 18 attempts. The sample size for all players is tremendously low, but it's the closest thing we have to being able to quantify productive outs.
For what it's worth, the 1985 Braves were successful in 31% of their opportunities, the World Series Champion 1995 Braves were successful in an abysmal 30% of their opportunities, and the 2005 Baby Braves were successful in 33% of their opportunities. Further observation seems to point to a small trend. Slap hitters are generally better at the successful productive outs, but that should be expected, though not just for the reason you expect. Mark Lemke was successful in 39% of his chances in 1995, but he was also 7 for 9 in sacrifice bunt attempts.
I hope you learned something. Productive outs are a key staple to the idea of small ball. Atlanta is not built for such a game, but they do an adequate job at successfully capitalizing on productive out opportunities, at least according to their peers.
1. Atlanta doesn't make productive outs because of strikeouts.
A lot of the myths about the 2013 Braves stem from their frequency in strikeouts. The league average of all plate appearances ending in a strikeout is 20.1%. Atlanta has five starters above that mark along with often-used subs like Evan Gattis and Jordan Schafer. Atlanta has a whole strikes out 23.6% of the time, led by Dan Uggla's staggering 34.3% of the time. To put that in more expressive terms...
DAN UGGLA STRIKES OUT A THIRD OF THE TIME!!!!!
Holy crap, that's a lot. All those strikeouts must mean a lot of unproductive outs. Right? Well, considering this a "myth" column, I bet you know the answer. Baseball-reference tracks the statistic "Productive Outs" which goes a long way toward providing the evidence of the often talked about strategy. The number basically is found by adding up any of the following situations: Successful sacrifice for a pitcher with one out, advancing any runner with nobody out, or driving in a baserunner with the second out. Currently, the league average is in 32% of the situations, success is found. That runs in striking contrast to the mentality, perpetrated by probably 95% of baseball analysts, that making the productive out is the "easy" thing. To compare the league average, I picked three seasons from Atlanta Braves past (1985, 1995, 2005) to see, briefly, if there was any notable difference in the times. The league average for those three years were 34% success, 34% success, and 32% success in 2005. As the game has changed, the approach has altered, but only slightly. Someone with more time, resources, and a much better internet can do further research and my usage of the Productive Outs statistic is not to say it's a perfect statistic, but it can help to tell a story.
If the league average is 32% this season, and the Atlanta Braves strike out a lot, and Harold Reynolds says that strikeouts are highly unproductive, the Atlanta Braves must be failing tremendously to even be league average. Mediocre. Run-of-the-mill.
Observational bias is inherent and we all suffer from it. It is almost impossible to approach everything in life without it. In arguments with our significant others, we often only recall the things that help our side, ignoring everything else.
But baseball doesn't need to suffer from it with information so readily available. Again, the league average on productive outs is 32%. This number is pretty consistent with the last 18 years based on our sample. Atlanta is slightly below average in productive outs at 31%. However, if we just look at players who receive significant playing time, we come away with the conclusion that Atlanta, at worst, is at least average at the notion of productive outs. The trio of Andrelton Simmons, Dan Uggla, and Justin Uption have been successful in 35% or more of their productive outs opportunities. Freddie Freeman and Evan Gattis are both slightly above league average, Ramiro Pena slightly below. Jason Heyward, Chris Johnson, and B.J. Upton are both well below, especially the older Upton, who has only been successful in 3 of his 18 attempts. The sample size for all players is tremendously low, but it's the closest thing we have to being able to quantify productive outs.
For what it's worth, the 1985 Braves were successful in 31% of their opportunities, the World Series Champion 1995 Braves were successful in an abysmal 30% of their opportunities, and the 2005 Baby Braves were successful in 33% of their opportunities. Further observation seems to point to a small trend. Slap hitters are generally better at the successful productive outs, but that should be expected, though not just for the reason you expect. Mark Lemke was successful in 39% of his chances in 1995, but he was also 7 for 9 in sacrifice bunt attempts.
I hope you learned something. Productive outs are a key staple to the idea of small ball. Atlanta is not built for such a game, but they do an adequate job at successfully capitalizing on productive out opportunities, at least according to their peers.
Are the Braves just...lucky?
I scour the facebook landscape for the best commentary on the Atlanta Braves. Well, not the best, but the strangest. And in a great many of these wonderful, level-headed exchanges, I, and other crazy bastards like myself, have provided this irrefutable fact. The Atlanta Braves are in first place.
I even looked it up. Yep, the Nats, after beating the Diamondbacks, are 38-38. The Braves, after beating the Royals, are 45-33. According to math, a foreign concept, that comes out to a six game difference. And that six-game cushion is pretty consistent. Sometimes, it trickles down to 4.5 games, sometimes it rises to 7.5 games. But generally, Atlanta has not had to worry too much from their NL East rivals that their division lead was in jeopardy. They took over sole possession of first place on April 7th, or after game number six, and have yet to wake up one sad morning with someone else in first.
But...but...wait...ESPN said, and Harold Reynolds said, and everyone was sure that the Nationals were going to be THE team in the National League East. Surely, the best chance for Atlanta to head back to the playoffs was via the one-game playoff.
Why the continued ownage by the Braves over the NL East? Well, the Marlins are horrible and Jeffrey Loria probably should be publicly flogged. The Mets are just cute. Sometimes, they win. Often, they lose. But they are just so cute the way they try to play baseball even though it seems like its the first time they ever have. Some make the mistake of bringing up the Phillies. I don't know why a team that won 81 games last year (and lost 81), was one of the oldest teams in the league, and simply got older in the offseason was considered a challenger for the NL East crown. Was is Chase Utley's inability to get through a day without a limb falling off? Maybe it was the fact that Ryan Howard appeared in The Office's final season. I don't know why that would help, but on the other hand, I don't know why anyone thought the Phillies were going to turn it around despite no noteworthy pickups.
BUT...the Washington Nationals were going to be the team that ran away with the division. And they still might. It is, after all, late June. However, considering the Nationals have a been a game from .500 (over or under) or right at .500 for six straight games and an astounding 15 of 16 games, I just wonder if they are ever supposed to be the team people assumed they would be. I get it that Bryce Harper has been injured with self-inflicted wounds, but are they off from where they are supposed to be? Gio Gonzalez is reverting back to a pretty good pitcher, but he wasn't the worldbeater he pitched like last year. Tyler Clippard continues to be very lucky, but he's not the fireballer he was last year. And Ross Detwiler is figuring out that if you throw two pitches and pretty much at the same speed, your success is often short-lived. What it boils down to, and why the Nationals, like the Braves, have been shut out a good deal of times is that their offensive players are not performing like they expected.
Unlike Atlanta, however, it's not really that the Nationals are under-performing. They are just reverting back to the mean. Denard Span has been healthy this year for the most part, a stark contrast to recent seasons, but his production is minimal. However, its not because of a huge negative turn in his BABIP or something like that. Basically, he's just not the guy who, in 2009, posted a 10.4 BB%, a .359 wOBA, and a 3.9 WAR (that was muted because of a bad UZR number despite that he is, and remains, a solid defender in center). His walk rate is a little down this year, but not much. His ISO is down from last year, but in line with his 2010-11 numbers. His K-rate is a little up, though not much to believe it's anything more than a mild adjustment. And yes, what concussions have done to his numbers can't be truly stated. However, he's about what you would expect. A strong fielding player with a bat that does not threaten.
Adam LaRoche homered today, his eleventh and his power is considerably down, though he tends to heat up later in the season. His BABIP is also down so he probably will get better. But he went from a 2.2 career-best WAR to 3.4 last season. It should have been expected that he was due for a fallback season. Jayson Werth seems always hurt, though he was very durable from 2009-2011. And while his walk rate is down along with his ISO, even if they revert back closer to his career norms, he doesn't seem capable of getting his Phillies years production back. Though, to be honest, we all know the park had a little something to do with that. He's also became a liability in the field, turning in negative UZR's in three of the last four seasons. Are we to expect the 34 year-old to get better? Really?
Oh, but Ryan Zimmerman was the face of the franchise and he has underperformed? Again...has he? Zimmerman has steadily went from a defensive force to a liability over the last four seasons. He again is terrible and some have flirted the idea of dealing LaRoche, moving Zimmerman across the field, and putting the youngster Anthony Rendon at third. Let's be clear, though. Zimmerman, while he striking out a bit more than usual, is about on target with his recent numbers. He's just so awful in the field that his WAR is getting muted.
But Kurt Suzuki (hasn't been good since 2009)...But Wilson Ramos (can't stay healthy)...But Roger Bernadina (really?)...okay, I grant you that Danny Espinosa has significantly under-performed, but he's always been a stronger defender than a hitter.
So, no, the Braves haven't been lucky that the Washington Nationals have been awful. The Nationals are a good team with a couple of superb ballplayers, a true Big Three in the rotation, and a great closer. However, simply math should have been enough to cause people to wonder if the Nationals were truly the NL's best team entering 2013. In fact, considering how much the Braves have under-performed, that six game cushion is lucky for one team. The Nationals. If Atlanta truly gets rolling, and I believe they will sooner rather than later, the Nationals better hope for some of that 2012 magic if they hope to get to the playoffs.
In the one-game Wild Card playoff, of course.
I even looked it up. Yep, the Nats, after beating the Diamondbacks, are 38-38. The Braves, after beating the Royals, are 45-33. According to math, a foreign concept, that comes out to a six game difference. And that six-game cushion is pretty consistent. Sometimes, it trickles down to 4.5 games, sometimes it rises to 7.5 games. But generally, Atlanta has not had to worry too much from their NL East rivals that their division lead was in jeopardy. They took over sole possession of first place on April 7th, or after game number six, and have yet to wake up one sad morning with someone else in first.
But...but...wait...ESPN said, and Harold Reynolds said, and everyone was sure that the Nationals were going to be THE team in the National League East. Surely, the best chance for Atlanta to head back to the playoffs was via the one-game playoff.
Why the continued ownage by the Braves over the NL East? Well, the Marlins are horrible and Jeffrey Loria probably should be publicly flogged. The Mets are just cute. Sometimes, they win. Often, they lose. But they are just so cute the way they try to play baseball even though it seems like its the first time they ever have. Some make the mistake of bringing up the Phillies. I don't know why a team that won 81 games last year (and lost 81), was one of the oldest teams in the league, and simply got older in the offseason was considered a challenger for the NL East crown. Was is Chase Utley's inability to get through a day without a limb falling off? Maybe it was the fact that Ryan Howard appeared in The Office's final season. I don't know why that would help, but on the other hand, I don't know why anyone thought the Phillies were going to turn it around despite no noteworthy pickups.
BUT...the Washington Nationals were going to be the team that ran away with the division. And they still might. It is, after all, late June. However, considering the Nationals have a been a game from .500 (over or under) or right at .500 for six straight games and an astounding 15 of 16 games, I just wonder if they are ever supposed to be the team people assumed they would be. I get it that Bryce Harper has been injured with self-inflicted wounds, but are they off from where they are supposed to be? Gio Gonzalez is reverting back to a pretty good pitcher, but he wasn't the worldbeater he pitched like last year. Tyler Clippard continues to be very lucky, but he's not the fireballer he was last year. And Ross Detwiler is figuring out that if you throw two pitches and pretty much at the same speed, your success is often short-lived. What it boils down to, and why the Nationals, like the Braves, have been shut out a good deal of times is that their offensive players are not performing like they expected.
Unlike Atlanta, however, it's not really that the Nationals are under-performing. They are just reverting back to the mean. Denard Span has been healthy this year for the most part, a stark contrast to recent seasons, but his production is minimal. However, its not because of a huge negative turn in his BABIP or something like that. Basically, he's just not the guy who, in 2009, posted a 10.4 BB%, a .359 wOBA, and a 3.9 WAR (that was muted because of a bad UZR number despite that he is, and remains, a solid defender in center). His walk rate is a little down this year, but not much. His ISO is down from last year, but in line with his 2010-11 numbers. His K-rate is a little up, though not much to believe it's anything more than a mild adjustment. And yes, what concussions have done to his numbers can't be truly stated. However, he's about what you would expect. A strong fielding player with a bat that does not threaten.
Adam LaRoche homered today, his eleventh and his power is considerably down, though he tends to heat up later in the season. His BABIP is also down so he probably will get better. But he went from a 2.2 career-best WAR to 3.4 last season. It should have been expected that he was due for a fallback season. Jayson Werth seems always hurt, though he was very durable from 2009-2011. And while his walk rate is down along with his ISO, even if they revert back closer to his career norms, he doesn't seem capable of getting his Phillies years production back. Though, to be honest, we all know the park had a little something to do with that. He's also became a liability in the field, turning in negative UZR's in three of the last four seasons. Are we to expect the 34 year-old to get better? Really?
Oh, but Ryan Zimmerman was the face of the franchise and he has underperformed? Again...has he? Zimmerman has steadily went from a defensive force to a liability over the last four seasons. He again is terrible and some have flirted the idea of dealing LaRoche, moving Zimmerman across the field, and putting the youngster Anthony Rendon at third. Let's be clear, though. Zimmerman, while he striking out a bit more than usual, is about on target with his recent numbers. He's just so awful in the field that his WAR is getting muted.
But Kurt Suzuki (hasn't been good since 2009)...But Wilson Ramos (can't stay healthy)...But Roger Bernadina (really?)...okay, I grant you that Danny Espinosa has significantly under-performed, but he's always been a stronger defender than a hitter.
So, no, the Braves haven't been lucky that the Washington Nationals have been awful. The Nationals are a good team with a couple of superb ballplayers, a true Big Three in the rotation, and a great closer. However, simply math should have been enough to cause people to wonder if the Nationals were truly the NL's best team entering 2013. In fact, considering how much the Braves have under-performed, that six game cushion is lucky for one team. The Nationals. If Atlanta truly gets rolling, and I believe they will sooner rather than later, the Nationals better hope for some of that 2012 magic if they hope to get to the playoffs.
In the one-game Wild Card playoff, of course.
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